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INTRODUCTION 
Since the establishment of the Republic of Cuba in 
1898, the country has been politically and economically 
unstable. Partially as a result of these instabilities, 
the social structure has suffered. With the exception of 
the Estrada Palma administration from 1902 to 1906, the 
democratic electoral process has been interrupted by fraud 
ulent elections, dictatorships and revolution. 
The economic structure has been subject to violent 
fluctuations since 1900. Periods of prosperity brought a-
bout by large exports of sugar, have been followed by re-
cession and/or depression which was due to the loss of ex-
port markets. The greatest boom in Cuba was the ttDance 
of the Millions" of 1920 which was followed by a depressi 
~hat was aggravated by the world depression of 1929. This 
economic crisis lasted until the beginning of World War II 
when once again markets became available fmr the export of 
large volumes of· sugar. This stimulated a high level of 
economic activity as the whole Cuban economy revolves aro 
the ability to export sugar. 
The purpose of this thesis is to determine whether 
or not the progress made during 1944-1951, was to create 
a permanent and real stability in Cuba. The free election 
I. 
ix 
of 1944, indicated the development of political constancy 
on a democratic basis. And,. in the economic structure, 
the prosperity that began with increasingly large produc-
tion and exports of sugar indicated that Cuba would have 
the financial resources with which to diversify her produc-
tion and thus create greater economic stability. 
By analyzing and evaluating the political, economic 
and social developments, t.he conclusions have been drawn. 
The basic method of research used was topical. That is, 
to handle separately the developments.in each of the abo 
mentioned sectors. The·main sources have been the librar 
at Harvard University, the Boston Public Library, especia 
the Statistical Division and the research facilities of 
Boston University, College of Liberal.Arts and College of 
Business Administration. I am especially grateful to the 
American Republics Branch of the Department of Commerce 
who supplied me with annual economic reviews of Cuba for 
the years covered in this thesis. 
I am indebted to Dr. Walter Beveraggi-Allende, mem-
ber of the faculty of Boston University in the Department 
of Latin American Regional Studies, who developed my in-
terest in Latin America and directed me in the preparation 
of this report. His wide knowledge and broad understand 
of political and economic problems in Latin .America have 
X 
of great value to me during the preparation of this paper. 
To Dr. Maurice Halperin, Chairman of the Department 
of Latin American Studies, at Boston University, I ames-
pecially grateful for his organizational advise and the 
comprehensive knowledge of social and cultural development 
in Latin America that he has given me during my associatioA 
with him, while undertaking graduate study at Boston 
University. · 
To my sister, Mrs. Oscar L. Larkin, a very special 
gratitude is expressed for her assistance in editing and 
for the long hours that she has spent in typing the first 
and final drafts. 
Lastly, but of prime importance, is the debt of 
gratitude and sincere appreciation I owe to my parents who 
understanding, inspirat~on and financial backing have made 
it possible fur me to study on the graduate level. 

CHAPTER I 
CUBA'S HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Cuban history can be seperated into four hundred 
years of colonial rule by Spain; the period of' indepen-
dence from 1898 to 1925; the Machado dictatorship to 
1933; rule by Fu1gencio Batista until 1944 and the con-
temporar.y scene. 
The purpose of this paper is to show the contem-
porary political, economic and social trends in Cuba. 
1944 seems an.appropriate year in which to begin the 
study of' the contemporary scene for it was then that a 
peaceful democratic election took the·government out of' 
the hands of' Batista, the man who had run Cuba since the 
1933 Revolution. The year 1944 seemed to indicate the 
beginning of' a democratic system in Cuba. The President, 
Gran San Martin, had been popularly elected and the 
economy flourished under expanded productivity. Thus, 
the period starting with 1944 had a favorable beginning. 
Ouba•s economic and political development have 
been greatly affected by its location, climate, topog-
raphy and people. To understand the effect of these 
features and factors on Cuban development, I shall pre-
sent a brief' analysis of' them. This is followed by a 
review of the historical developments in Cuba which are 
.•. 
necessary as a basis for understanding the contemporary 
scene. 
The ~ and the People: 
The island of Cuba is the large~t of all the 
islands of the West Indies. Its 44 1 217 square miles 
comprise umore than half of the land area of the West 
1' Indies. 1' This expanse of territory extends 785 miles 
in an east-west direction and its north-south width 
\ 
varies from 25 'to 120 miles.2 
2 
Cuba's geographical location has been an important 
determinant of her history and the development of her 
economic structure and heli"'~political organization. The 
trad~inds brought Columbus and later the Conquistadores 
to her shores. The Gulf Stream made Cuba the departure 
point on return voyages and expedited the introduction 
of sugar and tobaeeo into the European and North Ameri-
can markets. Because-Cuba is the most northerly of the 
tropical countries, it has become the natural source of 
trppieal products for the industrial north, a circum-
stance which has in a large measure determined her 
economic system.3 
The source of Cuban wealth has been· in her soil. 
uTwo-thirds of Cuba is flat or ·gently undulating.n4 
The remaining one-third is mountainous, but of economic 
3 
value because it produces minerals, cacao and coffee. 
Ot the 28,000,000 acres in Cuba, two-thirds are arable 
and of this 4,809,000 acres·are cultivated.5 Fifty-two 
per cent of the total cultivated land is occupied by 
sugar cane pr~duetion. The richness and levelness of 
the soil combined with a favorable semi-tropical climate 
are the beneficial factors that make for intensive 
sugar production. Rainfall is. sufficient throughout 
the entire island with the western sector receiving more 
than the middle and eastern parts. "One of the most 
notable features of the rainfall is its dependability 
during the _critical agricultural season from May to 
·, ~. 
November."6 This con.tbined with small variations in 
temperature provide for good vegetation. 
Fortunately Cuban soil was not of the eroding type 
due to the expanse of forests on the island. But the 
problem of erosion· has presented itself in modern Cuba. 
At the turn of the century, one-third of Cuba was still 
.. 
forested, but at the end of World War I when the sugar 
. . . 
industry was greatly expanded, deforestation went on 
indiscriminately. ~ny of Cuba's best forests were 
destroyed and places poorly suited to sugar cultivation 
were cleaned for such cultivation. In these areas, soil 
erosion began and the land is now worthless until a 
complete program of reforestation and soil conservation 
.· 4 
is carried out. 7 
The land tenure system'is basically one of con-
centration of vast estates in the hands of a few, mainly 
the sugar companies. In the province of Cama~uey, 
. . . g 
large ranches of grazing lands are the rule. nThe 
degree of concentration of land ownership is most 
clearly revealed by the fact that farms of less than 
twenty-five hectares constitute seventy per cent of all 
farm units, but occupy only eleven per cent of the total 
area, while the S94 farm units with holdings of more 
than one thousand hectares occupy thirty-six per cent 
of the entire farm land.n9 The trend of greater con-
centration of the land seems to have ended with the 
stagnation of the sugar industry in the 1930s and with 
the application of restrictions in the 1940 Constitution. 
The island of Cuba is divided 'into provinces • 
./ 
From West to East they are Piner del Rio, Habana, 
Matanzas, Santa Clara, ~ama~uey and ~iente. These six 
provinces are further divided into a total of 126 
municipios each of which includes a city and a rural 
area, thus resembling the county of the United States. 
10 
The estimated population of Cuba is 5,469,000. 
Of this number, about one~sixth is concentrated in the 
city of Habana, the capital. In general there is a 
. 
trend toward concentration in the cities which will be 
5. 
dealt with more fully in a later chapter. 
The ethnic composition is primarily Negro, Mulatto 
and White. The origina~ Indian population was so dessim.-
ated by the Spanish within a few years Qf discovery, 
that the few remaining were quickly assimilated, leaving 
no trace of their culture. According to the census of 
. 
1943, the ethnic division was seventy-four and four-
tenths per eent white and twenty-five and six-tenths 
per cent colored which includes Negroes; Mulattos, 
Mestizos and Yellow peoples. 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Four ~~dred Years of Spanish ~: 
When Oolwmbus landed on the island of Cuba on 
-October 2S, 1'92, he thought that the western gateway 
to India had finally been found. But Ool~bus was 
wrong. He had discovered instead what was to be the 
ttCrossroads of the Oarribbeantt •. The first settlements 
in Cuba came about in 1511 through the efforts of 
,. 
Diego Velasquez. These settlements flourished for a 
short while but ttsince the primary interest- of the 
. 
Spanish conquerors was to obtain gold rather than set-
tling the land, attention shifted sharply away from 
Ouba • ttll 
With no precious minerals available for exploita-
tion~ the settlers in Cuba turned to raising cattle. 
By the end of the sixteenth century, sugar cane became 
a substitute crop for livestock. But, it was not until 
the end of the eighteenth century that sugar production 
was greatly expanded. In the interim sugar cane pro• 
duction was impeded because of the scarcity of slaves, 
the limited market and _the tremendous cost of importing 
machinery from Seville, the only Spanish port open to 
-
6 
Ouban trade. This cost was exceedingly high because the 
merchants in Spain had to buy the equipment from Portugal 
and then resell it in Cuba. The many middlements profits 
added to the cost. Slaves were also expensive as a 
monopoly existed on their importatiqn.12 By the late 
1700s, steam mills, freer availability &f slaves and 
more liberal trade concessions allowed for·an expansion 
of sugar production. The boom and bust crop was begin-
ning to entrench itself into the economic and social 
systems of Cuba. 
The first three hundred years of Spanish rule in 
.. 
Cuba were completely absolutist and centralist. All 
policies as carried out by the various governor-generals 
appointed by the crown were to collect revenues and to 
send them on to Spain. All functions of government were 
in the hands of the governor-general including the 
administration of local units. 
With this much power concentrated in one man, 
responsible only to the Xing of Spain, each and every 
governor saw the opportunity for quick wealth. Re-
placements of governor-generals came often, for a new 
governor-general was appointed whenever misdoings were 
suspected. But the 6 residenciadorft after having found 
out the methods and systems of peculation which the 
former governor had carried on, instead of remedying 
the evils, simply used the information for his benefit. 
adopting most likely such improvements in his own way 
of stealing and of iinposing on the people as were sug-
gested to him by the knowledge which he had acquired 
from. the experience of others.13 
Mercantilism thrived in Cuba. Economic activity 
was restricted to production of goods which did not 
compete with Spanis~ production. ~1 imports came from 
Spain and all exports went to Spain. This system was 
. . 
continually being interfered with by the English and 
French. As early as 1536, the first French Corsair had 
. 14 
made its appearance in the waters of Habana. 
7 
Because Cuba was considered the main artery of ~he 
Spanish Empire in America, the island was turned into an 
armed fortress in the late 1500s and continually through~ 
out the 1600s. During all of this time British and 
French pirates and official armed forces were persistent 
in their attempts to conquer the island. "During the 
whole of the Seventeenth Century contraband and p±racy 
reigned supreme. and with almost absolute impunity; but 
the various governors who succeeded each other at the 
beginning ot the Eighteenth Century erected stronger 
fortifications and finally routed the Corsairs and 
exterminated piracy • .,;1.5 
•.. 
But the islandts fortresses had not been built 
8 
strong enough. In 1762, ·the English stormed ~bana 
which tell on the 13th ot August that· year. The English 
-held the island tor eleven months with occupation ending 
July 18, 1763. The presence ot the English on the island 
even for this short time was.very important in the 
islandts development. For the first time, Ouban trade 
became relatively tree and productivity was greatly 
enhanced. nThe presence of the British for a year in 
Cuba imparted energy to the commerce of the island, and 
the labor of black slaves began to be productive of 
sugar.nl6 British influence on the island had a lasting 
effect. The people became aware of liberal philosophies. 
They followed with interest the revolutions of 
the North Americans and the French at the close of the 
Eighteenth Century. But when in the early 1800s the 
rest of the Spanish colonies won their independence by 
revolt, the people of Ouba were apprehensive about 
9 
severing their ties with Spain. 
T.he reasons for this were numerous. Firstly, the 
Oubans were fearful of the Negro slaves rising against 
them in case of emanieipation from Spain. ffAccording 
to the census of 1817, for example, in a total of 
688,000 inhabitants, there were 250,000 slaves and more 
than 115,000 free colored persons• Taken together they 
represented more than half of the population.nl7 The 
people were afraid of a·situation resembling that of 
Haiti in the 1790s where the Negroes rose against their 
white m~sters and massacred them by the thousands. 
Another factor was that Cuba had been treated quite 
liberally by Spain since the British occupation. In 
1801 Cuba was opened to world commerce; this lasted 
only eight years. nin 1818 the bars were again somewhat 
lifted, though heavy export and ~port taxes were imposed; 
numerous discriminations favored Spain.••lg Also the 
. . 
Cuban island was strongly fortified which meant the 
Spanish Navy could prevent any out~ide assistanae. 
One of the effects of the revolutionary wave in 
Latin America was the formation of secret societies by 
Cuban sympathizers. These groups were very much per-
secuted, but this factor stimulated their cause. The 
causes for revolt kept growing. Some of the worst 
features of colonialism were breught back. The 
10 
governor-generals became notoriously unscrupulous. The 
most famous of these is General Miguel Tacon (1834-38). 
His cruel and reactionary rule greatly increased the 
odium for Spain. 
By 1848, the spirit of revolt had grown to a 
degree where a revolt was attempted under the leadership 
Of Narciso Lopez whose Uplan from the first had always 
been independence and then annexation to the United 
States.1'19 The first att.e.m_pt by Lo'f,ez failed ·for the 
promised aid of' arms and ammunit~on from the Southern 
States of' the United States did not arrive due to the 
' 
vigilance of' both American and Spanish authorities. In 
. I 
the lat~ Spring of' 1850, Lopez set sail from the United 
States with six hundred men, mostly Americans and suc-
cessfully effected a landing at Cardenas, east of 
.. 
Materzas. Although he met with success on his landing, 
the people did not offer him any support. n • •• annex-
.. 
ation to the United States did not constitute so strong 
an appeal to Cuban patriotism.as would a cry for that 
-
independence which even the Creole followers of' L~pez 
were not ready to espouse.ff20 This lack of popuiar 
support and the arrival of the Spanish army caused Lopez 
and his forces to free and return to the United States. 
A second landing was attempted in August 1851, 
with four hundred men, mostly Americans. t'Dividing his 
.· .... 
11 
/' 
rorees, Lopez began a fruitless and pitiful search for 
the expected, but ?on-existent Cuban supporters. One 
portion of his command under Colonel William s. Crittenden 
was captured and taken to Habana. • • • Lopez himself' 
met with one discouragement after another and was taken 
prisoner, along with other survivors of the expedition.•21 
" The defeat of Lopez did not kill the desire ror 
.. 
independence. By 1868, the increased taxes and oppres-
sion had grown to such extremes that on October lOth, on 
Yara plantation in Oriente a group of men declared the 
independence of Cuba. A provisional government for a 
Republic or Cuba was formed with the Presidency held by 
/ Carlos Manuel de Cespedes. The important feature behind 
this movement was popular support which gave it the force 
to continue for ten years. When independence was pro-
claimed the forces totaled 147 men. ffB~t the Army 
literallY,. grew overnight, and amounted to 26~000 by the 
22 
close of 1868. '' 
Guerilla warfare was the general method of success. 
The charae~er of the war was ruthless with both sides 
burning and pilfering. The military leader of the Cuban 
. / ,/. 
revolutionaries was Maximo Gomez. By 1875 he had to 
his credit a number of brilliant victories over the 
Spanish forces who were better equipped and trained. 
At Puerto Principe in 1875, the Cuban forces were 
·-
decidedly defeated but the war did not end. It lasted 
for three more years at which time, through the con-
ciliatory policy of the new captain-general~ Martinez 
Campos, the Cuban leaders were persuaded to lay down 
their arms. The treaty of ~anjon made peace, with 
"Spain promising a political amnesty, the emaneipation 
of the slaves who had fought in the Cuban cause, and 
various governm.ent~l reforms. ",23 
·~ 
This peace treaty, signed in 1878, was merely a 
12 
truce. Continual outbursts by Cuban independists occurre 
The promises of the Spanish were never carried out. The 
oppressive methods of the past four hundred years were 
put into full force again. By 1895, most Cubans were 
prepared to answer the cry of "Cuba 1'-bre''. 
The revolution of 1895 was organized in the United 
States. It was there that Mart{ and Estrada Palma laid 
the groundwork. Whe!l. __ t.t:t_:_ revolution ~e:~a~Jl+n Feb~uary 
1895, the people suppa~ted it. Many who until that time 
• • - - • ' ••; .• c. '-~. ·~ .•. 
were still loyal to Spain turned ~o the cause ot inde-
pendence once Weyler' s reeonoentration policy beeame 
... 
effective. Wayler was the Spanish general who, to avoid 
guerilla warfare, for which he was not prepared, tried 
to garrison all the rural people in cities or stockades. 
Penalty for movement was death or forfeiture of prope~ty. 
-----
13 
Militarily the Spanish were poor thinkers. They 
thought that trench righting could contain the insurgents. 
/ But at will, Gomez and Maceo broke through the Spanish 
lines. This was necessary to take the revolution to the 
whole island and not keep it just in the province· of 
Oriente where it started. 
The native Cubans were being quite successful, 
but-they owe to the United St~tes thanks for helping 
them to bring the war to a quick close. The reasons 
the United States entered the war are too complex to 
deal with here. It will suffice to say that the close 
proximity of Cuba to the United States and the emotional 
propaganda set forth by the United States press were 
sufficient cause at that time. Within six months after 
the explosion of the battleship 1~aineu in the Habana 
- . 
harbor -- the immediate cause of the Spanish-American 
-
War -- the Cuban people ha.d gained their independence 
from Spain. 
Although independent from Spain, the Cubans 
actually w~e not free. The United States occupied Cuba 
until 1902. 
United States Occupation: 
The Cuban people had fought long and hard during 
the Nineteenth Century, but they were not to know self-
' . 
14 
rule until 1902. The.United States took upon itself the 
establishment of a democratic government in the Anglo-
Saxon style to suit the temperament and habits of a 
Latin people;4 ~ 
The first problem met by the military government 
under General Brooks was disbanding of the Cuban army 
which in general felt bitter toward the United ?tates 
. . 
for snatching the recognition of victory due them. After 
~ 
much haggling and diplomacy, Maximo Gomez, the army 
5 leader, agreed to dispersement upon payment of $3,000,000. 
With this problem disposed of, General Brooks turned to 
cleaning, nursing and helping the population. ffHe began 
reconstruction of governmental machiner~, set the 
custom-house in working order, put new excise taxes on 
26 liquor and laid the foundations for popular educat1on. 11 
This was a beneficial start, but when General 
Leonard Wood took over Brookst position the work of re-
construction became very active. 
In general, Woodts job of preparing the island 
for self-government was commendable. One of his first 
taskswas cleaning up Habana and the country. This was 
done with the eradication of Yellow Fever, the dread 
disease that took an uncountable number of lives during 
the War for Independeno~. For the systematic sanitation 
facilities, Wood had Major Vargas to thank. The work of 
' . 
---r 
15 
er~dicat~ng Yellow Fever was done by the famous Doctors 
Reed, Lozear, Carrol and Agramonte. 
In the field of education, Wood through Lt. ~t 
Hanna set ~ a centralized school system to organize und 
a severe school code the many schools that had popped up 
since 1S98. ttrrnder Spain enrollment in the schools had 
been 36,306 (only 21,435. in 1899) with an attendance of 
little over 15,000. In ~une 1900, enrollment totalled 
143,120.n27 School management was taken out of local 
politics and became a function of the general government. 
Teachers were Cubans; they were the ones to train as it 
would be their responsibility when the occupation was 
ended. The cost- of centralization was high, but con-
sidering the expense of new schools, texts and training, 
much was accomplished with the funds. 
Another area of reform was in the administration 
of justice. In the department of justice the basic law 
remained Cuban. Wood, however, established a judicial 
heirarohy: a Supreme ·Court, six Provincial Superior· 
. 
Courts, and Municipal Criminal and Civil Courts. In 
place of a fee, judges were paid annual salaries to 
lessen the occasion for graft. Wood also introduced the 
right of Habeas corpus and providing lawyers for the poor. 
2S Prison r.eform also was a major accomplishment. 
16 
Wood's administration was plagued by an economic 
recession. Cuba's sugar fields and sugar mills had been 
destroyed by gueri1la warfare. To add to this, the 
world ma-rket price of ,sugar was extremely low. Some 
circles believe that agriculture, industry and commerce 
were given too little :finana;al assistance, and education, 
justice and sanitation too much. 
~tTo allay a growing Ouban suspicion that the United 
States weald not fUlfill her pl~dge, as early as April 
1900, General Wood decreed a law of election.u29 The 
law provided for only male suffrage and limited it to thos 
who could read and write or owned property ya~ued at 
$250, or were veterans or the Cuban army. 
On September 15, 1900 under a Wood decree, thirty-
one delegates, apportioned among the provinces according 
to population, were elected to frame and adopt a consti-
tution and to arrange as part of it, the relation to 
. exist between the United States and Ouba. Within six 
days a constitution was drawn. United States officials 
. . 
considered it, suitable except that it overlooked the 
matter of Unit.ed Btates-Ouban relations. This was 
finally accomplished by the inclusion of the Platt 
Amendment which gave the United States the right to 
-
intervene to prevent instability on the lsland and the 
right to maintain Naval bases. Ouba also bound herself 
17 
not to incur debts inconsistent with her ~evenues 'and· 
to continue ~ulfil~ent o~ the plans ~or sanitation. 
Naturally the Cubans ac.cepted this Amendment unwillingly.· 
The forcing of the Piatt Amendment on th~ Cubans was to 
embitter them in their attitude toward the United States 
for many years. Even today it seems as though that 
bitterness has not been co~letely abrogated even though 
the amendment has not been in effect for eighteen years. 
By December 190& the muttering against the Platt 
Amendment had died down and a P~esidential and Congres-
sional election were held. Estrada Palma became the 
first President of Ouba in what can be termed an 
unanimous election. By May 20, 1902, the functions of 
the United States occupation were compl~te and they 
left Ouba in the hands of her first President. 
Independence ~ 1902 1Q ~: 
The Estrada Palma ad~nistration has been termed 
by Chapman 11Best years of the Republictt •30 Never before, 
never since has Cuba been managed so honestly, efficient 
and economically~ Estrada Palma is probably the only 
Ouban President to leave the office penniless. 
In financial affairs the keynote was economy. 
~aving found a surplus of less than a million in the 
treasury, within four years he managed to store up twenty-
... 
constructe.d more kilometers of roads than had the 
Americans.~3l The ability to build up such a surplus 
was aided greatly by the economic boom which developed 
in the sugar industry. Also, by law tariffs were in-
creased from fifteen per cent maximum to thirty per cent 
maximum and were collected at the maximum even though 
expenditures did not requi-re it .• 
The political tinanini.ity by which Estrada Palma 
. . 
was elected was short-lived. By 1904 the political force 
had divided into two parties, Liberal and Conservative. 
Estrada Palma ·j9ined with the Conservative el~ment and 
1 
1 1 i 
built his Cabinet from their ranks. 
With the electoral machinery at the Conservative 
Party~s disposal, they made. positive arrangements whereby. 
they would be successful ~n the Presidential elections 
of 1906. The fraudulent methods reported by the Con-
servative Party irritated the Liberals to initiate a 
revolution which brought in United States troops on the 
-
request of the President who resigned. 
For three years, 1906 to 1909, Cuba was administ 
by the United States through Charles Edward Magoon. It 
seems that Magoonts inexperience in the ways of Latin 
Ame~ica caused him to make mistakes that have affected 
the future of development of Cuba. He thought that the 
most favorable way to curb ~he revolution was to offer 
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the Liberals government jobs and contracts. Thus Magoon 
re-introduced into Cuban life one o:f the worst :features 
o:f the Spanish colonial system. The creation o:f an 
army which was to be an economic drain on the Treasury 
in :future years was also a Magoon error. Ouba certainly 
did not need the Army for international protection :for 
through the Platt Amendment, Cuba was protected by the 
United States. Thus, the Cuban Army was to play a role 
in domestic affairs. Whoever was able to control the 
army was to be able to control the government. In all 
future administrations the expenditures :for the army 
were increased. 
When ~goon le:ft Ouba, he le:ft the government in 
.-" 
the hands of the Liberal Party candidate, Jose Miguel 
G6mez who had been elect~d to the Presidency with the 
apparent endorsement of the United .States. To retain 
/ ' . 
popular support Gomez re:.introduced 'into Ouban society 
a national lottery and cock fighting; two remnants of 
Spanish rule. Throughout all o:f the Gomez regime graft, 
corruption, use of violence, and mild dictatorship were 
avidly practiced. Deals, large and small, were to allow 
" Gomez to leave the Presidency with eight or more million 
dollars. Despite all, the peoplets attitude toward G6mez 
was one of admiration. 
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With a relatively fair and free election in 
1912 the Conservatives came to power with General Mario 
Garc{a Menoeal as President. He was to remain in power 
until 1921 with his second term being made possible 
through intervention of the United States in 1917 when 
the Liberals revolted because they thought the election 
fraudulent. The United States looked upon the revolu-
tion as lawless and unconstitutional. With a war pending 
--in Europe and sngar cane and its p~oduots vitally needed 
in the United States, disorganization in Cuba was im-
possible. n • •• the American attitude made the Liberal 
defeat inevitable ••• n 32 By selling Menocal ten 
thousand rifles and five million rounds of ammunition, 
the United States guaranteed his re-election. 
During Menocal•s sec&nd terin, Cuban economy 
prospered· due to the rise of the world sugar price. 
Cuban trade expanded to over a billion dollars with 
the United States. Despite a war prosperity, govern-
mental activity degenerated. MDney was spent foolishly: 
costs were high. ~complishment was nil. MOst critics 
agree that Menooal was not an active grafter but allowed 
those around him to do as they wished. .When Menocal 
left office, the '~·dance of the .millions" was over and 
Cuba was in the midst of a severe recession. 
The successor to Menocal was Alfredo Zayas, now 
a product of a Conservative and dissident Liberal 
coalition. The Liberals protested his election as 
fraud and appealed to the United States to intervene. 
Intervention was not forthcoming but the United States 
government sent General Enoch Crowder to investigate. 
Under his direction Zayas' election was attested. 
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Crowder remained in Ouba to help Zayas put its 
financial house in order. Reorganization of the finan-
cial department of Ouba was necessary under the Platt 
Amendment if Cuba was to obtain the large loan she 
wanted in the United States •. The bankrupt condition of 
the Cuban Treasury forced Zayas to accept all of the 
recommendations that Crowder made. By 1923, ·Crowder's 
position was changed to Ambassador which meant his 
meddling in Ouban affairs was over. Zayas dismissed 
'' 
the Crowder Cabinet and appointed his political partners. 
~ith Crowd&r out of the way and with friends and relatives 
in power • the Zayas administ-ration had the t'liberty to 
loot 11 • .And thus it did, especially in the six months 
between the election of ~chado and his inauguration. 
Zayas in the pre-election period supported the 
Liberal candidate, General Gerardo ~chado y Morales, 
although he had been nominated by a so called flPopular 
Party•. It is not surprising that Machado came to power. 
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As the Liberal candidate he had popular support and 
governmental s~port which indirectly meant the United 
States support, for the United States Government gave 
Zayas its support by supplying it with war materials to 
discourage revolution.. Would Machado give Cuba an honest 
-. 
regime? That was the question. 
The Machado Dictatorship .=. ill2, to llli,: 
The groundwork laid from 1909 to 1921 was the 
backbone of the ~chado regime. The Cuban populace 
became accustomed to the importance of an army, to the 
many occurrences of graft and corruption and to the in-
f'luence exerted by the United States. 
Domestically Nachado was able to stay in power 
because he had the army with him. In addition to this 
source of strength, he formed a secret police, many of' 
whom were criminals released through amnesty. Besides 
these two forces, he also had a well-organized terrorist 
gang. 
Economically Machado was kept going by loans rrom 
banks in the United States. By June 30, 1933, six weeks 
before ~ohado•s flight, the Cuban debt amounted to 
6 3~ tJ~>244,500,000. The fact that loans were made by United 
States banks to Machado is evidence enough of United 
States support, for according to the Platt Amendment, 
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permission from the United States Department of State 
was necessary and was obtained. As the brutalities and 
oppressions of the Machado regime increased, the United 
States t~ough President Herbert Hoover insisted on a 
"hands off policytt. This is one incident where the Platt 
Amendment, since it did exist as an integral part of 
United States Cuban policy, should have been used to 
relieve the people from the despotism and tyranny of 
Machado. 
As economic conditions grew worse due to the World 
.. 
depression in 1929, the President through decree increas 
taxes and decreed new taxes on food and all sales. With 
decreased wages to the depression and high taxes on 
necessities of life, the majority of the Ouban people 
became destitute. 
Machado administered completely through martial· 
law. All forms of opposition were blocked. The Univer-
sity of Rabana, high schools and nor.mal schools were 
closed as from such places much opposition emanated. The 
brutalities, open and secret, resorted to, could today 
be matched with almost any that have gone on under the 
recent dictatorships of Hitler and Mussolini. It appears 
that with a weak economic system and a greater insecurity 
in himself, and a greater restlessness among the people, 
~chadots methods became more and more oppressive. 
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By 1933, an efficient underground movement, known 
as the ABC, had developed. They were well organized. 
When Ambassador Sumner Welles, the Roosevelt appointee, 
came to Cuba in May 1933, h~ realized the plight of the 
Cuban people and knew that it had to be relieved. He 
also knew that he had to prevent United States interven-
tion, a policy which was soon to be given up at the 
Montevideo International Conference of American States. 
. . ' . 
Welles• attempts to effect a compromise with ~chado 
failed. But by dUly 1933, the people themselves forced 
Machado to resign, first by precipitating a general 
strike that paralyzed everything on the island and then 
the Cuban Army revolted for they realized that interven-
tion was imminent. Machado knew his powers were gone 
and fled the country. Within three months after his 
arrival~. Welles had persuaded Machado to resign. It is 
apparent that the Cuban people worked hand in hand with 
the United States in this event. 
The country politically, economically and socially 
disorganized had to be rebuilt. This time the United 
States was unable to help for the Platt Amendment was 
abrogated. But there emerged on the Cuban scene a man 
who had the organizational ability to accomplish the 
task. To him we now turn. 
CHAPTER II 
.. '" 
THE POLITICAL SCENE: 1933 TO 1951 
The Batista Years :; 1933-1944: 
As an alternative to armed intervention, implicitly 
repudiated by the Good Neighbor Policy which had been, 
ado~ted in the early months of 1933, United States 
Ainbassador Sumner Welles offered to mediate the acute 
conflict between the Government and the opposition. His 
services were offered, not as an official 0f the United 
States government, but as an individual with no diplo-
matic or political ties, and as such were accepted.34 
The meetings of' mediation were attended by the 
v9,rious <!>pposition groups, the ABC {the main terrorist 
underground movement), the OCRR, the Union Nacionalista, 
and the Marianistas. The only two groups remain~ng 
aloof to the mediation were the Conservative fellowers 
0f ex-President Marie Menocal and the University 
Student Directorate who were ce-leaders with the .AEC 
in the anti-Machado movement. Thus we have the first 
indication that the groups who had a common purpose and 
had been loosely connected were beginning to disunite _ 
35 
and impede the completion of their goal. 
By early August, Machado was· forced into taking 
a "permanent leave ef absence""pecause of a c~isis 
. ; ~ ... 
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precipitated by a general strike, application of diplo~ 
matic pressure and the less of the support of Liberal 
and Conservative leaders. All of these; combined with 
the less of the most efficacious support of the army, 
brought Machade's regime to an end • 
. 
The_government then was placed in contrel of 
Carles Manuel de C(spedes who included in his Cabinet 
men frq~ the ABC, Unitn Nacionalista; Marianista and 
the OCRR. Again the Menocal Conservatives and the 
University Studente Directorate remained out. 
The popular reaction to this new coalition was 
apprehensive. It was called a nmade in USA government" 
because of Sumner Welles' intervention. iecause its 
legality was based on the 1928 Machado Constitution, it 
/ 
was unpopular. When Cespedes abandoned the 1928 Con~ 
stitution to return to the 1901 don~titution, he lost 
the suppert of' the ABC who t~ought ~t outmoded. 36 With 
the less of' the ABC support and with 0ppositi0n f'rem 
the University Studente Directorate, the government was 
in a very weak position and was overthrown on 
September 4, 1933, by an army revolution led by 
Sergeant Fulgencie Batista and supperted by the University 
Studente Direct·orate. Thus, "the army; the bulwark ef 
., 
law and order,·· had fallen into the hands of an unkown 
'' 
group of' sergeants. The civil government was contrelled 
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by a gr~up of 'reveluti0naryt intellectuals backed pri-
marily by Univ~rsity student~.n37 
~he government was nGw under the Presidency of 
/ . / Ramon qrau San Martin and backed by the ~atista-led army. 
This greup received .. no ether political backing, but was 
popularly endorsed because ef a natienalistic and strong 
pre-labor attitude. Due to varieus circumstances 
(1) the alienation of Ambassador Welles; (2) the cen-
t~nuatien ef terrorism; (3) the disselutien of the 
University Studente Directerate and epen criticism frem 
them for leaning en the army to0 much; and (It) the nen-
recegnitien by the United States, President Grau resigned 
three mG>nths after his inauguratien. 
/ 
To replace Grau San Martin, :Batista selecte<il 
/ 
another physician, Carlos Mendieta y Mentifur who had 
the support of i?~e army, the United States and the- ABC. 
But Mendieta, to.o, was still plague9- by labor. -un;rest, 
terrorism and student agitat?-on. To cope· with these 
problems, Mendieta allowed the army to do as,it wished, 
declared a state of sie~e and placed Hab.atia• 1Upder martial 
law.38 By December 1935, the popular feelings against 
him, forced Mendieta to resign. On January 10, 1936, 
a national election in which women participated for the 
first time was held to determine his successor. The 
successful candidate of this election proved to be 
.' ., 
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/ Miguel Mariano Gomez who was backed by the Nationalists, 
Republicans and Liberals, and also by Batista which 
#! 
meant the Army's support. Gomez's opponent was 
General Menocal of the Natiohal Democratic Party.39 
After 1936, Cuba was living o~ly under a demo-
crati.c facade. The power of Batista was continually 
growing, "gradually extending his control over civilian 
as well a~ military matters~ n40 His power was of such 
strengt~ t~at when President-G~me~ failed to sign a 
bill raising revenue for an army-controlled school sy~em, 
'1/' 
Batista had his henchmen in Congress impeach and remo~e 
·him. 
By the time of' the Congressional elections .of 
·~· 1938, the Batista: power was o.pposed by Gomez, Menocal, 
. , 
and Grau San Martin who refused to constitutionalize 
the election and forbade their followers to go to the 
polls. "And their attitude made necessary several 
postponments, of the· projected election for an assembly 
to ~evise the 'constitution~ n.41 · When in November 1939, 
. ., 
the elections were held, and all political parties took 
part, the 1~inal result wa~ an opposition majority in 
the Assembly. But, soon after the Aseembly met, the 
Menocal delegates switched to Bat·ista, giving him control. 
In the President'ial elections of June 1940, 
Batista supported by Liberal, Democrat, ABC, Popular 
.. 
• . (1, ~·. 
• ..
.. ·.·• 
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/' ' 
S:qcialist parties defeated Grau San Martin, the candidate 
of the Cuban Revolutionary Party. In this election 
Batista was given titular control to complement his 
armed political control. 
Shortly after becoming President the world crisis 
became acute and despite attempts at neutrality, Cuba 
was economically affected. Sugar prices soared. Lack 
ot snipping facilities caused widespread unemployment. 
Shortages and inflation added to the difficulties. All 
of this plus the "government's habitual disregard of 
constitutional guarantees" and-widespread graft were 
responsible for a steady decline in Batista's popularity. 
By June 1944, the continued growth of Batista's unpop-
ularity coupled with an election that has been termed 
"the most honest in Cuban politiesu~ made for Batista's 
. -
defeat by the leader of the Cuban Revolutionary Party. 
Pre-Election Politics = Introduction: 
When in 1943, Batista made it clear that he had 
no intention ot returning himself to the Presidential 
office iri the June 1944 elections, the nation's politi-
cal leaders hegan to prepare for the campaign. Since 
the fall of Machado, many small parties arose which 
could not hope to win an elect-ion alone. Because of 
this, two coalitions were formed. One was the Democratic 
.. 
.. 
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Socialist Coalition and the other the 1tepublican Authen- ., 
tic Alliance. 
The Parties .sm,g Politics of ~ Q§Q: 
. . . ' / 
The Coalicion Socialista Democratica {CSD) was 
composed of the Liberal, Democr~t, ABC; and Popular 
• 42 Socialist part~es. It was the coalition that backed 
Batista's nomination in 1940 and was controlled by him 
during the 1944 Presidential campaign. 
The Liberal Party was the largest member of the 
CSD having a total party affiliation of 590,685 members.43 
The Liberal Party was the "oldtime party" that had 
dominated Cuban politics since the establishment of the 
Republic, but had lost its prestige because Machado was 
a member of its ranks.44 Alt9ough its title would seem 
to indicate a partywith progressive principles, in 
actuality, it was more a party of conservative .status 
quo. Despite the fact that the Liberal Party·· was the 
largest· of the CSD, its political strength was .substan-
tially weakened by diversified factions.45 "The main 
• 
st;:'re!J-gth of the party is in its excellent provincial 
organization and it is .fair to say that the party stresses 
. . . 
loyalty and organization more than program or issues. In 
philosophy and program it is conservative to moderate 
depending on specific problems and issues. Financial 
rectitude, administrative c 
l ,. 
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and preperty and modest concessions to welfai'e demands, 
express, in general, the positive characteristics of the 
Liberal program. Negatively, of course, it is associated 
n46 
• • with the terrible excesses of Machado •• 
The second largest member of the CSD was the 
Democratic Party whose total affiliations for the election 
i944 numbere.d: 581,450.47 ':fhe Democratic Party like the 
Liberal Party stems from conservative sources. Whereas 
the Liberal Party is well-organized,. the Democ:r:atic _Party. 
is not. Its whole history seems to be an attempt to 
strengthen into a unified party the diverse groups that 
support it. At the Democratic Party national assembly 
of September 26, 1941, Dr. Gustavo ~~vo Rubio explained 
their general planks as the logical progress of our 
.. 
society, the firm development of our economy, security 
for private property, the advancement of education and 
culture, and the maintaining of a democratic political 
r~gime.48 
The other two members of the CSD were the ABC 
and the fop~ Social~st Party, actually Cuba's Communist 
party. Before the elections of 1944, it was known as 
the Communist Revolutionary Union Party. The name was 
changed during· the campaign period because of the . 
unfavorable stigma attached to the teriJl., communist. 
49 
·At the time of the 194-4 election the Fopular 
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Socialist Party was··the best organized and the best dis-
ciplined party in Cuba. They controlled the principal 
labor syndicates and decisively,.inf'luenced various cul-
tural and relief' organiza.ti·ons not directly. connected 
. 
with Communism.50 The total party affiliation for the 
1944 election was 146,050 although of' this number only 
35;·000 were considered "re.llable members".5l 
The ABC Party wh~· contributed 106:982 members52 
to the CSD can be classified as a liberal group. This 
. "' 
party was created in the early 1930s to ~ight the terror-
ism of Machado. At that time its orientati.on was revolu-
tionary but it had moderated its position. ·~en Batista 
became the powerful political figure,. they supported 
. . . ' 
him for a while, went against him, and again ~upported 
him in 1940, gaining two "c·abinet posit ions for·, their 
support. In actuality during the 1944 Presidential 
campaign, the party did not exert any great e.ff'ect on 
. 1 l"f 53 nat~ona ~ e. 
The partles· that constituted the CSD coalition 
e~~asize one of the basic failures of Cuban politics. 
The CSD, consisting of' two conservative parties, the 
middle-of-the-road party, and one extreme leftist party, 
is an example of political parties grouping together 
• for politi'Cal profit rather than the promulgation .. of 
a set of principles and an ideology common to all in 
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the coalition. This association for political profit 
was a factor that influenced the workings of the coali~ 
tion from its conception to its end. 
From its formation for the Presidential election 
of 1944, the CSD was faced with the possibility of rup-
ture. The political maneuvering of the Liberal and 
Democratic Parties to obtain for each Party the nomina-
tion of President was the issue of greatest concern. 
Within the Liberal Farty there were several 
variations of opinion. One group led by Dr. Nunez 
Portuondo insisted that the Liberal Farty have one of 
its members nominated as President even if it were not 
endorsed by the CSD.54 This group believed that because 
the Liberal Party had the largest number of affiliations, 
they automatically should control the nomination for 
President. The thesis of this group was "power for the 
Liberal Party," {el poder para il partido,Liberal)55 now 
-that Batista was retiring from the political scene. 
Another group within the Liberal Party was. con,.. 
vinced that only by joining the CSD could the Liberal 
Farty have any voice in the administration of the govern-
ment.56 This group was led by Guas Incl;n and Marquez 
Sterling both of whom aspired to the Presidential 
nomination. 
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When the National Assembly of the Liberal Party 
held its convention in ]'ebruary 1944, the battle for 
control by these two sectors was won by the group led 
by Guas Inclan and Mclrquez Sterling, the Cooperativists. 
With control resting with this group, it became a matter 
of bargaining with the now well-organized Vemocratie 
Party which was directed by Batista •. · (The iJemocratie 
.. 
Party had split in 1942-43.) 
Because the Liberal Party was divid~ into two 
factions, the Democratic Party through Batista was able 
to capture the Presidential nomination for Dr. Carlos 
Saladrigas by preventing the merger of the political 
strength of the Liberal Party. Thus the attempts of 
the Liberal Party to gain the nomination were frustrated 
by diversive factions and the political acumen of the 
Democratic Party. 
To placate the Liberal Party, the Vice-Presiden-
tial nomination was given to them. But, again the 
candidate was handpicked by Batista who selected his 
........ - ,.. 
former Prime Minister, Ramon ~aydin. Although he was 
,. 
a Liberal, Zaydin was known to be a product of the 
Batista machine. 
In the other compromises made, the Liberal Party 
fared better. In allotting the Provincial Governors' 
nominations, they received all six. Of the thirty-six 
., 
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·.. Senate. seats, they were given. eighteen nominations with 
'• I 1 
:the J?emocratic P~y retaining twelve, the ABC four, 
.~;and the Popular Sociali~t·s two. Of the 126 municipalities 
, the Liberals ·were allo~t~.d .fifty-five per cent, the re-
. ~, 
·tnainder being divided amop.g the other members of the 
•,' • t I• 
. coalition. 57 .. 
;; 
After the allotment of nominations was made, a 
new crisis arose in the CSD when the Popular S.ocialist 
·Party threatened to withdraw because it had been given 
half as many Senate nominations as the ABC Party which 
.had less affiliated members. The Communists (Popular 
·Sociglists) threatened to run their own candidates, 
especially in Habana. Because the Popular Socialists 
had 150,000 registered with their party and could at-
tract fifty to one hundred thousand more at the polls, 
the balance of power in many districts was with them. 
The CSD realizing their need of these votes convinced 
the Liberal Party to cede one Senate nomination to the 
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Popular ~ocialists. 
This factor serves to illustrate two things: {1) 
the political bargaining and artifice that was necessary 
to hold together a coalition based on political expediency, 
( ?;} the growing weakness of the numerically largest party, 
the Liberals. Thus with political matters smoothed out 
to the satisfaction of all parties, the CSD entered upon 
its campaign against the Republican Authentic Alliance. 
The Parties and Politics £! the Republican-Authentic-
AIIiance: ·-
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The parties which joined together to form the 
Republican Authentic Alliance were the Partido Revolu-
cionario Cubano, Autentico 1 (PRC(A)) and Partido Repub-
licano. The PRC(A) was the party that evolved from the 
terrorist and revolutionary movements of the anti-
Machado groups. The Republican Party, on the other 
hand, was a dissident rightist sector of the conservative 
Democratic Party. ~When President Batista (as head of 
- -
the Democratic Party). selected Dr. Carlos Saladrigas as 
standard bearer, the opposition labeled this move 
1 continuism' and broke away to form the Republican Party. ,;9 
Although the Republican Party was of a very conservative 
orientation, since they were in opposition to the CSD the 
only party with which they could collaborate was the 
PRC(A). Again expediency·rather than a common set of 
principles formed the allianc-e. 
The politic'al principles of the Republican Party 
are based first on the idea of alternation in power, and 
second, against political extremes. The economic and 
social principles of the party were a defense of capi-
talism, defense of the permanent interests of society 
and the '_.f.amily and national virtue. 
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A radio address in 1943 by Dr. Guillermo Alonso 
Pujol served as the final rupture from the Democratic 
Party of the group that was to form the Republican 
Party. 60 In this address he stressed that "the President 
of the Republic cannot be a symbol of natio~al solidarity, 
if at the same time he boasts of the supreme position of 
head of various political groups.n61 He went on to say 
-
that as head of a party, the President picks his suc-
cessor which leads to negativeness in party program. 
In this same speech Dr. Pujol emphasized the need 
< : J~ 
· of the conservative forces to unite in a common fight for 
the democratic principles which the organized demagogery 
of the Communist Party was trying to exclude from the 
Cuban way of life.62 
In a speech May 21, 1943, Dr. Paul G. Menocal gave 
a summary of the principles of the Republican Party. 
"(1) Complete separation from the CSD. 
(2) Complete independence of action within the 
framework of our ideology and the basic laws 
of our nation. 
(3) Sustainment of order and peace with respect 
tor the wishes of the popular majority and 
free promotion of their leaders. On the other 
hand, we are opposed to all official partiality: 
• • • The President of the Republic by consti-
tutional mandate is the supreme organ of ' 
national solidari~y and his preference in 
Presidential succession will cause to dis-
~ppear from the public spirit the sentiment . 
of confidence, indispen.sable for the exercise 
of democracy. 
-1 
• (4) Defense of the gains of 'revolution' incor-
porated in the Constitution of 1940. Res-
pect for the, powers inherent in public office. 
( 5) 
{6) 
(7) 
Combat totalitarianism and condemn political 
extremes •••• Our thesis is, the right of 
the worker can-never be hate of capital: it 
is the harmony, conciliation and common ap-
proach for one and for the other. The legi-
timate demands of labor will have in the 
Party the best realizations and hopes. 
In postwar times, integral development of the 
State as a base of national welfare, without 
exclusion of any class •••• To gain this 
constructive purpose, Cuba should re-establish 
credit with the objective of returning to 
circulation money that was withdrawn for 
lack of confidence and stimulate the'spirit 
of enterprise and private initiative. 
The party will fight for a vast tax reform 
of scientific character, eliminating the ex-
cessive burdens that only explain themselves 
within an irregular public administration. 
(8) In order to defend the liberties of the world, 
it is necessary to redeem them domestically. 
(9) Defense of the permanent interests of society 
and the family by meeting the egents as they 
arise, not by making promises." J 
.. 
The above ideology of the Republican Party well 
indicates their conservativeness. Their middle-of-the-
road stand by condemning political extremes, the impor-
tance of defense of capital±sm and the apparent thesis 
of giving to labor what they deem fair, not what labor 
thinks they should obtain, serve as strong examples. 
In contrast to this conservativeness, we have the 
background and principles of the PRC(A). 
' ..... 
I - - - - , __ _ 
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The PRC(A) was founded in February 193~, as a 
revolutionary organization. "The party (at that time) 
encouraged insurrection, sabotaged the electoral census 
of ll:'1endieta' s government, .and participated actively in 
the abortiv~ general strike of March'l935.n64 Because 
-
of these activities, the Party was forced into exile 
and joined with a revolutionary group known aa Joven 
Cuba. Together they continued their activities of 
violence. In 1939 though, the PRC(A) changed its 
ideology from one of violent overthrow of the government 
to one of victory through electoral methods. The leader 
.,.,. 
of this more conservative strategy was Dr. Ramon Grau 
• San Martin. Since its formation, the PRC(A) had mono-
polized the symbol of revolution and socio-economic 
progress for the masses. "Because of this sentiment 
that the PRC(A) means progress and betterment for all, 
the party has in their membership, political ideologies 
of extreme left and extreme right. The autenticism is 
. . 65 
a sentiment as much as it is a political party. tt · 
The definition of the pol±tieal Aut~ntic doctrine 
. / ~ 
according to Dr. Ramon Grau San Martin is as follows: 
"The PRC(A) consider in general; a revolution 
as a. process that. moves to manipulate profound 
transformations in the economic, in the political, 
and in the social field, that gives an immediate 
benefit to the oppressed and disposed masses •••• 
"The Autenticismo is the formulation of the 
tendency of territorial, economic and political 
.. 
. . • . . II' 
eman:tcipatrion.-,. ·· ·· 
. . 
"The ,Autentic political doctrine recognizes 
in Cuba· 'thei" fight for the liberation of t'he Cuban 
state from the semi-eolonial existence in which 
it has remained since the war against Spain. 
·· "The Autentic doctrine, in figreement with the 
actual socialist tendency of humanity equally 
recognizes, the fight for the betterment of the 
Cuban working class; sufficient work and suf-
ficient pay for the Cuban workerw; sufficient 
product~ve l~nd for the Cuban farmer1 war against 
the lat~fund~o and monoproduction. The doctrine 
teaches as necessary the intervention and control 
of the State in the national economy and the 
direct intervention of the producing classes of 
the right in the direction of the State. The· 
doctrine, of definite revolutionary character, 
is essentially .natiog~listic, socialistic and 
anti-imperialistic." · · ·,. . . 
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Here we -h.~~.' in b:rief, the. two ideologie~ of the 
.. 
'two leaders of the Re.publican and fRC(A} parties res-
, .. 
' · pectively. I,mmediately·it is ~vident that the,two doc-
trines are at, opposite extre.~es ,· the first advocating 
complete, freedom and private enterprise, and th.e other . 
avid stca.te .intervention. But, despite these diffe~ences 1: 
political expediency forced the two parties to .collabo-
rate to. win the 1944 elections. 
--
. s~~;, 
In l!'ebruary 1944, the two parties signed their 
pact for the elections. It was a foregone conclusion 
that the PRC(A) would control the nominations for 
·' 
/ 
President and Vice-President which went to Grau San Martin 
/ 
and Raoul de Cardenas Echarte 1 respectively. The only 
important nomination given to the Republican Party was 
. ' . 
,==w 
I 
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Mayoralty of Habana which went to Raul Menocal as de-
cided on at the signing of the pact forming the alliance.67 
.. 
In allotting the Senatorial positions, the· PRC (A) re- <·. 
ceived eighteen, the liepublican Party twelve, and the 
'Mendietista six: 6g The Mendietista were a group led 
by ex-President Carl Mendieta who formed a loosely-knit 
opposit~on party called the Cuban National Party. Their 
importance to the alliance was negligible. 
The Issues and Results . .2! ~ ~ Election: 
Once the nominations had been made, the Parties 
and their candidates began campaigning. Both the Govern-
ment and the Opposition developed a program of compromise 
which was due to their aligning for political'profit. 
The project that they both presented to·the people, was 
getting elected. 
As was natural, the Alliance molded its campaigning 
around the corruption and graft of the Batista era, 
making a great point of stating that its program works 
for the elimination from power of those elements desiring 
to enrich itself at the cost of the public, a Cuban 
. . . 1 69 I ~nst~tut~on known as the "Bote latt. t was wel1l:nklnown 
'" -
to the people that Batista and many in his political 
entourage had accumulated vast fortunes while in office. 
To overcome this occurence, the Alliance also advocated 
42 
the creation of a Tribunal of Accounts which would audit 
annually departmental e~penditur~s. 70 
'~}.o 
Another strong issue of the Alliance was a ret~n 
~'. 
to ·c~nstitutional democratic principles that often h~4 
. ·'• 
been inft:;l.nged by the Batista government. The program 
,. •·t• 
of the Alliance promised adherence to democratic prin-
ciples and constitutional procedure •. To add. to these. 
theoret~cal issues, the program promised a budget reform 
(less army spending), social assista;ce for the, masses, 
new facilities to business initiative, and tec~nical and 
financial as~istance to the farmer. 71 • · 
The CSD came forward with a~def~ns; of the Batista 
government. Their main c ol?-tention sf:lems~:to,have been 
that the masses were better ?f!.~ The economy of the 
' 
nation at that time was booming~due to the wartime 
pressur~s. ··The CSD had on their hands the job of ex-' 
. ,, .. 
plaining the inflationary trend, the shortages and the 
black market. Almost completely they were on the defensi 
Despite th~ fact that both parties had set forth 
a program for which they stood, the campaigning was one 
of personalities rather than of parties and principles. 
One factor that counted heavily in the election ·was the 
_, 
psychological. People looked to Grau San·Martin for 
r. • 
complete social and economic reform. To them he was the 
symbol of salvation and.a more lucrative future. The 
·."' 
.. ' . 
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/ 
socio-economic reforms that Grau San Martin had talked 
of during his 1933 stay in office were well remembered 
by the people. As stated previously, the Autentica 
philosophy of being the party of reform and revolution 
was ·unexpendable to Grau's success on June 1, 1944. 
The importance of ·Grau's personality to the cam-
paign is well supported by the election returns which 
gave him a plurality but which did not give him a Congress 
with his Alliance in the majority. 0£ the 1 1 821,720 
/ 
votes cast, Dr. Grau San Martin had a majority of 181,890. 
However, it must be noted that Grau became President 
without. control of either house of the legislature. He 
was outvoted by thirty to twenty-four in the Senate, and 
by ninety to thirty-seven in the House. 72 This serves 
as a strong indication that Grau's popularity was the 
winning_factor, for the people rejected his Party in 
their choice of Congressional members. 
The 1944-1948 Political Era: ; ' 
The political events of the Grau administration 
saw a weak government grow stronger and then weaker. 
The dissolution of the Democratic Socialist Coalition~ 
the shift of party alignment, the Communists and dis-
sension in the PRC(A) and between the PRC(A) and the 
Republican Party were the factors affecting Cuban 
44 
political life .from 1944-1948. 
Soon after the electoral victory by the Autentic-
Republican Alliance, the signs of rupture began to ap-
pear in the CSD. By the time of Grau' s inauguration, 
the parties of the CSD had gone their separate ways. 
Carlos s·aladrigas, the defeated CSD candidate, led the 
fracture. Saladrigas even went to the length of brazenly 
charging Batista with falsifying the ·election so that 
Grau could win. With this distrust and antagonism be-
coming more intensified and with no political plums to 
share among them, the four parties of divergent back-
groundw·and ideologies took the natural course of 
'dissolution. 
With dissolution, Grau's administration could now 
court the various parties so that it c ou.ld build a 
government majority in Congress. The ABC and Popular 
. . 
Socialist Parties joined the Alliance by February 1946. 
The entrance of these two parties into the government 
created a majority i~ the Senate that was favorable to 
. ' 73 
the Alliance program. · The acceptance of the ,ABC and 
·Communists also caused a strain between the PRC(A).,_ and 
the Republican Parties. The Republicans .had been com-
plaining that they had not received their share of 
patronage. When the ABC and Communists entered the 
Alliance, the Republicans were ready to withdraw, feeling 
-· .. ,; 
·. 
45 
that they would not be able to add to their political 
plums. To remedy this, Grau added to his Cabinet two 
Republicans in the positiqns of Ministers of Justice.and 
. ·, 
Sanitation. 74 
More dissension between the two parties was created 
when Grau refused to give Raul Menocal the nomination for 
Mayor o! Habana for the June 1946 elections. Because of 
this, the Republican Party split, the dissenting group 
re-uniting with the Democratic Party to nominate Raul 
. - 75 
Menocal for Mayor of Habana. The Democratic and anti-
government Republicans tried to unite with the Liberal 
· .. 
Party to defeat the PRC.{ A) -Republican-ABC-Communist 
r .. 
candidate, Fernandez Supervielle, but were unsuccessful. 
The Liberal Party nominated their own candidate, Carlos 
Miguel de C/spedes.76 The fact that Grauwould not 
allow the nomination of Menocal as the _PRC(A)-Republican 
candidate serves to indicate his strong one-man .control 
over the parties' politics and also serves to indicate 
a lack of parliamentary procedure in the party set-up. 
The results of the 1946 elections for Congress 
and the municipalities re-affirmed the popular confidence 
in the Grau administration. The people returned to both 
the Senate a~d the House a government majority. In the 
Senate it was a thirty-four to twenty-one split in favor 
of the Government, while in the House it was eighty-five 
.• 
.,_ 
I 
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to f:ifty-o'ne77 It is important t.o point out that the 
ABC and P·opular Socialists Parties contributed much to 
the measure of a successful Government majority. In 
the fight for Mayor of Babana, the Government candidate 
,., 
,-, ,. 
won, as did· ninety-three of the one hundred twenty-six 
candidates in the municipalities. 
During 194 7, the Government was weakened by the 
loss .. of the ABC and Communist support. But of greater 
political significance was a schism in the PRC{A) Party· 
itself" 
The first indication of the degeneration of: the 
ABC Party was the returns of: the June 1946 elections where 
oriiy a very few of their rank wer~ _elected to of'f:ice. 
The Grau administration further aggravated them by 
replacing many of their men in Government. This action 
was in accord with the proportionate_ political .strength 
they added to his forces. With a diminishing strength, 
the political plums available to the ABC were proportion-
ately decreased. As the ABC's strength grew weaker,. 
its members sought membership in new parties, mainly 
the Republican Party. 78 The final dissociation from 
the Government coalition came about in March 1947. 
The immediate cause of the Communists breaking 
away from the Government coalition was the order by the 
~ _,. 
Minister of Labor, Carlos Prio Socarras to seize the 
47 
headquarters of the Cuban Workers Confederation. Early 
in 1947, an anti-Communist campaign was started in both 
official and reactionary circ~es. Grau himself stated 
,. 
that the CTC (Confederacion de·Trabajadores Cubanos), 
the largest labor syndical union', should be in 110ubantt 
79 hands. By this he meant that the anti-Comm\ll\ists 
should control the CTC. It was politically important 
that the CTC be in non-Communist control favorable to 
Grau and the PRC(A) because the CTG membership of 
500,000 was a block of votes that could mean defeat or 
victory •. 
When the fifth Congress of the CTC met in April 
1947, the Autentico and Communist forces clashed over 
certification of credentials. This was the first 7te·p 
that led to the division into two forces, one CTc.;-
Autentioo and the other a Communist CTC. The Ministry 
of Labor tried to unite the two groups to avoid having 
political repercussions from their division, but was 
unsuccessful. Each group went ahead and formed their 
80 
own executive. The precarious new situation is ex-
plained by the fact that the Government according to 
law had to declare which group was the legal one. When 
the· Ministry of Labor ordered the Communist CTC to turn 
the CTC headquarters building over to the CTCt-Autentico 1 
the Communist Party broke completely with the Government, 
-· 
8~ 
realizing that the Government had made its choice. 
The schism within the PRC(A) Party itself was of 
a more serious nature. When the party of the President 
cannot maintain its unity, it becomes apparent that 
inherent weakness cannot lead ~o a co~structive program. 
The beginning of the rift in the PRC(A) was no more than 
, , . . , 
a.rivalry between Carlos Frio Socarras and "Eddy" Chibas 
for the position of Grau's favorite protege and the 
Presidential nomination ~f 1948.82 As the rivalry be-
came intensified, it developed into an anti-Grau movement 
within the PRC{A). The basis of Chibast attacks was the 
failure to implement the PRC(A) campaign program and 
principles. As the Grau administration continued in 
power, it became evident to Chibas that it was becoming 
an administration for professional politiciansqrather 
than the people. "A complete break with the PRC(A} 
- ~ ' 
was precipitated, according to Chibas, by three factors: 
(1} his realization that the Grau administration was 
corrupt; (2) the rehabilitation program--rural schools, 
cement floors in each bohio, sanitary latrines, good 
wells--was stopped in its tracks and Grau did not seem 
to do anything but make promises; and (3) belief that 
Grau intended tq perpetuate himself in office or affect 
'continuism' by handpicking a successor.n83 When Chibas 
~ 4 .... 
broke with the PRC(A), forming the Party of the Cuban 
\-• 
• 
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People (Orthodox) he took with him a group of Senators 
and nine Representatives. These coupled with the losses 
of the ABC, and Popular S.:ocialist Parties' members, left 
the Government in the minority in both Houses of Congress • 
··The loss of the ABC, the Communists, a split in 
its .ranks, the dissolution of the Opposition coalition 
was the background for the Presidential election of 1948. 
Would the Opposition unite to defeat the Alliance?· Would 
. ·-
the people feel that the Grau administration had worked 
for them"l' 
The Eolitics £! ~ .1.2.!& Election: 
In discussing the political maneuvering for 
nomination in the 1948 election, the important factor 
to deal with is the personal control of the leader of 
each party. It. is true ·that as early as 1946 various men 
in each party announced their availability, but they had 
to wait. for sanction from the leadership of the party as 
.to who would be the nominee.~ 
In the PRC(A) the Presidency was publicly coveted 
. / ~ / / 
by·Grau himself, Carlos Prio Socarras, Jose R •. San Martin, 
and Miguel Su~ez Fernandez •. T~e President, hqwever, did 
not come forth with his choice until the public's reaction 
. .. ' . 
to talk of reelection was confirmed as negative. During 
this interim period he was seeking the candidate who 
would be most • Su,rez Fern~nd 
his nomination by getting control of the forty.-two 
·Autentico delegates of Las Villas and Matanzas. 84 
While the struggle for nomination in the PRC (A) 
was going on, the opposition parties (the ABC, Democratic, 
Liberal and Cuban Peoples Parties) were intensely trying 
to formulate a united front. The first candidate pre-
. sented as a representative of a. united o~position was 
Miguel Coyttl.a, editor of El Mundo, who was to be a non-
political candidate. Both the Liberal Party and the 
Cuban Peoples Party rejected this. 
In the last days of January 1948, and early Feb ... 
ruary, all segments of the opposition were in conference 
in an attempt to establish an effective united front. 
As this was in process, the PRC{A) was stimulated to 
greater activity. 
,;' . ,;' 
Jose Manuel Aleman who was a strong 
. / ~ 
political leader came out in favor of Prio Socarras• 
/ ,/ This left only Jose R. San Martin as·a contender along 
with Suarez Fer~lndez who . stili controlled forty-two 
delegates. 
/ / 
"Late in February Suarez Fernandez concluded that 
.. 
-
the time had arrived to push his bid for the PRC(A) 
nomination and he announced that he was ready to discuss 
means of solving the crisis within the Government Party.n8 
But his offer was no~ met with any interest by the PRC(A) 
and he started to confer with the Democrats, Orthodoxos 
. ' 
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,.. 
and other party groups. Suarez Fernandez became accept-
able to all groups except the Liberal Party who insisted 
·that Ricardo Nunez Portuondo be the united candidate • 
. 
While the opposition was again trying to unite, 
the PRC{A) Convention met on March 11th, to nominate 
their Presidential-candidate. The delegates of Las V.illas 
and Matanzas were not present but a ttfun~tional quorumtt 
- ""' ""' 0f seventy-~ine delegates nominated Carlos Pr:ro· Socarras 
as the_Presidential Candidate. A Vice-Presidential Can-
didate was· not selected, leaving --the way open for the . 
Republican Party to do so.86 The Republican Party then 
nominated as the Vice-Presidential Candidate, Alonso 
Pujal, the party le~~er. Besides the Vice-Pres~dency, 
the Republicans received sixteen Senatorial and three. 
ot'. 
Provincial Governors' nominations. 
The attempts at unity by the opposition failed 
· because of their inability to agree on the actual can-
didates for President and Vice-President. When the 
final efforts failed, each party went.its seperate way. 
The Liberals nominated Dr. Gustavo Cuervo Rubio to be 
,.., 
the running mate of Nunez Portuondo •. The national as-
sembly of the Democratic Party accepted fourteen Sena-
tors and three Provincial Governments in return for 
supporting the Liberal Party candidates. The Communist 
Party which had not been courted by any group, ran 
• ... ,, 
., 
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seperate candidates, Juan Marinello as Presidential Can-
. didate and L~zaro Pena as Vice-Presidential Candidate • 
. The Cuban Peoples Party also nominated a seperate ticket 
with Eduardo Chibas and Roberto Agramonte 1 Presidential 
and Vice-Presidentia~ Candidates respectively. 
The ~ Campaign and Its Results: 
. - . . . 
The campaign of 1948 revolved around the thesis 
of attracting the masses, but also guaranteeing to the 
special interests that their "rights" would not be 
disrupted. The campaigning by all sides was inte~sive 
. . 
and very costly. The incumbent parties had an advan-
~age in that they could use the various departments of 
the government as campaigners. 
To say the least, the campaign was not one of 
analysis of various programs. In this election, though, 
as in 1944, the'PRC(A)-Republican Alliance continued to 
entrance the masses with the argument of being the only 
"Revolutionary"·party. To add to this propaganda tech-
- -
nique, they used Machadism as the s)mbol of the Liberale 
Democratic coalition which to the people symbolized 
potential reaction and dictato.rship.87 This technique 
· preyed very effective and immediately put the Liberal-
Democratic coalition on the de!ensive. The government 
campaign of Machadism was actively aided by an opposition 
• 
.. 
.• 
·• 
'. • . . 
. . • 
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candidate, Chib(s, who also played up Nunez Portuondo's 
88 praise of Machado. 
The non-emotional program of the government alli-
ance included the following planks: 
"economic: 1. 
2. 
creation of a National Bank; 
industrialization of the country; 
agrarian reform; 3. 
4· 
5. 
6. 
protection and development of the 
export industry; · 
maintenance of a high perc.entage · 
of employment; 
continuation of policy of no 
foreign loans; 
administrative: 
social: 
Eolitical: 
1. extension of existing plan of 
public works with particular 
emphasis on country highways; · -~· 
2. a budget law; 
3. a merit system in the civil service; 
l. 
2. 
3. 
1. 
2 • 
3. 
to fight increasingly for the class 
interests· of Cuban labor; 
better technical and other educa-
tional facilities for both city 
and country people; 
especial attention to the health 
of children; 
protection of public liberties; 
protection of the principle of 
political equality, guaranteeing 
women and colored Cubans oppor-
tunities to rise in state employment; 
maintenance of the fo§~ign policy of 
the Grau government." ~ 
-
The campaign of the Liberal-Democratic coalition 
tried to awaken the people to the corruptness of the 
Grau administration using the accumulation of wealth and 
estates by the political chiefs of the PRC(A). The ef• 
fectiveness of this appeal is questionable, :for in Cuba 
I 
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most politicians that had been in office had shown an 
equal moral weakness irrespective o.f party labels and 
programs. The popular attitude in regard to this con-
dition is not one of moral insensitivity, but one of .frus .... 
tration and impotency to effect a government administra~ 
tion of unquestionable integrity. One of the results of 
this .frustration has been,the passive acceptance of~ 
dictatorial regime that has an appearanc~ o.f integrity •. 
, . 
. , 
"The coalition's major planks wer..e: respect for 
4 •.•• · •• ••• '•.;_ ..... 
- -
democratic liberties and the principles of the Constitu-
tion; honesty in administration and probity in the ~n~ge­
ment of public .funds; protection o.f the.;r,ight of pJ·ivate 
·•·: ... . ' 
. ·. 
property with the economy organized for,:tlie general wel-
fare; emphasis on private initiative in expand,ing and 
distributing facilities of the state but with government 
aid, assistance and guidance, particularly in respect to 
land use and to credit problems; strengthening of the 
semi-parliamentary system and firm opposition to 
Communism."90 Thus we see the conservative nature of the 
-program and also that there is a definite lack of specific 
reform.proposals. 
The campaign issues brought forth by the· Cuban 
P'eoples Party emphasized the corruption of the Grau 
government and the non-fulfillment of the "revolutionary" 
program. In his criticism of the Liberal-Democratic 
···~.,;) 
,. 
·.~ . 
~~~====~==========~==~=======r===== 
·;.. 
·'. -~" . 
·.·~ 
coalition for their consel"vativeness, Chi bas was streng-
theni~g ,the plea of the PRC(Al-llepublican Alliance ·~s . , 
j. ' . : ' . . . ' : . : 
much as h'is 6wn cause, The p~ouam ·put forth by Ohibas 
.. ; .... ' . . . . ... ·. . . : . . . . 
called for the full reali.~a:tion of the nrevolutionary" 
' • ' ¥ < • • • • ' • 
pr~gr~ stressing the specific points ot betterment ot 
conditions of the masses .. 
. After months of political campaigning wtth the 
. ' . . ' . 
people listening to cha:tges and Q.ounter.....cha:r.ges, promises 
I ·• . . • ' 
and· more promises, . they went to 'the polls. The result 
~. , . r ~ , . 
was victo:t'y fo1: Prio and his forces tor the :P~esideney 
. . 
' ! 
and fo'l! majority oon,~o1 ()f Congl"ass,. but a olos$~· .look 
~ I . 
shows thflt "the victo~ was a weak one for he 'pollee! only 
a·pl~ality ·ana lost support ~o$ hi~ pa~y ,ati"il1ation8 .. 
·The pre·election party.regi.st:ration was the 
£o;lowing: ·. PRC (A)-?90~l27l Repu.blic~s-282,1541 
Li't?~rals~3S7tlt79J Demoerats ... lS6.6lo; Orthotioxos-164,87)1 
Popular Sooialists-l;1.2S)jw91 . The.·election results 
shoW:. that the PRO (A) ... Republican ~lliance polled only 
8~9,162 v·otes_, or 183 1 ;jl9 votes less than. their party 
affiliations. But we notice gains of ~o.ooo votes by the 
\ ~ . . . 
Libe~al-Democrat1c eoalitiOl'l aild 154tOOO by the Cuban 
Peoples Party over their 'respect1 ve party at.filiat16ns. 
' . ' . . ' . . 
The Oonnnunist. Pa.ny sUffered a loss of. 15,000 vote$ 
polli~g only 142~203 whiie 1t;had a party atf1liat.1on 
c£ 157 ·.2$3~ 92 . . 
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These facts serve as strong evidence of the enthusiasm 
/ 
that Chibas was' able to arouse. It also is a great moral 
victory for the party which stood as a symbol of integ-
"" rity in government. The effect of Chibas~increased 
strength challenged the Aut enticos in their position 
as leaders of the "revolution". 
The Political Events ~12M~· 195~:. 
This three-year period which included the 1950 
elections brought to the for~gro"UD.d of Cuban politi·cs 
an increase of political terrorism, a public exposure 
of corruption under the Grau admfnistration, a further 
split in the Autentico ranks and new party alignments 
a.m.~! fractures. 
Political terrorism·or "pistolerismo" were the 
rule of the day during the Machado regime. Throughout 
the Batista regime the ~errorist activity was at a 
minimym, but as Grau's stay in power became longer, the 
list of assasinations of political persons grew longer 
and the number of bombings increased.93 Although there 
was a steady increase in this activity, Grau did nothing 
about it. In the spring of 1949, gangsterism was so 
"' rampant that Prio organized GRAS, Group for the Repres-
sion of Subversive Activities, to combat these killings 
and to get to the politicg.l basis of the terrorists. 
t • 
' .· 
; . 
Within a few months after Prfo•s inauguration, 
the unity in the PRC(A) was threatened for President 
"' /-Carlos Prio Socarras was actively dispossessing Grau 
government employees of their jobs. Many of these em-
ployees held their jobs illegally having bought and 
. /. 
paid for them. The firing by Frio of members of his 
own party, for the Grau employees were Autenticos, in-
dicates the very personal sp~ils system. 
. "' The disharmony tliat was started by these dis-
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missals was aggravated into a party split by the accusa-
tions of graft in the Grau government being brought to 
,; 
court.by Prio, and by the Habana mayoralty campaign and 
the differences it created~ 
The malfeasance of public funds has been a part 
of Cuban political life and government administration. 
But the sum involved and the prosecution of political 
leaders set a new pattern in this case. On January 18, 
1949, Senator Guervo Navarro accused Grau and various 
of his ministers of misusing public funds to their per~ 
sonal advantage. 94 Naturally, the charges were refuted 
as publicly as they had been made. But the courts took 
the initiative to start compiling evidence so that the 
persons involved could be brought to trial. Since the 
efforts of the courts were not interfere~ with by the 
/ ~ 
Prio government, the enmity between Grau and Prio was 
.•. 
~ . 
,· 
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self-evident. The scbi~m that resulted··was to greatly 
affect the 1950 Habana mayoralty campaign. 
The 1950 campaign for Mayor of Habana taxed 
great.ly the hitherto strong organization of the Autenticos 
The Grau group was no longer following the dictates of 
the party. The Republican Party which had been in al-
liance with the Autenticos had also split, with part 
breaking away under the leadership of Alonso Pujol. 
To further complicate the political scene was the return 
ott; Batista to Cuba as a Senator and the formation of the 
United Action Party under his leadership. The member-
ship of the party included many Liberal and Democratic 
95· 
_Party men. 
The dissident Grau AutEmticos, the dissident Pujol 
Republicans and Batista joined forces behind Nic'olas 
Castellanos, the incumbent wh9-had severed his relations 
with the Autenticos when they overpassed him and nominated 
/ / ' 
Antonio Pri o Socarras, brother of the President, for the 
. . . 
Mayor of Habana •. The Cuban Peoples Party (Orthodoxo} 
under Chiba's also nominated their own candidate, Manuel 
Bisbe. 
The results of the election prove~ successful for 
the loosely united opposition with Nicolas Castellanos 
. / 
carrying fifty-two per cent of the vote, Antonio Prio 
/' , . 
Socarras thirty-seven per cent and Manuel Bisbe eleven 
·e 
... 
.. 
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per eent. 96 The outcome ot thebongressional elections 
.. 
gave t.he Autenticos and their affilia-tes control of bt?t~ 
. 
Houses of Congress. In the Senate the Government main-
" tained a majority of thirty-one--twenty-four Autenti~~s, 
. six Democrats and one Republi.oan. 97 The Senatorial,.. op-
position of .tw.enty-three consisted of nine Liberal.s, .. 
•.. 1, • • ··" t 
six opposition-Republicans, three Granistas, one Unitario 
/ . . (Batista), one Orthodoxo (Ohibas), and three Independents 
In the Lbwer Hd~se the Government majority of seventy-
three consisted of fifty-six Autenticos, sixteen Demo-
-· 
erats,. and one Unitario. The opposition of sixty-three 
consisted of eighteen Liberals, fourteen Orthodoxos, 
fourteen opposition-Republicans; seven Popular Socialists 
. ·. . 98 {Communists}, four Unitarios, and six Independents. 
The political events from mid-1950 are concerned 
with att~mpts by the Administration and the opposition 
parties to· gather voting power for the Presidential 
elections of June 1952.99 Rumors of pending coalitions 
were many throughout this period. The attempts by the 
opposition to unify were many, but the Ad.minis.tration 
party took active steps to build its strength. 
The administrat:ipn reorganized to allow the Liberal 
Party to join its ranks tor the promise of s~port in 
the 19 52 elections. The results of the Cabinet reshllf'f .. 
ling was to bring the Liberals and Democrats into the Ca et 
- 60 
with two and three members respectively. "In theory, 
the new alliance means considerable support tor the 
.Autenticos because it represents section:t' ot Cuban 
li:t'e which opposed one another during the tight against 
100 Gerardo Machado.u 
The dissident elements o:f the PRC{A) and the 
' 
Partido Republicans which were the victors o:f the Habana 
mayoralty in June 1950 further developed into two new 
parties. The first ot these to torm their own party 
was the dissident Republicans who under the leadership 
ot the Cuban Vice~resident, Alonso Pujol, created the 
Partido Nacional Cubano. The Presidency ot this group 
·. . 
went to Nicolas Castellanas, Mayor ot Babana, with whom 
Pujol had associated to organize an effective opposition 
to the Governm.ent.101 The party organized by the 
Grauistas o:f the PRC(A) was called the Partido de la 
Oubanidad. 
These two newly-·oreated parties were trying, with 
/ 
the Partido Aocion Unitaria to coalesce so that they 
.. 
could form an effective opposition. Various reports 
-· 
throughout the year indicated that their goal was to be 
realized. 
~e one party that remained aloof to coalition 
,. 
with any group was the Orthodoxos under Ohibas. Th'?Y 
continually worked tor political freedom and morality 
. ~-
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in government. The ~arty reached its peak of public ap-
peal in 1951 when its leader committed suicide after a 
radio address. Whether the futility of his cause or the 
desire to attract mass following was the reason for his 
action, is a question for debate. But, the new leader-
ship of the party under Roberto Agramonte continued 
.. 
the policy of no coalition. 
As 1951 drew to a close the political scene had not 
formed any definite picture. The opposition had not 
united effectively and consistent rumors of rupture were 
prevalent. 
To bring the results of the attempts of coalition 
to a logical conclusion, a look at early 1952 saw a 
complete change of atmosphere. The Partido Naoional 
Cubano and the Partido de la Oubanidad both went over 
to the side of the administration. Thus the only part~es 
left in the opposition oamp were the United Action Party 
the Communi-sts and the Orthodo:x:os. Three units which 
. . ~-- . ' 
would never make an effective opposition, and eaeh 
nominated their own candidate. It would appear as though 
the Alliance of the PRO(A) would be in power again, but 
"" .. ~ 
the results were never known for a coup on March 10, 1952, 
interrupted the natural election proeedure.102 
. ·~ ' 
CHAPTER I!I 
.... -, 
. . . 
THE PRODUCTIVE FORCES OF THE CUBAN ECONOMY 
'• . 
Introduction-The Basis g! the Cubgg Economx: 
.. 
The outstandi?g char~cteristic of the Cuban economy 
; 
is its reliance upon agricultural·production and exports, 
and the greatest emphasis by far is placed upon·the sugar 
industry. The products of the sugar industry account for 
approximately ninety per cent of the value of Cuban e~ ... 
ports. Because the main domestic activity relies s~r· 
heavily upon international sales, the vulnerability~o 
which the economy.is subjected>is greatly magnified. 
Maintaining economic stability within .. the country when 
Jlt!;" • 
the economy is dependent upon·the upward and downward 
variations in world demand for sugar has been impossible 
for Cuba in· the past~ ... Her economy bas had to meet the 
. . . 
foreign na~ionalistic ~ariff; protectionism and competiti 
abroad, and most 1.mport.ant, the changing sugar needs· o:f 
":; . . 
the· United States, her largest ·customer• 
In .t·imes of world prosperity, the Cuban economy 
• ,r ... , ... ·.:. •: . .1, ' 
· has ,indeed pfospered. But wheri the first sig:rl:s of re-
. ' 
·cession or depression abroad are felt they become ap-
' y ~ . 
parent in C~ba·due to the fact that the price of agri-
' ., . 
cultural produc:~s, is the first to decline.. At times when 
the.price was in decline, production has been increased 
.... 
~ .. 
to retain total value of sales which only t~nded to fur-
ther depress prices causing a condition of hidden unem-
ployment and further complicating the inherent weaknesses 
of the economy. 
One solution to this problem of being totally de-
pendent upon the fluctuations of world sugar trade is in 
diversification of the economy. To effect this, produc-
tive efforts have to be concentrated on other agricultural 
and industrial activities. In 1927, when the. sugar and 
tobacco industries were in decline, the government took 
the .initiative in attempting to diverwify its agriculture 
and industry by establishing high protective tariffs on 
I 
many imported foodstuffs and manufactured articleso Pro-
tection was also granted when a new industry was 
established. 103 This policy has occasionally been empha-
sized and has meant an important start towardp diversify-
ing the economy; ~ut the sugar industry continues to be 
the backbone of Cuban economic acti-vity. 
An excellent picture of the Cuban economic history 
indicating periods of prosperity and decline would be 
available from ~summary of domestic sugar production and 
export figures, the periods of prosperity being marked 
with large exports of sugar and soaring prices with the 
opposite being true in depressed times. 
An intensification of sugar cane production occ 
.. · 
-I 
•·. 
in Cuba in the Nineteenth Century after revolution on the 
island of Hispanola forced a decline in production there, 
and the planters emigrated to Cuba. From this beginning 
.. 
until political unrest developed in 1870, Cuba was the 
world leader in sugar production. At this time Cuban 
production was hampered by internal political difficulties 
and competition from t.he ,European sugar-beet producers and 
"'_:; .. ,, 
the Cuban sugar industry wa,s ·thus brought near to ruin •. 
But technological improvements making possible a higher 
perce_ntage of sucrose extraction, saved the industry. The 
struggle for independence (18~5-1898) again interrupted 
sugar production. However, the establishment _of the 
·Itepublic, and the proclaiming, in 1903, of a commercial 
reciprocity treaty with the United States which granted 
.. 
. a twenty per cent t~riff 'reduction on eac;:h others imports, 
~ . 
· was a stimul'Jils to the industry. The position of protector 
that the Unite·d States .assumed, made Quba a favorable in-
vestment area for United States businessmen and the sugar 
industry expanded. 
Demands for sugar during World War I and the dis-
ruption of the European sugar industry -created an inflat~d 
market for Cuban sugar _during the war and in the post-war 
years. By mid-1920, a return to more normal conditions 
tb.roughout the world coupled with.a vast increase in 
United States tariffs, and a decline in United States 
--~~· 
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consumption brought disaster to the Cuban sugar industry. 
Overproduction caused a further decline in price. The 
instability in foreign demand and world price have been 
the·nemisis of the Cuban economy. 
International Plans and Attempts At Control: 
To counter the trend, various sugar defense programs 
were instituted. The first attempts to cope with the probe 
lem were unilateral. In 1925 'and 1926, the cultivated 
area was limited through Congressional action. The 1925-26 
area ·sown was reduced by ten per cent and by another ten 
.per cent ~n 1926-2?, with more stringent enforcement regu-
lations this time prohibiting new plantings and assigning 
. d i . d" "d 1 "11 l04 pro uct on quotas to 1n 1v1 ua m1 s. 
When the unilateral efforts.proved ineffective, in-
ternational agreements were made. The first in 1927, was 
concluded with Germany,_Czechoslovakia, and Poland which 
limited.Cuba's 1928 crop a~d restricted her sugar exports 
to principal markets. Theexpeeted res~lts were never 
achieved as the limitations only enhanced the sugar pro-
duction in countries not party to the agreement. Because 
.. 
of the increasing production .in the United States and its 
po_ssessions and territories,. Cuba's quota was further cut, 
aggravating an alre.ady.disastrous condition. This ledto 
abandonment of all controls for the 1929 crop when produce 
tion e ualed five and nine-tenths mill short tons at an 
• 
.... 
,. 
. 
.. 
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average price of two cents per po~d.l05 
The world depression o:f 1929 further aggravatfftd the 
decline in trade and prices. To meet this situation, ·Cuban 
law agencies were established to control domestic produc-
tion, to handle surpluses, and to engage in negotiating 
international agreements for stabilization o;f the world 
·sugar market. ·The Cuban Institute for the Stabilization 
of Suga,r was responsible f_or::the latter and became party 
t·o the Interpational· Sugar Agreement of 1931 (the Chad'"'"~'"'"' 
Plan) .. to which nine countries that accoUnted for forty per 
~-
cent of total produ~tion, and ninety per cent of world 
sugar exports, were party. This agreement was to cover 
the disposal of surplus production and entail crop reducti 
. 
The effectiveness of this plan was ~ampered again 
by its not embracing all producers plus the ':fact that it 
·' 
conceived at a time when.world prices were declining. The 
greatest aid to Cuba's situation came in June, 1934, when 
the United States reduced its sugar tariff and -limited 
. dqmestic and insula:r production.· This meant a larger quota 
for Cuban sugar (reaching c 1 ose to 2, 000, 000 tons ·through 
. 19~9) at a minimum price. 107 The United States price ad-
vanced from 0.78 cents in May, 1934, to 2.72 cents in 
. October, 1935.: 
In May, 1937, Cuba through the Institute for Stabie 
lization of Sugar, the government agency which was respons 
106 > 
'. 
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for the sugar defense program, becpe party to the 1937 
International Sugar Agreement to which twenty-one nations 
-
representing the major sugar producing and importing coun-
tries were party. Since most world consumption·. was con- . 
troll~d through domestic production or preferential treaty, 
this agreement dealt with free-market export limitations 
for a fiv~-year period.108 Cuba was assigne.O. an annual 
free mark.e~ quota of 1,000,000 metric tons. :The effective-
ness of this .. prograni with regard to Cuba is non-assessable 
due.to.the outbreak of World War II in 1939. 
Cuban Agricultura.:± @g Industrial Production~l2l.t4-1951: 
it • ' 
The onset of World ·War II provided Cuba with ·~n 
.... 
attractive .market for her expanding sugar pDoduction •. But, ·~ 
~!) . 
the war also left huba without sources of supply. for a 
great many of_ h~er needed foodstuffs and manufactured g_oo.ds • 
. 'This situation ,stimulate:d domestic production of other 
.~ . 
agricultural and· industrial commodities, but in the post-
war y~ars would it make the economy less dependent upon:. 
'~ 
:the sugar industry? Was this expansion of producti·on in 
' ~ other fields than·sugar going to make Cuba less vulnerable 
to the fluctuations of world trade? By analyzing-the 
trends.in the various agricultural and industrial activit 
, I ' ' 
and .. relat·ing them· 'be t}le export trade and commercial pol'icy 
of the country, the answers can be determined·. The· sugar 
shall be dealt th first as it is the main item 
of the eo onomy. 
~ Sugar Industr~: 
'· 
The sugar industry plays, as we said bet'or~., the 
dominant role ~.the Caban economy. ~ore than fifty 
per cent of the cultivated land is devoted to cane and 
when there is a favorable market, two-thirds or the 
agricaltural income is contributed by it. Nearly one-· 
third of the gainfully employed, or approximately 500,000 
workers f'ind direct' e.mpl.oyment in the industry during the 
height of Z.afra. Between one-third, and one..:.quarter inoeme · · 
.· . .. 109 
arises directly t'roin sugar production. 11 
" 
· The direct importance of the sugar :industry is fur-
ther enl?Xged when its affect upon the general ·eeonomi~, 
' 
activity is'taken into accotmt. The seasonal trends.of' 
other industries and retail trade follow that of. sugar. 
During the Zafra, the period from Deeember threug}+ April. 
or May, V(hen the cane is narvested and ground,- the .ot.her 
industries run at full oapaeit.y: ·t.o· meet demana:s. Retail 
outl'ets have their best periods o:f business in these·· 
months • I>uring the rest of the year ;When the majority of 
the sugar workers are idle, busi.D.ess in manufacturing and 
retail fields is at a decline due to. the lack of purchas-
ing powe·r. Thas, the seasonal unemployment in the s ogar 
industry causes a seasenal Ull,elllpleyment in other indus-
tries and adds to the problems of.stabilization of the 
Cuban economy and· points to the- need of diver·sification. 
•; 
·." 
.,. 
The importance of the sugar industry is further 
enhanced when one takes into account the following facts. 
--Besides running privately within. the various sugar plan-
tations.almost twice as many miles ot railroad as are 
publicly operated, the sugar industry provided as much as 
eighty and nine-tenths per cent of the tc;>nnage and f'orty-
fi ve and. fi1t'e-tenths per cent of .the revenue for Grade A 
public railroads through hauling sugar cane and its pro-
ducts as was the case for the fiscal year ending June 30, 
1949.110 Add to this the fact that about fifty per cent 
of the country'· s electric power is provided and absorbed 
by the sugar industry. 
The psychological effect that the sugar industry' 
has on the general economic activity is outstanding. When 
. ·' 
the international :poE!ition of .sugar is optimistic, ·the 
.O.uban sugar industry booms· and carries into prosperity ·' 
the other ~usiness activities of the whole economy. The 
habit of the Ouban has been to prosper and decline de-
pending on the ability to sell their sugar abroad. When 
international demand for sugar is steady, the tendency 
·and trend is to devote more and more to the energies, 
land and investments to growing more sugar. 
In the period under consideration here, 1944 to 
19~1., the increase in sugar production and its by-products 
· serves to indicate this trend. The outbreak of World War 
~ 70 
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I~ 
brought about an increase in demand for Cul:>an sugar. The 
post-war period has also kept the demand up first through 
United States pur_ehasihg to fulfill its various interna-
" 
.tional programs, and then the demand resulting from the 
... Korean War. But, we also find that in 1948 and 1949, 
. . . 
when Un~ted States demand was slackening, the Cuban 
economy suffered a mild depression. 
From 1944 through 1951,. there was a consistent in ... 
crease in the concentration of the' available land devoted 
to the growth of sugar cane. In the eight-year period .· . 
there was an increase in planting of sugar cane of 700,000 
acres, as we ean see from the following table. 
Year 
1944 
1945 
1946 
1947 
'r.ABLE l 
ACREAGE OF CANE GROWN .ANIJ HARVESTED 
in. thousands .. of acres 
Grown Harvested Year Grown 
2402 2392 .•. 1948 3025 
2528 2343 1949 2980 
2645 2517 1950 3014 
2845 2774 1951 3190 
Harvested 
2915 
2939 
294e 
3164 
Source: Agricultural Statistics 1951, United States Depart· 
ment of Agriculture, P• 101. . 
Naturally with such· an increase in acreage planted 
and harvested, the resulting sugar tonnage produced by the 
16l'eentrales was greater. The yearly pro~hotion tonnage 
.. . ·;-~ . . 
·. 
·I! 
'(!• 
I 
I 
•' 
.e 
was as follows: 
TABLE 2 
·-
CUBAN- RAW SUG.AR PRODUCTION 
Year 
1944 
1945 
1946 
1947 
in thousand short .. tons 
Tons 
4741 
39.24 
4476 
6448 
Year 
1948 
1949 
~950 
1951 
Tons 
6675 
5763 
6127 
6348 
The decrease in production from 1944 to 1945 was 
due to ancontrollable natural conditions of a drought that 
lasted throughout the growing season, the swmmer and fall 
of 1944. Stastics of the per acre yield show the effects 
of the drought. In 1944, the per acre yield was 18.94 
short tons which declined to 12.90 short tons in 1945.111 
The effects of this drought were a lower income for many 
sugar workers due to a shorter working period which re-
acted to produce a business decline 1 especially in the 
112 
rural areas. 
The variations in raw sugar production are due to 
different circumstances. ·rn the 1946, 1947 and 1948 crops 
there was a definite increase over 1945. This is account-
able by three factors: (a) an increase in the number of 
acres harvested; (b} an increase in the per acre tonnage 
o~ cane harvested; and (~) increases in the yield o~ raw 
sugar per ton of sugar cane. In 1949, the decrease in raw 
sugar produced is accountable by a three ton decrease in 
113 the yield per acre o~·cane harvested. 
The increase in the 1950 crop was due primarily to 
a ten pound increase in the productivity per ton of sugar 
cane harvested, with slight increases in factors {a) and 
(b) noted above adding to the 364,000 short ton increase. 
In 1951, 200,000 additional acres were harvested and in 
addition increased yield per ton of cane should have det 
mined a vast increase in raw sugar production. This tho 
was not the case due to a drop of twenty-three pounds in 
the amount of raw sugar obtained from each ton o~ sugar 
c~ne.ll4 
Year 
1945 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
!9~~ ', 
TABLE 3 
SUGAR O.ANE YIELD 
Sugar Cane Harvested 
(short tons per acre} 
12.90 
14.64 
18.96 
18.62 
15.65 
15.91· lo.78· 
Raw Sugar Produced 
lbs. per ton, sugar 
c 
2 
243 
245 
246 
251 
261 
238 
~~~================================7~3~===== 
I. 
' 
The two main by-products or the sugar industry are 
blackstrap molasses and its rerinad product, industrial 
alcohol. The production or blaekstrap molasses, which is 
the final liquor from which no further sucrose can be 
extracted, has increased with the increase in raw sugar 
production. ffThe principal uses of blackstrap are as a 
source or industrial alcmhol and in mixed reeds for live-
stock. Minor.applications are in the production of 
yeast, vinegar, citric acid, rum and butyl alcohol. 
During.World War II a number or Cuban co.m;panies estab• 
-lished disti~leries for the production or industrial al-
cohol, but with export markets largely eliminated as a 
result of rising United States synthetic alcohol produc-
tion, most of these were not operated in recent years.ull5 
-Since the outbreak of the Korean conflict in ~une, 1950, 
the United States and the United Kingdom have contracted 
.. 
for the purchase of all exportable molasses surpluses. 
Year 
1944 
1945 
1946 
1947 
TABLE 4 
BLAC~R.AP AND .ALCOHOL PRODUCTION 
Bl.ackstrap1 in gallons 
-' 
230,892,000 
194,912,000 
261,924,000 
339,205,000 
Alcohol 
in litres2 
211,522,307 
200,130' 291 
192,376,796 
143,195,615 
~-~=r==============================7=4~==== 
Year 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
11Source: 
2souro-e: 
TABLE 4 {continued) 
.. 
BLAOKBTRAP .AND .ALCOHOL PRODUCTION 
.... ' .. 
Blackstrap1 in gallons 
332,335,000 
291,547,000 
262,365,000 
288,000,000 
A1cohol 2 in litres 
91,771,192 
72,281,438 
84,857,649 
68,591,360 
Agricultural Statisties,1951, p. 101 •. 
Ouba Economia ·y Financiera, 1\/fay, 1947, p. 30; 
February, 1949, p.26; January, 1952, p. 32. 
Since 1945, the sugar cane growers and the oclonos, 
have been sharing in the proceeds of the b1ackstrap pro-
ductien and sales. Before Decree No. 516 of the Ministry 
. 
of Agriculture issued February 10, 1945, and publishe~ 
in the Gateta Ofieial of February 22, 1945, the sugarmill 
owners retained the total receipts of blackstrap produc-
tion, which was reasonable due to the fact that they pur-
chased raw sugar cane and then processed it into the 
various products. By the above-mentioned decree the 
eolonos began to receive thirty per cent of the average 
value of blackstrap molasses produced in Cuba. A general 
Biaekstrap Fund was set up in the Cuban Sugar Stabilize-
. 
tion Institute with the total proceeds from the sale of 
Blackstrap manufactured during each crop season going 
int0 the fund. tt.Artiole four ( 4) of the decree states 
75 
that the CSSI will determine what part of the proceeds 
from the sale of blaekstrap is to go to the mill owners 
and to the colonos, in the following manner: 
'(a} it shall estimate the total amount obtained 
.-- from the sale of all blackstrap received on 
the basis of fifty per cent sugar content. 
(b) of the total Yalue received in this manner, 
it shall deduct the total expenses that have 
been paid. 
(e) of this net total seventy per cent. will go 
into a fund to be known as the colones share. 
(d) the net total of the mill share shall be 
distributed among the mill owners at the 
rate of the number of gallons of blackstrap 
received from each of them; the colones 
share shall be re-distributed among the 
colonos of each mill based on the volwne 116 of sugar cane delivered by each colonoa'fl 
Further gains for the colonos from the sale of blackstrap 
were provided in two decrees. ~residential Decree No. 
3209, October 15, 1945, provided that when the price of 
molasses was over four cents per gallon ••• the excess 
was to be shared in the proportion of fifty-three per cent 
for the mills and forty-seven per cent for the. colonos. 
A new decree, No. 915, Naroh 23, 1950, has raised the par-
ticipation of the cane grower to fifty per eent.n117 
The above decree is indicative of the political 
and social changes that are occurring in the sugar indus-
tr·y. The mill owners remain the major force but 11 they 
have been compelled to share both their powers and their 
ofits to an inereas 
·.!· 
11$ 
sugar workers. 11 The sugar workers have also gained 
.. 
benefits in the past few years due to the orientation 
of the government. The general tendency in the wage 
field has been to relate wages to the price of sugar. 
7 
The effect of this policy was to raise wages during price-
rising periods in the post-war years. When in 1947, 
there was a decline in official sugar prices, wages did 
not decline thanks to a government decree (Presidential 
Decree No. 4602, December 30, 1947} which froze sugar 
workers salaries at the peak 1947 level. This action has 
continued. 
The government has justified this action by con-
tending that an increasing sales vol~e has kept total 
value of the sugar crop from declining. Basically, tho 
the :Policy is unsound because wages are frozen before the 
volume of sales is known. aonsidering this policy in 
view of Cuba's export economy forcing her to meet com-
:Petition in marketing her sugar crop, artificial wage 
sup:Port s are unsound. 
The government laws and regulations that have gi 
the sugar cane growers and workers a greater share of the 
:Profits have had a decisive impact in the Cuban economy. 
By the "':Profit-sharing" method established, a greater 
purchasing :POWer was given to many more :People which can 
serve as a stimulus to domestic :Production by providing 
• 
an enlarging local market • 
Despite the social and economic ehanges that have 
occurred to benefit the masses in the sugar industry, 
their plight depends completely on the ability to dispose 
of' the sugar in the international market. 
Sugar Sales-1944-1951: 
In the years under consideration here, we will see 
the transition that Cuba made in disposing of her sugar 
-
crop. In 1944 and 1945, no real problem existed because 
of a demand built up by World War II. But, at the end 
. ·. . .. 
of the war in 1945, Cuba again had to resume. her search 
tor markets. The pressure was increasing consistently due 
to the constant increase of her sugar production. 
The bulk of the 1944 and 1945 sugar crop was sold 
to the United States Commodity Credit Corporation at 2~65 
cents per pound119 and 3.1 cents per pound120 , respecti 
The prices were f. o. b. Cuban ports. From the sugar erop 
255,000 short tons were withheld for domestic consumption 
in 1944 and 285,000 short tons in 1945. In 1945, 170,000 
additional short tons were withheld to meet barter trade 
agreements with other West.ern Hemisphere countries. 121 
Of the 4,100,000 short tons exported in 1945, 
seventy~six per cent went to the United States, fourteen 
.. -· 
per eent to the· United Kingdom and ten per cent to USSR, 
• 
78 
of the 117,000,000 gallons o~ blackstrap molasses export 
the United States received 94,000,000 with most of the 
122 
rest going to the United Kingdom. 
'l'he 1946 and 1947 crops were contract-ed to the 
Commodity Credit Corporation which acted as purchasing 
agent ~or the United Nations. For domestic consumption 
and direct sale to other countries, ~i~teen per cent of 
the sugar crop was reserved. One of the most salient 
J 
features of this two-year agreement was the '"escalator 
-
clause'" which specified that the price of sugar will rise 
above the minimum of 3.675 cents per.pQund of raw sugar, 
f.o.b. Cuban poEt when the prices of foodstuffs or the 
cost of living in the United States rises two per cent 
.. .. 
above the 140.,27 indice level of the last quarter of 
123 
1945. The result of this clause was to raise the a 
age price to about 4.18 cents per pound in 1946 and 4.9625 
cents per pound in 1947 which accounted f'or an increase 
of about forty per cent above the 1946 level in the total 
income from sugar sales of the 1947 erop.124 
The record sugar har-vest of' 1948 presented new pro 
lema of' disposal. The 1946-1947 sugar contract with the 
United States had been replaced with a new Sugar Agreement 
that limited the Cuban quota to 28.6 per cent of United 
States consumption. At the same time that Cuba was faced 
with a surplus production, the price of sugar was de ........................ 6 
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The anxiety that developed with these circumstances was 
relieved during the year when the United States Army 
purchased one million short tons in April, and when the 
United States increased the Cuban quota due to greater 
internal consumption in this country. By the end or 1948 
the total sugar crop had been contracted. The United 
States market had absorbed 3,110,.000 short tons; the 
United States Army 1,238,000 short tons; domestic eonsump 
tion 190,000 short tons; and the remainder was sold to 
countries other than the United States. The average 
price or 4. 33 cents per pound (:t<" o. b.} pl~s the sale or 
., 
blaekstrap, brought the total value or the crop to 
$625,000,000 or $70,000,000 less than 1947. The extra 
purchases @y the United States bailed out the Cuban 
economy and Cuba was able to maintain its level of pros-
125 
perity through 1948. 
The price decline that began in 1948 eoh.tinued 
into 1949. As a unilateral attempt to stimulate the 
price, Cuba by decree, -withdrew 1,350,000 tons .o"! sugar 
!.. . : ·. . . 
rrom the exportable quota. This program proved inerrec-
tive as prices continued to decline until May 1949. 
Again in 1949, the above-quota purchases o"! the ~ited 
' . 
Stat~s·government and army along with increased sales to 
the British disposed of the surplus that was feared at 
the beginning of the year. 0~ the raw sugar crop, 3,221, 0 
80 
tons were absorbed by the United States market; 443,000 
tons by the United States government ror use of the Army 
in Occupied Areas; 239,000 tons domestically; 749,000 
tons by the British government and the remainder to other 
countries including United States purchases for distribu-
126 tion through ECA. 
The total value of the sugar crop, including molass~s 
amounted to approximately $535,000,000 or about $8o,ooo,oop 
to $90.,000,000 less than the preceding year. The decline 
in total value was due to a great decline in the molasses 
prices with the sugar price averaging above the 1948 
127 level or at 4.80 cents per pound. 
Even though the total value or the ~948 and 1949 
crops show a decline from the 1947 peak, the industry was 
at a high level of prosperity which it continued to enjoy 
during 1950 and 1951. 
The main event that stimulated Cuban sugar activity 
in 1950 was the beginning of the Korean War in June of 
that year. The news of hostilities in Korea brought an 
air of optimism to the industry as it was ·Well aware of 
the possibility of increased sales during such a period. 
The close of 1950 saw the contracted sale of the 
total cr·op with shipment of all but 326,637 short tons. 
The value of the sugar plus molasses was $608,900,000, 
a substantial increase over 1949. The average price or 
,. 
\ 
.·• 
1 
. '\~ar was also higher in 1950--ll-.85 eents per pound as 
8 . I. 128 compared to 4. 0 eents ~n 19~9· 
The 1951 sugar crop was an abundant one which rapidLy 
approached the peak harvests of 1947 and 1948. The trend 
of slowly rising prices started in 1949 continued and 
brought the average price per pound up to 5.292 cents, a 
substantial increase over the previous year. This price 
rise and one in molasses brought the total value of the 
sugar crop up to $705·.ooo, 000, a 15.78 per cent increase 
over the preceding year and 1.43 per cent over the post-
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war peak reached in 1947. 
In this year we see a strong continuation of the 
attempt by Cuba to multiply her foreign markets. The 
. United States still remains Cuba•s largest purchaser but 
on a decreasing seale. Ot the 6,320,164 shirt tons expor-
ted in 1951, the Unit·ed States absorbed 2,905,508, the 
United Kingdom 954,764, and other countries 2,038,100 
short tons. The principal recepients were Japan, 373,284 
short tons; Holland, 339,594 short tons; Germany, 238,905 
tons; Belgium 166,137 tons; Greece 108,154 tons; Ireland, 
99,440 tons and Yugoslavia, 22,029.13° 
Thus, again in 1951, Cuba was able to dispose of a 
large sugar crop. But all indications were that it would 
be increasingly difficult to do so. In 1951, the United 
States legislature amended the 1948 Sugar Aot, one feature 
of which meant a cut of 245,000 tons of Cuban sugar 
quota exportable to the United States. In Europe the 
shortage of hard currencywas becoming greater and 
oaa$ing new problems in importing from such areas as 
Cuba which has a hard currency. 
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The sugar industry at the end of 1951 was confront 
with the same problems as it has always had, mainly dep 
denee on variations in international markets and prices 
well beyond tb,eir control. Because of the long prevail 
but nevertheless, expanding importance of the sugar in-
dustry, the economy was vulnerable to external factors 
~ore than ever before. It appears that the prosperity 
of the sugar industry during the war and post-war years 
was creating a situation of greater instability than had 
ever before existed ... 
~ Tobacco Industry: 
The Cuban t·obaeoo industry has been established 
for severa'l hundred years and the quality of its products 
is world renowned. It was al~ important to the Cuban 
economy in the past as the largest export crop. But since 
1899, the last year that tobacco exports exceeded ~ugar 
in value, the tobacco industry has been relegated to a 
lesser position in the economic life of Ouba. 
The tobacco industry, like the sugar industry, in-· 
.. 
~ =.' . . . ... . :.
·Agr,i~.tll."turally, it is considered. the third main activity, 
(sugar. and. livestock are first and seeond resp~eti vely) bu~ 
. ~ .. 
tb'baec~ products rank as· the seo:ond most important export. 
. . . 
The· tobacco. ·manufacturing process is important as an di-
versifien of the economy and as a source of' employment for 
many people on a seasonal basis. nThere are over five 
hundred cigar-making establishments, but as cigars are made 
sorted, banded, labeled and boxed entirely by hand, this i 
not ~trictly a factory industry. Cigarettes, however, ha 
long been made and packaged by ~ehinery.n131 
':Pobaeco is gr-own almost everywhere in Cuba, but 
different sections .of the island produce more or less se-
parate varieties. The growing areas are divideq into five 
regions which are known as Vuelta Abajo, Semi-Vuelta, 
Partido, Remedios and Oriente. These regions are listed 
in a west to east direction. In the Vuelta Abajo region 
located in Piner del Rio, is produced the finest quality 
of tobacco and accounts for forty-one per cent of total 
production in recent years. This region's tobacco is 
mostly used within Ouba for cigar-making. Just east of 
Vuelta Abajo,. lies the Semi-Vuelta region also located in 
Pin«r del Rio Province. This region produced a tobaeoo of 
stronger aroma that is in demand in the United States for 
blending. In recent years about four per cent of the tota 
•. 
.. 
crop was produced here. The region east of the Semi-Vuelta 
is the Partido which is southwest of Habana and produces 
tobacco that is used e:x:tensively;for wrappers on cigars 
manufactured for the English mar.lc.et.. Here three :Per cent 
of the crop is gro~ and it accounts .for seventy-five per 
cent of the shade-grown tobacco. East of t:Q.e ~artido lies 
the Remed·io whi.ch located in eastern Las Vi:llas and we.stern 
Camagu~y Province. This region.whieh accounts tor approxi-
mately fifty. p~r cent of the total Cuban tobacco growth, 
pr~duces an .ar'omati~, gWllilli-te:x:tur.ed tobacco that. ~s in 
great demand by Unit~d Stat.es ciga~ manutaot'urers because 
. . 
. Gf its uniformity and strpnger aroma .. From the ~riente 
region in oriente ~rovince comes three per e~nt of the 
tobacco crop, the quality of which is inferior with a 
.c;oarse te'Xture and strong arGma. It is used mainly in 
. . . 132 
manufactUre of cheap~~ grades of domestic cigarettes. 
The 'fh.e t_?baceo indust.ry .has been subjected to the var-
iations of the demand of·the international market. With 
domestic eonsumption!.aecounting for only forty per cent 
of the crop, the reliance on foreign markets is intense. 
In the period under consideration, foreign demand during 
1944 and 19~5 stimulated an expansion of the tobacco indus-
try. ·But with foreign demand beginning to decrease as 
early as 1946, the Cuban toba~co industry had to make a 
downward adjustment from a war-expanded prosperity to a 
, .. 
• 
.--
.,, 
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more nearly nor.mal peacetime basis. 
The war-time expansion and the peaoe-tfme adjustmen 
that were necessary are evidenced by acreage harvested 
. . 
(see Table 5}, annual production statistics and export 
volume and value figures. Ths inorea~ing domestic oonsump 
tion did not use the.surp1us created by weakening foreign 
demand. 
T.ABLE 5 
ACREAGE HARVESTED! AND PRODUCTION2 
Year Thousands of Acres Thousands or Po 
Harvested Produced 
1945 6 62,390 
1946 140 .,. 83,489 
1947 111 7.·7 ,107 
1948. 112 55,599 
1949 136 52,588$ 
1950 ll7 9.2,323 
1951 78,272 
I 
Even ~hough there was an increase of 31,000 har-
vested acres in 1945, the total production was slightly 
lower due to the severe drought and fertilizer shortage 
in late 1944. In Table 6, we also notice a "forty per 
cent decline in the number ot cigars exported in 1945 as 
COIIIJ?are~, to 1944. This waa due primarily to dl,-astio 
,. 
s 
~· ~. -, 
... 
. ·IJ ~· 
• 
: 
.. 
TABLE 6 
TOBAOCO EXPORTS-1944•51 
8; 
-
I I 
. 
· · · · · · · "Year · ·unstemmed Price Per· Stemmed Prioe Per '~ . 
-· 
.. Potinds 100 1bs. Pounds 100 1bs. 
I 
II. .. 
. . . 
,. 
1944 7,110,032 109.64 24.88.3,170 104.45 
',1945 8,64-6,187 111.71 20,950,385 13.3.66 
1946 20,345,787 74.03 25,140,148 1-25.10 
1947 12,146,917 80.53 14,308,528 130.8-2 
1948 16.806.991 67.78 11 , 297 , 5-51 111.45 
1949 11,723,715 83.51 14,297,761 113.10 
1950 13,983,067 79.75 13,047,152 119.03 
1951 21,896,713 65.94 . 15,706,137 119.62 
. 
- ... 
.. 
-
-
. 
.. 
< 
-
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TABLE 6 (continued)· 
TOBACCO EXPORTS-1944-51 
------------------~----.. ------------··~·---------------------- ~ Year Cigar Exports Average Prioe Total" Value 
1,000 Vnits !ler 1~000 . of Exports 
. 
1944 l~l~~l.J 98~32 $51,743,762 
1945 109,955 113.95 . . . 50,443,025 
1946 59,695 140.22 55,881,135 
1947 39,464 152,84 34,688,950 
1948 53,811 160.85 32,669,314 
1949 21,309 173.,31 29~785,015 
1950 20,424 184.69 30,575,143 
1951 36,956 167.39 39,520,430 
Souro~e:- Oul:>a, Eoonomiea y Finariciera ,-.~various issues. 
. 
"" 
~ 
. 
~ 
<» 
.....;J 
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1 dropping o:r sales to the United States .Armed Forces start .. 
·-
ing in 1945. In the lea:r tobacco eXpo~ts there is also a 
decline in 1945 as compared to 1944, but the prosperity o:r 
the tobacco industry was maintained through substantially 
higher prices. 
In 1946, the tobacco production was more than 
20,000,000 pounds over the 194~ total. This is accounted 
:for by greater per acre yield. dtie to :fine growing condi-
tions and eulti vation o:f increased acreage. Production 
:far exceeded domestic and external demand, and to partia 
relieve this situation, the government instituted a 
Tobacco :Stabilization Fund to purchase surplus tobacco. 
The :funds were obtained by·a one cent tax increase on 
cigarettes. During 1946 this new government agency 
withdrew 4,000,000 pounds o:r ansold tobacco :from the mar-
ket by paying the growers an average o:r :forty-two eents 
per pound.133 
As a means o:r controlling the size o:r the 1947 
tobacco crop, the government decreed that purchases o:r 
surplus tobacco would be made only :from those growers who 
did not increase their p+antings above the 1946 average. 
The ef:feetiveness of this decree is problematic, but the 
1947 crop did decline over o,OOO,OOO pounds. Even with a 
decline in production, vast surpluses of tobacco remainad 
on hand at the end of 1947 due to a large decline in 
• 
exports. From the export peak o~ $,5,88~,135 reached 
. . 
in 1946, exp·orts decreased.to $34,688,950t or a level very 
near the pre-war norm. 
In 1948, the price decline ~or stemmed and unsu~~wu~:~ 
tobacco accompanied by a twenty-two per cent decline in 
stemmed leaf exports was not offset by the increase in 
cigar exports and the export value ~urther declined six 
per cent. Meanwhile production decline had been brought 
about by decreasing plantings in line with a government 
degree limiting the size of the ·crop. It should be noted 
that the government limitation decrees are a dubiously 
e~fective means of control and, as an example, it suffices 
to say that the government in 1947 aimed at restricting 
the 1948 crop to ~orty-five million pounds, but the har-
vest exceeded ~ifty-:-:five .million pound~.l35 
The tobacco industry in 1949 was further depressed 
by decreasing exports of sixty per cent in cigars and 
thirty per cent in unstemmed leaf tobacco which was not 
offset by increases in stemmed tobacco exports or by 
higher prices. The export value thus decreased to the 
1943 level~ The main trouble was the loss o~ the European 
market which brought about by increasing dol1~r shortages. 
The decline :from the war-time prosperity that be-
gan in 1947 was arrested partially in 1950. A large part 
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of the recovery was due to a new ""commercial treaty with , 
Spain, Cuba's secgnd largest tobacco purchaser, which.enw 
136 larged Oubats export market~ 
By 1951, the upward trend in the tobacco industry 
~s further accentuated. Domestic consumption was at its 
highest peak~ Leaf'· tobacco exports were substantially 
higher than at any year since 1947, averaging about 10,000 00 
·~ounds over the annual exports f9r the years 1947 through 
1950. Part of the gain in 195l. was accounted for by a 
new commercial agreement between Cuba and the United King-
domwhich inclu~ed a clause which set tobacco exports at 
a ~ilf;mum of'.·$5~0,000 annually through 1953.137 
· ·· When .the aforementioned downward. adjustment had·to 
be nWde in the tobacco industry, the cigar manufacturers 
.. 
wanted to mechanize the making of eigars~ It was felt 
that· by lowering the cost of production and thus the' 
~ 
price of the product, the exportation of,_; cigars would be 
increased. But the hopes .of' the manufacturers were quell 
by the pressures of the' labor unions and the small manu• 
f'acturers. Only in-April 1950, after the .export sales of 
. the industry had receeded to pre-war levels did the Go 
ment issue a decree (Decro4ee No~ 1073 of April 4, 1950)·, 
whereby ffmachinery may be u~d by the cigar-manufacturing 
industry :for the production of all export cigars and for 
a maximum of' twenty per cent for domestic use.u l3S 
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' Labor had .. always feared· this type of decree as a 
potential cause of unemployment in the industry, but the 
only method open as a means of retaining her cigar indus-
try was to meet mechanized competition with modern mev~g~•11 
zation of her own production. Without mechanization, the 
decline of the industry would have continued because of 
loss· of markets due to high labor charges.. Although mech- · ,,. 
anizatiQn fs necessary for the greater portion of the C-0 --- 11 
industx:y, the nand-rolled, high quality cigar section 
should be maintained to supply the domestic and foreign 
luxury market. 
In summarizing the trend~ of the tobacco indaatry 
since 1944, we find a condition that is comparable with 
the sugar~industry in many respects. The tobacco industry 
.. 
experi:;n·ces great expansion and prosperity during the war 
years in its agricultural and industrial aspects. With 
end of the war there was a continuing large production 
above the pre-war level, a c~ndition similar to that in 
the ~t;tgar industry. But unlike the sugar industry, which 
was threatened with surpluses, but was fortunately able 
.- , to sell their production at fS\Vorable prices, the tobacco 
industry expe.rienced overproduction and resulting surpluse 
It was unable to regain or maintain many of its foreign 
markets.due to t~e weakened economic state of their cus-
tomers, namely, the shortage of dollars. 
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Even though over forty per cent of' the toba.cco in-
dustry's ·putput is domestically consumed, the tobacco in-
~ Q 
dustry is affected mainly by external :·oonditions not wiu.u. . .~.u11 
its control or the control of' the Cuban government. Much 
can be ~one through mechanization to strengthen the inter-
,natio.Iial' position of' the· industry • but this cannot be a c-
.' complished successf.ully with the prevailing attitude of' 
. labor and the'··support it receives f'rom of'ficial government 
policy. 
Other Agricultural Export Crops: 
Of' significance to Ouba because of' their nutritive 
value and because of their economic importance 
.ing domestic production and exports, are. these other 
cultural produots-~winter vegetables, citrus fruits, 
pineapples. I shall deal primarily with the exportation 
of' these various products. A quick glance at the export 
• 0 ' 
statistics of' various 'vegetable·s and fruits listed in 
Table 7, will immediately show that ·p~e~war a~erages for 
most exports was much higher than at anY. time during the 
period under consideration. Various reasons account tor 
these facts • 
. 
Firstly, the lack of' transportation faoilities.aur .... 
ing World War II caused a. decl~ine in production. Since 
f'ruits and vegetables -.~J?.at are exported are high-ly I)erish-
-
-
-, 
... •1 
.. 
·-
... 
'· 
,. TABLE 7 
.. 
EXPORTS OF SELECTED FRESH VEGETABLES AND FRUITS 
_. (in ki.J,.ogr.ams) . 
. . 
.. .. 
-· 
Vegetables Average 
' 
1935-39 '._. -1944 . 1945 1946 1947 
I I 
:- Squash ~ 83 882·· ·. 254,463 183.254 236,243 125,999 -~ Lima Beans .2,354,620 ·n.a. 63,646 536,169 542,164 
Pimientos • 1,658,620 35,56~ 30,190 177,796 645,724 
Cucumbers . :.· 728,142 362,243 528,498 917,441 1,351,719 
Tomatoes 22,329,448 8,761,768 -. 7, 980,747 16,042,.342 11,810,609 
Avocados- . . . 4,.,11.9,960 1,136,634 . 96,136 2l-560,241 2,587,515 
,Lemons _. 74,667 30,685 8,89lm 7,057, 2,170 . 
Grapefruits -~ 5,050,678 2,210,824 372,750 1,394,241 2,956,515 
·Pineapples 38,9p0,301 33,945,489 42,140,177 52,403,438 44,413,320 
Plantains · · 519,519 . 2,183,170 301,040 788,100 801,519 .' 
. 
Papayas . 96,050· 31,346 19,189 252,169 113,710 
Bananas 121,515,107 tot 24,570,129 26,359,240 44,273,735 43,533,974 
.-
. 
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. TABLE 7 {oon~inued) 
EXPORTS OF SELECTED FRESH VEGETABLES AND FRUITS 
. _· .. {in ~ilogram.a) . .. . . . . . . 
I 
II Vegetables 194.8 1949 1950 1951 ' I 
II . " 
Squash 88,.150 .118,663 ·' n.a. n.a. 
Lima Beans 425,810 327,201 n.a. n.a. 
Pimientos '323,261 297,541 n.a. n.a. 
Cucumbers 1,547,010 3,094,993 n.a. n.a. 
'rome toes 11,271,581 14,100,257 n.a. n.a. 
' 
•3,475,983 2,496,629 3,523,182 4,179,669 '• Avocados 
Lemons n.a.· 6,037 32,097 ' ' 3,172 . 
Grapefruits . 1,531,342 3,307,938 2,024,027 2,050,506 
. Pineapples 23,958,920 34,021,142 37,851,990 25$654,511 
Plantains . so1,e41 523,525 1,747,555 10,190 
Papayas . 132 36,406 ' 24,093 5,788 
. Bananas 27, 373', 078 14,791,954 6,014,704 2,057,511 
I 
n.a. ' not available. . . 
II 
•':j; Source: Report on Ouba, Tables 222~223, pp. 929,930. 
. 
. . :Phe Yearbook of the West Indies, 1952, Po 335 • 
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able, refrigerated shipping facilities must be available 
when the products are ready for shipment. Secondly, one 
must give consideration to the i.Q.stitution of price con-
. ' .· ' . 
trols in the United States which gr.eatly limited the profi 1 s. 
Thirdly, the war created ·such a demand for sugar at com-
paratively profitable prices without the risks involved in 
the growth of perishable products, that the farmers turned 
their lands to sugar cane production. And fourthly, we 
must consider the growing domestic market as absorbing 
an increasing share of the produce. 
Of the war years Shown in Table 7, the only crop 
that exceeded the 1935-39 average was pineapple in 1945. 
In the plantings for 1945 a greater acreage was devoted 
to pineapples. This increase was stimulated by shortages 
in the United States accompanied by high prices for fresh 
fruit. or the other fruits and vegetables exported, there 
was a decline due to a drastic lack of shipping facilities 
damage done by hurricane and drought and ceiling prices in 
139 the United States, the main purchaser of Cuban produce. 
In 1946, there is a noticeably sharp increase in 
the volame of exports. This was possible due to the war•s 
end which made shipping space more abundant. As shipping 
conditions reached a normal state by late 1946 and 1947, 
it became evident that Cuba had lost much of her produce-
market in the United States. High production and trans-
···. 
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:portation costs :placed the Cuban :producer in a :poor com-
peting :position with the winter producer in the United 
States. Added to this, are the problems of disease, 
drought and hurricane. BaiUU3.a exports for instance, were 
greatly reduced because of high production costs and plant 
disease in Cuba which improved the :position of Cubats com-
petitors in the United States market. The increase in 
domestic consumption cuased a further decline in exports 
of many products. 
The war scarcities abroad stimulated the export of 
canned tomatoes and pineapples, mainly in 1944 and 1945. 
But, with the return of adequate :production in the Unit~d 
States, imports from Cuba were drastically decreased. 
Here again hi&h non-competing production costs, import 
tariffs and :poorer quality were major causes for the 
decline. ·•. 
One other agricultural product that helps diversify 
Oubats exports is henequen, though in relation to the huge 
volume of sugar exports, it accounts for a relatively ~mal: 
:percentage of the total. 
Henequen raw fiber :preduotion for 1944-48 was below 
the pre-war level of thirty-five million pounds. This was 
due primarily to adverse weather conditions; namely, 
drought, and to labor difficulties during harvest time. B: 
1949, and continuing through 1951 henequen raw fiber 
production picked up substantially~ Production was thir 
five million pounds in 1949 and 1950, and 36,200,000 po 
in ~951 as we can see from Table S, below. 
Year 
1944 
1945 
1946 
1947 
TABLES 
HENE~UEN PRODUCTION 1944-1951 (in .pounds) 
Amount Year 
29,812,200 1948 
29,000,000 ~949 
31,000,000 1950 
28,700,000 1951 
.Amount 
28,000,000 
35,000,000 
35,000,000 
36,200,000 
Regarding exports of henequen, Table 9, below, 
indicates a decrease in total exports in relation to the 
pre-war average with the only exception of the year 1949~ 
One interesting factor, though, is the importance of manu-
factured exports tor 1944-46. This change w~s the result 
ot a governmental limitation on raw fiber exports. Be-
cause the demand tor henequen was large, especially due to 
purchases of the United States Armed Forces, the United 
States agencies were willing to ·buy the already processed 
fiber. While this demand lasted, the Cuban government 
could enforce its limitations of raw tiber exports. But 
with the war•s end and increasing oom.petition, the trend 
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the trend was reversed. Starting with 1947, exports of 
manufactured fiber dropped due to high production costs 
which placed the Cuban product out of competition in the 
' 
world market. "In fact, if the price of the f'iber should 
drop below a level of thirteen cents per pound, many of 
the producers would be operating at a loss. • • • ul40 
' (The 19.51 avera9e export price was twenty-four cents per 
potin.d~} 
Year 
1935-39 
average 
1944 
1.945 
1946 
1947 
1.948 
1.949 
1.950 
TABLE 9 
CUBAN EENEtUEN EXPORTS 19~-1951. 
(thousands _ of pounds J 
Raw Fiber 
18,439 
3,091. 
1,212. 
Manuf'actured 
Twine and Rope 
5,7-67 
12,767 
20,262 
10,939 
1951 .. _,1. 
846' ' 
1.0, 295 
1.2,941 
27,656 
19,500 
18,400 
6,903 
2,250 
2,01.8 
2,200 
3,500 
Total. 
24,202 
1.5,613 
21.,474 
11,785 
17,198 
1.5,191 
29,674 
21,700 
21,900,:, 
The Cuban henequen industry could become a more 
. 
stable and important one, if production costs were lower. 
Agricul tura1ly, it can be produced on sub-standard soils 
and Ouba produces a quality demanded in the world markets. 
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Industrially the technology of the Cuban industry is on a 
.Par with tha~ of other nations but the high wages paid 
quen workers makes its production costs soar. The saliemt 
factor of the henequen industry is that it provides year-
round employment in contrast to most of the agro-industr 
activities-in Cuba. 
Agricultural Products !2t Domestic Consumption: 
Production of foodstuffs for domestic cons\llll.l)tion 
naturally is very important to the Cuban economy as is 
shown by the fact that "meat production and dairying, ·in 
combined value of products, constitute Cuba•s second lar-
gest agricultural activity.n141 In 1951, fifty-four per 
cent of the wholesale value of fooQwas aecount~d for by 
meat, dairy products, rice, corn and potatoes, which make 
up the bulk of the Cuban diet. Dome~tic food production 
in 1951 was sixty-one per cent of the total wholesale 
142 
value of food. 
During the war and post-war period, the demand for 
meat in Cuba was high due to the greater purchasing power . 
of the average Cuban. But the supply of meat was not suf-
ficient to meet the demand. Droughts, gradual reduction 
in total number of cattle and the refusal of cattle ranu~~,~·~ 
to send.their herds to market, were the causes of the 
shortage. 
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' In 1945 and 194~, the drought particularly affected 
the.weight and size of cattlej. making, also, fewer ot them 
available tor market. During the first six months ot 1947, 
there was a severe shortage of meat in the urban areas be-
cause cattlemen refused to s~ni their products to market 
until the government allowed a rise in ceiling prices. 
In 1948, ·the same situation arose: _Even though the gov 
·~ ._, 
m.ent allowed meat importation 'on a reduced tariff basis 
and on many oceasions on a tariff-free basis, the meat 
~ supply was insufficient to meet domestic demand. In 1949, 
-· 
supplies beca.Iiie. more plentiful than they had been in the. 
tour previous years due to a rise in the ceiling price of 
meat···· It was estimated that cattle saaughterings in 1949 
14-3 
were three to tive;.per _cent above 1948 • 
.. ~.· . 'It 
•. ' DesP,;ite. the price increases allowed by the govern-
. . 
. ment, the income of. the cattlemen was still relatively 
smaller than that of growers of sugar cane or other crops • 
. The consequence was that more profitable crops were grown 
on the pasture land. This trend was well entrenched by 
end of 1951 and the outlook tor Cuba •·a beef supply was be-
coming bleak~ Ad~ to this, the increasing slaughter to 
meet demand and the picture of a decline of the livestock 
industry becomes apparent tor the future unless the go 
ment allows the livestockraisers an equitable profit. 
·-
'·l ' 
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· Domestic production of foodstuffs has never been able to 
.: ,, .· 
. ·,, .. 
. sup~ly the total needs of the country despite the estab-
.. ' . 
. ) 
· _li'shment in 1927 ,; of a high· tariff' on food imports. Sine 
•. < 
"th'e ·adoption _of the 1927 poiicy, advances have been .made, 
but witP, ·.a growing populat~on and. gre.e.ter purchasing power 
'· . . . . . ,.. 
the de,n;_aP:d· for ~mpo~ted f'oodst~ffs hal- not declined very 
'-· 
.much •. To ind.icate the relianc~ on.. tooci' .. imports, we can 
say that in 1951·, thirty-nine p~r cent of the whol~.sale 
. . 144 
value of foodstutts was of foreign source • 
. 
Of the basic foods in the Cuban diet, rice i~ con-
sidered the most important and is becoming .more so as per 
·,.capita consumption is. increasing annually. "Its impor-
tance in the diet is shown by th, fact that in 19?1, it 
made up an estimated elev~n per cent of the volame of food 
consumed in Cuba, about eighteen per cent of the. ca&oric 
intake, and represented about seventeen per cent of the . 
money Cubans spent {on the wholesal·e level) tor f'ood.nl45 
Rice production in Cuba has been increasing with 20,000 
additional acres planted to rice since 1945. But the in-
crease of domestic production has paralleled increased 
consumption so that percentagewise the gain has been sligh 
Domestic production f'or 1944-51~ has annually approximated 
f'ifteen per cent of total consumption. 
Oohsidering the importance of rice in the Cuban 
diet, and the fact that about eleven per cent of total im-
.... 
•.. · 
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port value is expended on rice, it would appear that rlee 
production should be in:tensifi~d. The economic value of 
meeting consumption needs with a.larger percentage of 
domestic production is seen when one takes into account 
the amount of money that would be freed for the purchases 
of durable consumer goods and machinery. ·Also, rice pro-
duction could provide some hedge against the vulnerability 
of an economy dominated by one crop, sugar. Ita overall 
importance is further enhanced because the ~industry func-
tions during the so-called 'dead seasont when a third of 
146 Onban labor is idle •••• ff 
In regard to other foodstuffs, the increased demand 
of the war and post-war years has had to be met by impor-
tation. Because shortages were evident in many products, 
the government allowed tariff-free imports. A consistent 
shortage of domestic production of dairy produc~s had to 
be met by imports. Continually fro$. 1944-1951, decrees 
. .... 
:;;, 
were issued allowing' tariff-free imports of condensed milk 
butter and eggs. 
' ;._., 
To briefly summarize: Domestic production of food-
stuffs has not increased sufficiently to lessen the impor-
tance of import-ed f·~od lll. the Cu,ban diet. Advances have 
.. 
been made since 1927, but in comparison to the pre-war 
levels, the percentage of foodstuffs supplied domestically 
has not increased. Domestic production though can be 
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credited with supplying an equal percentage.of food sup-
plies as the population increased. The commercial policy 
of encouraging domestic food production set forth in 1927, 
has continued through the post-war period and it .should be 
intensified. In this way the economy could be so streng-
thened that it could better stand the hardships in times 
pf international recession which from time to time affects 
Cuban sugar trade. Thus, the lack of foreign exchange 
would not affect so strongly the total supplies of vital 
foodstuffs. 
Cubats Mining.Industry: 
The mining industry in Cuba depends extensively 
upon exportation which causes production .to vary according 
to foreign demand. During the war period, the expansion 
of production was brought about by United States war time 
., 
requirements. Table 10~ below indicates the production 
·trends during the war and post-war l(ears. 
From this·table we can see that production increase 
.. . . .. . 
;wer.~ ·. re&istered in every field of mining during the war 
. . ~ ... 
. . '~~ . 
, per~bQ,.~ with copper being the only exception. As we have 
said above, the responsible factor was the increased war 
time needs o;f the United St.a:tes. It was indeed fortunate 
. . ' ·~ 
for the United States that Cuba had the necessary res<,:>urc 
.,, 
and the manpower to work the mines. .C1:1.ba, too, benefited 
-
-
TABLE 10 
. . 
CUBAN MINERAL PRODUCTION-1939-1951 
_ . (in Long Tons) 
. 
Year Copper· · Manganese Manganese Chemical Refractory Metallurgical Nickel 
Concentrates Ores Nodules Manganese Ohromite _Ohromite Oxide 
1939 4 39,34.5 102,415l n.a. n.p. 59 562 n.a. n.p. 
1942 . 31,692 104,745 140,745 n.J? • 266:466 15,479 . n.p. 
1943 21,808 145,008 161,290 n.p. 341,612 6,946 1.5 
1944 21,830 120,295 133,496 n.p. 170,484 18,612 6,163 
1945 26,610 64,639 130,236 250 159,059 10,840 13,929 
1946 34,165 38,000 88,123 5,521 167,254 4,430 14,340 
1947 . 40,792 43,144 n.p. 4,766 150,354 6,340 2,576 
1948 49,474 23,531 n.p. 5,082 109,612 5,170 n.p. 
1949 53,489 50,534 n.p. 10,982 92,987 3,543 n.p. 
1950 61,745 70,987 n.p. 6,971 64,310 470 n.p. 
1951 59,218 143,039 n.p. 8,618 77,816 n.{). 14,406 
LTota1 _or manganese ore and nodules. 
Source: Report on Cuba, pp •. 981,987,992. -
Economic Review of Cuba, 1945,1946,1947, 1948, 1949. 
Annual Economic Review-Cuba, 1951. 
n.a.~ not available n.p. ~ ne production 
. 
....., 
~I 
J 
I 
I 
I 
I 
. 
I 
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from the United States purchases·as it provided employmen» 
for many thousands of Cuban V'brkers and :turther strengthAnr: !'\ 
Ouba 1 s positive balance of trade with the United States~ 
One indication of' the United States interest in Cuban min-
erals was their investing $32,000,000 to develop the Nicarc 
Mines for the extraction and production of nickel oxide. 
With the end of hostilities in 1945, the United 
States government discontinued its strategic minerals pur-
chase program in Cuba which accounts for the decline in 
production in the post-war period, with copper as the only 
exception. Again another Cuban indus try had pegged itself 
to foreign demand., making ·it vulnerable to the supply and 
demand of the foreign purchaser. 
By 1947, the decline was evident. The United States 
agencies discontinued operating the Nicaro Nickel Mines 
and the production of manganese nodules was terminated due 
to the exhaustion of satisfactory grades of ore. Although 
mineral production was declining, active exploration and 
developmental work was carried on in 1948 in search of new 
reserves. The pJurpose of this was to fim higher grades 
of ore so that:Ouba 1 s mineral production costs would be on 
a competitive level with that of other nations. 
The general mining picture for 1949, was more satis-
factory than for 1948, the :tirst half of 1949 being better 
io6 
than many previous years. But the improvements except 
~or copper and manganese, did not last into the ~ourth 
quarter. ~ncreased demand by United States buyers raised 
production of manganese to more than twice the amount 
produced in 1948 • 
.Again in 1950 and 1951, United States stockpiling 
demand, created by hostilities in KOrea caused renewed 
activity in the mining industry. Copper and manganese 
production increases were registered in both years. The 
most important development in 1951, was the re-opening of 
the United States government-o\vned Nicaro Nickel Mines. 
At the time o~ re-activating the minest plans were to 
operate at ~ull capacity. 
The trends of the war and post-war periods in the 
Ouban mineral industry prove that production increases and 
decreases are due to oscillations in ~oriegn demand. 
The only mineral activity that is carried on com-
pletely ~or internal consumption is the production of 
petrolewm. Domestic production provides a very small per-
centage o~ total consumption. During the post-war years 
much exploratory drilling was done by various foreign 
groups. The period of greatest exploration was ~rom 1946 
through 1948. "In e~~orts to stimulate petroleum. explora-
tion, the government suspended taxes and duties on imports 
of machinery and implements for drilling oil wells, and 
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appropriated $500,000 for the purchase of a rig for drill-
ing wells of 10,000 feet, such equipment to be loaned to 
private enterprises.~147 
~nufaoturing Industry !n Ouba-1944-1951: 
In a discussion of Cuban industry, it is necessary 
to make a distinction between those industries connected 
with sugar-and the so-called non-sugar industries. The 
basic reason for the differentiation is the need to seper-
ate the semi-manufacturing of sugar cane from the fabrica~ 
tion of raw materials into consumer goods. The industrial 
processing of sugar, or milling, is actually a semi-manu-
facturing process as the product of the Cuban sugar mill 
is exported in raw form, needing further refining to pre-
pare it for consumption. 
The transformation of raw materials into finished 
products shall be dealt with in this section. These non-
sugar industries hold for Cuba a hope of creating an eennnniu-
t,hat is less subject to the fluctuation of international 
economic trends. 
The development of non-sugar industries, to meet 
the demand for consumer goods which· are now imported, 
would lessen tbe intense need to export to cover the costs 
of her imports. Besides placing the economy in a stronger 
position, the economic gains obtained from producing goods 
!=-~~======================~===+==== 
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domestically (providing ern.ploym.en t, stimulating raw materilll 
production, and retaining within the country the product 
of its labor}, would more than counteract any loss in ex-
ports. The problem of diversifying the Cuban economy is 
indeed very complex, but one that must be solved. 
Within the non-sugar industrial activities are two 
distinct groups, those dependent upon domestic raw materiaJ!s 
and those dependent upon imported raw materials. .ln 
general, the level of activity of both groups was high 
during the war years, but again there is a differentiation. 
~hose industries that were dependent ~on local supplies 
were capable of peak production. Included in this group 
are such industries as cement, brick, tile, candy, shoes 
and tobacco. (Naturally, those industries like alcohol, 
which are sugar-users had sufficient supplies.) In con-
trast to the peak production of industries based on domes-
tic raw materials, were those dependent upon imported raw 
materials. The output of these industries, textiles, soap, 
tires, and others)were severely restricted. But with the 
end of World War II and the freer availability of imported 
materials~ these industries operated on a considerably 
more active basis. 
Industrial output ih general during 1946 was geared 
to the economic prosperity of the whole country. The war 
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limitations placed on the textile industry were relieved 
wiih removal by the United States of export control on 
cotton yanns along with a greater availability of,,rayon 
yarns. Because of adequate supplies and high l·ocal de-
mand, the textile industry produced at peak levels. In 
contrast, the shortages of fat imports seriously mimit~d 
the soap industry and labor difficulties limited domestic 
production of truck and bus tires. In the war-expanded 
industries of candy, alcohol and diamonds, declines from 
the 1945 level were general. In the.eandy industry, ex-
ports to the United States were out d~e to unsettled trade 
negotiations and declining demand. The alcmhol industry 
:• 
decline was also due t·o" weakening United .States demand. 
Labor problems, ~a;niy wage oohflicts, which interrupted 
the productive rhythm arid raised productio~ costs, put 
the Cuban diamond industry out of the competitive market 
causing three-fourths of the factories established during 
the war to close doWn.3.:48 , 
Despite setbacks in various industries, high local 
demand brought about by prosperity, kept other industries 
at peak levels. •. Cement production was unable to .meet de-
mand of new construction. Increases were registered in 
production of beer~· footwear, glass containers, tobacco 
products, paper products and soft drinks. 149 
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From Table 11, below, flQutput or Principal Oommodi-
ties11, industrial production trends of the post-war period 
can be appraised. The industria;L aativities of major in-
terest here are those of production for domestic demand. 
The shortages ot the war period stimulated industrial 
productivity through 1946 and 1947, but by 1946, supply 
was more than sufficient to meet internal demand beaause 
of the availability of imported goods in addition to 
domestic. 
F+om Table 11, a sharp drop in production of cot 
piece goods from the 1947-46 level is evident. The 
factors accounting for this were a consistently declingng 
demand at the retail level, coupled .with heavy wholesale 
and retail inventories and falling prices. Added to these 
domestic factors were imported goods of equal or better 
quality and lower price. The manufacturers blamed the 
crisis in domestic production on foreign competition and 
pressed the government to impose import controls on tex-
tiles. The government felt obliged to do so and on July 
10, 1946, import licensing was established by Resolution 
No. 530 of the Ministry of Commeree.15° This decree, 
however, was drastically modified in September due to de-
nouncement of it as a violation of GATT. the General Agre 
151 
ment on Tariffs and Trade. 
e 
TABLE 11 
OUTPUT OF PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES•l946-1951 
Industry and Unit 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 
Alcohol ~- l,Ooo·ts litres ·192;376 ·143,195 89,629 145,414 84,857 · 68,591 
Cigarettes •- millions 7,059 7,327 7,691 7,808 8,105 8,372 
Cement -- l~ooo•s barrels 1,414 1,625 1,676 1,837 ~,860 2,246 
Cotton piece goods -- l,OOO's yds. 48,000 57,900 38,868 27,611 381466 36,295 
Rayon piece goods -- n "' n.a. 1,600 2,000 796 2,449 2,632 
Rayon tire cord -- l,OOO' s lbs... n.p. n.p. n.a. 3, 780 6,329 9,058 
Rayon filament yarn - n ,. " n.p. n.p. n.a. 2,022 3,368 3,364 
Rayon staple..... n " n.p. n.p. n.a. 1,768 6,827 7,64.7 
Carbonated Beverages - "! oases 17,000 20,000 21,000 19,000 18,500 20,000 
Beer·-- 1' litres 81,365 84,384 99,608 96,513 104-,293 125,518 
Tires -- ~ units 53,396 65,881 58,749 53,050 87,299 110,213 
Inner Tubes -- . " 45,092 41,503 33,906 33,994 46,260 51,309 
Paper ~- . · . short tons 23,500 25,000 25,000 24,000 28,067 28,966 
Canned Milk -- l~OOO's oases f. 684 747 695 1,000 1,184 1,084 
11 Powdered Milk -- : " :' lbs. ", 107 118 113 200 691 1,374 Peanut Oil-- '·"' .n 12,000 11,000 6,500 4,000 2,100 2,000 
Paint -- " gals. n.a. 1,139 1,233 1,271 n.a. n.a. 
i II Soap -- '!, 1bs. '· n.a. 1 80,000 91,000 100,000 n.a. . n.a. 
11 
... 
Leather feo:bWe'ar " prs. 9,,500 10,000 8,000 5,850 6·;3"52 6,300 
Rubber footwear.:; 11 " n. --- 3,740 2,561 3,086 3,409 3,581 
~ - II "~" • 
n.a. :. ri.ot avail.able. n.p. ·.::.no production. 
1oombined leather and rubber footwear.- .. 
Source: Eoonomio Review of Cuba, 1946-1949, 1951. 
~ 
~ 
; .. , .. 
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In 1949 cotton textile production reached the low-
est ebb of the post-war period~ The textile workers and 
industr-y alleged that the chief" cause was importing o.f 
. ' , 
textil;es at «dumping -prices", i.e. p_rioes lower· tb.an those 
prevailing at their respective points of origin.- The· 
government tried to aid the industry by establishing, 
special supplem·entary regulations governing documentation 
of textile exports to Cuba and by extablishing a six per 
cent ad valoren tax on all imported and domestic textiles, 
the revenue of which was to be used as a subsidy to tex-
tile workers. But the government controls did not stop 
declining production.152 
As is evident from Table 11, textile production 
increases were registered in 1950 and 1951. The greatest 
stimulation to increased production in 1950 was tbB wave 
of scarcity buying at the. wholesale and retail level 
brought about by Korean hostilities. The 1951 increase wa 
due to two factors: first, the high level of retail sales 
and second, the establishment in June, 1951, of a new pro-
tective tariff on cotton and rayon textiles under pro-
vision of GATT. These new tariff regulations allowed the 
Cuban cotton industry to provide a greater percentage of 
. i53 
its own needs. 
Throughout the post-war period increases were reg 
tared in the cement industry due to the demand resulting 
~rom the construction boom which lasted through the ~irst 
si:x: months o:f 1951. The construction _increases that were 
registered in 1950 and early 1951 were brought about by 
a ~ean .o~ a material~ shortage and higher costs plus the 
prospect o~ selling sugar at a sellerts price because o~ 
154 '· hostilities in Korea. . At the end o~ 1951 when armis-
tice talks were begun and materials costs were rising, the 
' .. 
construction industry started to decline. This did not 
. ' 
af'~ect, however, the cement. inP:Astry,:;;as domestic product 
was still not enough to f'ul:fill demand. 
One other factor that ereated a high demand :for 
cement was the public works program o:f the government. 
Throughout the war and post-war perl,.~d, the developmental 
- . 
program of the government was at a_high peak due to the 
greater availability of r·evenue ·a.r;t~ the issuance o:f loans 
:for public works programs. 
Further increases in cement output can be expected 
i:f'the level o:f prosperity remains high as private con-
struction· and governme~tal public works are expected to 
continue. 
The sh~e industry since 1948, has operated on a 
lower scale than that o:f the war years. From Table 11, 
one sees that leather :footwear production has stabilized 
at approximately si:x: million pair aiU1ually, while produoti 
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o'f rubber 'footwear has.increased. This phenomena is due 
to a change in the habits o'f the ·consumer who has developed 
·a greater affinity toward non-leather shoes. The decrease 
in total production is due to the loss of export markets 
and also to a lower domestic cemand. 
Greater purchasing power was responsible for the 
maintenance of industrial activity at a relatively high 
level throughout the post-war period. Those industries 
whiph had little or no outside competition, fared well; 
as e)cample, the beer and carbonated beverage industries. 
Protective tari'f'fs have allowed other industries to main-
tain fair levels 'for production but some o'f these high-
cost indust~ies create the bi@gest problems. Their exis-
tence today is due to subsidies and protective policies. 
Their future in times of economic reseasion is questionablE • 
Only through more efficient productive processes and 
reasonable lab&r costs will they be able tp exist. 
Throughout the. post-war period, government policy 
towards industry has been 'favorable. Realizing the need 
~or diversi'fioation, the government through various measurE!S 
has attempted to stimulate industrial development. AnotheJ 
'factor responsible for the governm.ent•s attitude is a con-
certed ef'fort to avoid a repitition of consumer goods 
shortages which developed in Ouba. during World War II. 
-~. 
• 
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The first major step taken by the Cuban government 
to.st~ul.ate industrial development was Executive Decree 
Bo. 833 of April. 3, 1944. This decree allowed the ffim-
porting into Cuba of machinery, tools and accessories for 
establishing new industries from the United States free 
. 155 
of import duties for a three-year period.u The decree 
defines new indl;_lstries as those which may be established 
in the country subsequent to April 3, 1944, and which will 
not be engaged in the elaboration or.manufaoture of prow 
ducts already being produced. Exemption from payment of 
import duties is also extended 'bo machinery imported for 
use in already existing industries, provided the produc-
tion of such industries is less 'bhannthirty per cent of 
the national consumption. 
Decree No. 1831 of Jul.~ 13, 1945 extended the above 
deere~ to all industries, new or old. Under this, all 
types of machinery, apparatus and equipment for industries, 
public utilities companies, and public works were exempted 
for three years from payment of impo~t duties, consular 
fees, and any other imposts. The only proviso of the de-
cree was that the imported articles are not available from 
domestic Ouban producers. 
In 1948, the industries favored by De~ee 1831 had 
their exemptions extended for three more years. "The , 
-.. 
privilege was broadened to inc&ude equipment needed for 
. . 
-~~~--------------------------------~-----
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exp,ansion of the same industrial plant~, establishment 
of branch factories in the s·afu:e line, recovery of by-pro• 
ducts or even the establishment by these same comptlnie·s .. 
of supplementary industrial plants manufacturing products 
. 156 
which are not new to Cuba~ 
-
.. 
'.~ .; 
By Decree No. 4089 of January 3, 1946, those indus~ 
•· 
tries established after September 1, 1939 (the wa~ indus-
tries) which manufactured goods not prev.iously produced 
·':('.;. 
in ·cuba, were exempted for three years from custom duties 
on imported raw materials sp~_cific taxes on demestic raw 
·materials and/or from capital ievies and other fimcal bur~ 
dens affecting corporation stock 'and the exportati.on off 
money for purchase of ma:terials abroad. However, .the 
principal piece of Cuban legi~lation for the ·attractio.ll 
1· • .. 
. ~ .. 
of newindustri,es was Decree No. 2144 of August 1.4, 1945. 
This d~9re~ ._reproduced the special pr.ivileges .9:?noeded to 
industry~.by deeree No. 831 mentioned above, but· it also 
,,I .. 
included riew concessions and privileges that made the 
general conditions for the establishment of new industries 
stiil more attractive. Some of the speeial concessions 
and privileges are: 
(a) a thl-ee-year exemption from custom duties and 
eharges.~:.On all materials to be used in constr uc-
tion ot f~rctories, provided the materials are 
not produced or available in Cuba. 
.. 
;. 
•• ,f 
ll~ 
(b) a ·six-year exemption from excess profits taxes, 
oapital ·ta.s, stock issue taxes and levies on,. 
interest Of .mortgages and other loans. : ·; 
{d) 
a ten-year exemption on the-payment of duty and 
tax on raw mate~ials imported tor use in the 
manufacturing process, provided such materials 
are not:available in Cuba. 
a ten-year exemption from the payment of the 
normal tax: on profits in proportion to the 
value of c·uban raw materials used in the manu-
facturing pro.cess, provided Cuban raw materials 
equal a minimum of one-third of the total 
value of raw material used. 
_;(e) ·on computing profits tax, new industries are 
· authorized to depreciate fixed assets at 
. twenty per eent annually over a five-year 
period beginning.two years following the 
start of operations by the industry.l57 
~ 
From these dec,rees, ·it is evident that the Cuban 
government realizes that such inducements ara necessary to 
.,.· 
attract new industries a~d to maintain t~em through their 
initial :phases of operation. The success of -these efforts 
can be judged by the fact that approximately fifty new 
industrial concerns were chartered through 1951. The most 
important new enterprise to be established was a large 
and modern rayon plant. In 1951, another significant ad-
dition was made with the opening of Productos Agrioolas, 
. . 
B.A., for the production of flour and animal feeds. Among 
others opened in the post-war period were factories for 
roo~'products, chemicals, fertilizers, wire products and 
.;..·· 
det.ergents. 
*· 1'. 
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Under Decree NA. 2144 attractive tax exceptions 
were also ~ade to stimulate the use of. native raw material 
as an attempt to diversify the agricultural and primary 
activities in Cuba. The success of this effort has been 
iimited by the :fact that the largest new industries, 
rayon, :flour, milling, chemicals and fertilizers;· ... are 
primarily dependent upon imported raw materials. 
In trying to analyze the total benefit of these 
decrees, one must take into account that many old indus-
tries which are beset with intense labor problems, in-
surmountable resistance to modernization and other di:f-
:ficulties, are given very little consideration by the 
government. What appears to be the result, at least in 
part, :from this bulk of protective legislation, is that 
the older industrial :firms are changing to o,ompl~tely new 
lines to benefit :from the special inducements and privi-
leges, ~king the total net gain in industrial activity 
' 
rather small. 
Cuba's Foreign Trade: 
In the analysis o:r Cuban foreign trade there are 
three factors that are most evident: (1) the importance 
·Of sugar and cane derivatives in· the export field; 
(2) the importance o:f :rood products in the import field; 
(3) the importance of the United States as a consumer of 
Cuba•s exports and as a supplier o:f her imports. In this 
: . . 
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TABLE 12 
. -
VALUE OF EXPORTS FROM CUBA BY GROUPS 
Group 1944 1945 1946 1947 
1 and animal 
products 4,379,818 6,213,447 7,626,789 5,582,150 
s,earth and 
mineral product~ 18,321,231 29,392,046 23,562.,004 11,439,494 
tals and manu-
factures thereor 622,351 1,176,390 1,699, 713 2,540,086 
t products 3,740,277 5,451,610 3,207,516 3,542,086 
od products 15,722,521 19,408,664 29,672,549 20,:420' 259 
r and Oane 
derivatives 32.3,829, 034 294,793,318 350,309,717 662,724,097 
" af and tobacco 
manufactures 51,686,253 50,447,655 55,601,909 34,650,371 
emical·and phar• 
1,222,256 694,134 f~ 646,022 macaetica1 prods. 1,409,429 
sce1laneous 7,787,482 1,819,343 3,490,032 5,039,760 
TOTAL 427' 058' 296 409,924,729 475,864,.363 . 746,502,328 
ar and·Cane 
derivatives ·as .. . . 
percentage of total 76% 72% 78% 89% 
.. 
·e 
TABLE 12 (continued} 
VALUE OF EXPORTS FROM CtlBA BY GROuPS 
••• 
. --~ ~-r 
I Group . ____ 194~---- 1949 1950 1951 .. 
Anim.a1 and animal 
products 
Stones, earth and 
mineral J?roduet s 
!Metals and manufac-
tures thereof 
Forest products 
Food products 
Sugar and Oane 
5,229,090 
_8,330 ,422 
4,280,211 
. 3,037,162 
15,091,264 
deri va ti ves 
Leaf and Tobacco 
637,730,984 
manufactures 
Chemical and phar-
1 
maauetical prods. 
Miscellaneous 
32,868,888 
-902,948 
2,401,492 
TOTAL 709,872,461 
Sugar and Oan.e 
derivatives as 
percentage of total 90% 
5,474,318 
6,464,333 
4~036,560 
5,039,066 
10,178,436 
511,532,959 . 
29,875,360 
834,065 
4,87~,599 
578,307,696 
88% 
~--··---- - --- ~,[ 
4,871,858 
12,390,807 
2,542,011 
3,094. 745 
7,322,111 
572,302,409 
30,379,948 
641,006 
. 8,504,400 
642,049, 295· 
89% ~-
8,064,586 
14,547,807 
2, 7"59 ,164 
13,745,078 
6,183,153 
676-,191,71.5 
39.590,982 
679,478 
5,378,101 
766,140,124 
88% 
.. ~ 
ll .•• , 
.. ~. 
1-' 
l\) 
0 
Sourae: Cuba, Eoonomioa y Finanoiera, dune 1952, l?· 45. 
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section the most significant trends shall be analyzed. 
In Table 1~ the overall importance of sugar and 
cane 4erivatives is immediately evident. In the post-war 
period sugar and sugar by~~poducts played an increasingly 
important role in Cubats total exports. The annual varia-
tions that are shown· in Cuba ts· total trade: are directly 
related to the variations that occur in value df.sugar 
exports. The disturbing factor is that the trend -indic-
ates a greater reliance upon sugar exports in the post-
war years when diversification was made the €foal. The 
trend seems to show a f'lirther intensification of the 
mono-export sickness. 
Taking into consideration the fact that much of 
Cuba's.·need'ed foodstllf'fs and industrial equipment are av,a 
•. ' >\ 
able only through importation which are paid for eco~omi­
cally speaking, by exports, one can immediately picture 
the great importance that sugar plays f'or the welfare ot 
the country. 
When we .realize, as we have said before, that ex.;;; . 
-:..'· 
portation of sugar depends ~on conditions outside of 
Cuban control, external demand, quota-controlled markets, 
nationalistic pol~cies abroad, and in post-war years, se-
vere shortages of ''hard" currency, i"t; becomes clearer why 
Cubats economy is unstable. Thus, in·attempting to predio 
its future from the recent trends of her export trade, the 
,. 
>-",. 
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logical conclusion see.ms to _be that it wil.l show still 
a greater instability. It. would appear that only by ~~~~~~ 
sugar a relatively~~important factor and by diversifying 
her internal productive forces ean the economy be streng-
thened. 
From Table 12, the variations from the war years 
to the post-war years serve as indicators of the manner 
in which Ouban minerals and food products are in demand 
in the world market. only in times of world crisis. In 
both. elassifioations the war years show a gradual increase 
in value of exports while immediately following the warts 
end, there is a eonsistent- decrease in their export value. 
In 1950, we see a mineral export inorease due to the de-
mand oT the United States brought about by the KOrean 
conflict. In the tobaeco gro~ of exports, the pattern 
of high war exports is followed by consistently declining 
post-war exports. It has been hoped that non-sugar expor 
such as these would help to mitigate rather than accen-
tuate export fluctuations, but the course followed from 
1943 to 1951 appears to indicate the futility of this 
hope. 
One important trend that Should be noted is the 
destination of Cuban exports. The trend is evident from 
Table 13, below. There it can be seen that the importance 
of the Un!ted States as a purchaser of Cuban goods is 
-TABLE 13 
TOTAL VALUE .OF OUBAN EXPORTS AND PERCENTAGE BY DESTINATION: 
'·. 
o the To other To the 
Year United States American Countries United Kingdom Other Oountrie 
1942 
1943 
1944 
1945 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
'"" .. "' % Value % Value % Value % 
164,109,000 90 8,840,000 5 
295,620,000 84 14,085,000 4 
379,975,000 89 10,882,000 2 
323,331,000 79 28,912,000 7 
320,684,000 67 44,931,000 9 
497,706,000 67 39,817,000 5 
366,407,000 52 29,896,000 4 
369,802,000 64 17,486,000 3 
380,868,000 59 18,794,000 '3 
417,401,000 54 41,074,000 5 
.. ri" •• "'- ~A--~~~-- -~4~---4---
;,615,000 3 
34,884,000 10 
23,242,000 6 
34,629,000 8 
64,003,000 14 
133,208,000 18 
94,655,000 13 
70,019,000 12 
95,553,000 15 
104,924,000 14 
+ ........... _ , n t::"l 
-
~n 
3,811.000 
6,034,000 
12,959,000 
23,052,000 
46,246,000 
75,861,000 
218,824,000 
121,000,000 
146,834,000 
202,741,000 
• 
2 
2 g 
10 
10 
31 
21 
23 
27 
..... 
N 
\.1.) 
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is declining, though still remaining Oubats largest cus-
tomer. The high percentages for the war years can be 
qu~ckly related to the war demand of the United States and 
the unavailability of cargo ships for exportation to other 
countries. In the post-war years the trend has been 
clearly established and can be interpreted mainly in ,terms 
of sugar. It has become vitally important for Cuba to 
enter into commercial agreements which have been bi-later- ,.. 
al in character, with as many nations as possible to find 
markets for her consistently increasing sugar production. 
This policy has been necessary to attempt to lessen the 
impact of fluctuati~ns in the United States market in whicl 
Ouba is only a marginal supplier. By having more markets, 
the fluctuations will not be as violent. 
In the discussion and analysis of Cuban imports, thE 
trends in the importation of foodstuf'..fs, capital goods and 
raw materials for industry are important. In Table 14, 
.. belew, these trends can be appraised. 
Throughout the war and post-war years, the importa-
tion of food products.h~s been the most i~ortant item 
in Cuba's import trade. Even though foodstu1'fs account 
for approximately thirty per cent of the total value of 
imports in the post-war years, the long-term trend since 
1927, when a high protective tariff on foodstuffs was 
insti~uted, has been a reduction in the relative share of 
e 
TABLE 14 
--
VALUE OF IMPORTS INTO OUBA BY GROUPS 
tones and earth 17~989,742 20,524,887 25' 29 -Metals and their alloys 14,511,680 19,432,836 24,402,272 
Materials in chemical 
industry 24.451,009 26,920,880 31,928,950 
Cotton and its manu-
factures 18,032,752 17,660,449 24, 92!', 738 
Vegetable fibers 22,168,693 19,867,014 27,348,975 
Wool, hair, and manu-
factures thereof 1,776,156 2,131,931 4,291,562 
Silk and manufactures .. 
thereof 47 t831 85,248 463,946 
per products 7,063,503 11,757,774 14,118,667 
Wood products 5,846,937 4,418,369 5,011,804 
Animalsand animal products3,173,382 .4,077 ,549 4,255,522 
Agricultural and indus-
17,936,031 34,940,681 trial machinery 9,928,122 
Food products 68,751,754 81,271,593 83,796,221 
Tobacco Products 275,642 315,760 565,455 
Miscellaneous 8.,312;559 11,797,471 16,636,160 
Free list 1e,~:ra,et2 6,737,715 1,251,704 
TOTAL 177,323 '720 208,648,454 300,227,328 
43~811;516 
46,507,807 
37,600,158 
42,857,944 
,. 
3,534,463 
147,133 
17,079;978 
7,857,654 
5,,501,900 
77,910,297 
178}:491,535 
791,222 
15,831,756 
948,727 
519,980,402 
f-1 
l\) 
"' 
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TABLE 14 (continued) 
VALUE OF IMPORTS INTO CUBA BY GROUPS 
Group 1948 1949 1950 
ones 
Metals and their alloys 
Naterials and chemical 
industry 45,939,359 41,281,132 
Cotton and its manu-
factures 33,403,000 25,355,976. 
Vegetable fibers 42,786,682 31,600,716 
Wool, hair and manu-
2,206,072 1,650,953 1,788,622 factures thereof 
Silk and manufactures 
thereof '63,054 178i-510 181,340 
Paper products 20,215,404· 16,679,027 20,283,366 
.. Wood products 8,637_,114 6,986,052 8,877,242 
Animals and amimal prods. 4,189,857 4,555,907 5,433,755 
!gricult ural and indus- _\, 
trial machinery 97,817,444 81,159,439 90,681,593 
Food products - 162,771,841 147,218,171 148,500,592 
Tobacco products 955,825 955,585 967,494 
~soe11aneoui 13,144,605 11,356,933 15,198,354 
ree list 1,313,053 1,418,701 1,289,475 
TOTAL 527 t456,325 451,390,279 515 '069, 50-9 
1951 
62,141,642 
34,442,892 
37,678,063 
2,491,228 
164,388 
28,730,571 
10,303,694 
4,621,452 
127,297,346 
191,870,783 
1,201,118 
16,814,535 
1 688 661 , ' . 
640,214,656 
Souroe:Cuba, Economics y Financiera, ~ugust~l945,p.23: ~ay,l947,p.23; · 
. _une,l'j52,p.2) •. 
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~ood imports to total imports. 
While this is true of food produ~ts' the importati 
o~ machinery, instruments, raw materials arid semi-manufac-
tures ~or industry and agriculture has risen. From Table 
1~, this is readily discernible. In the post-war years 
I . 
the importation o~ capital goods has become a_major ~actor 
Also, the development o~ industries based on imported raw 
materials has change·d the--'p·attern of imports. It should 
be obvious that the high level o~ imports that has been 
· experienced in recent years has been due to thehigh level 
o~ economic prosperity, referred to in our previous 
analysis. 
It one were to chart the foreign trade o~ Cuba dur-
ing the post-war years, the trend would indicate that in-
creases in exports were paralleled by increases in imports 
with the same being true when exports decline·. For .examp 
in 1947, a large increase. in eXJ?orts was paralleled by .. a 
large decrease in imports. When in 1949, a substantial 
decrease in exports was registered, it was paralleled by 
a substantial decrease in ~orts. In checking this 
characteristic ~or the bi-ennirims, 1949-50 and 1950-51, 
we find that almost equal dollar increases were registered 
in both exports and imports. 
On the other hand, the sources of supply of Cuban 
imports have been going through changes in the post-war 
11. 
.. 
. . 
~ ·~ 
.. .. 
.. 
.,. 
period. These clianges are indicated in Table 15. It is 
immediately evident that the United States supplies the 
majority of Cuban imports. Throughout the war years the 
second most important supplier of imports was Latin .Amerio~ 
and Canada. In the post-war years though, ... the United 
States remained almost as large a supplier, with ~he 
European countries regaining its pre-war position. 
An important development in Cuba's roreign trade 
is evident when comparing the destination~ of her exports 
with the source of her imports. The steady decline of 
the United States as a custQmer has not been met by a 
I ' 
proportional decrease in imports from the United States. 
Consequently, the exports to the rest of the ~rld have 
been mueh larger than imports from it. The reason for 
the United States remaining the largest supplier of Uuban 
imports is based on a preferential treaty that·exists be-
tween the two countries which allows United States goods 
a twenty per cent tariff reduction. This means that 
Un~ted States goods ar~ available at lower prices than 
those of Europe. To this should be added that the proximi~y 
of Cuba to the United States, which reduces shipping costs 
considerably. 
It would appear likely that the imbalance or trade 
existing with the European nations will have to be dimin-
:~ ished if Cuba is to maintain her markets there. The 
~'====='ll===============U=== 
e 
TABLE 15 
. 
TOTAL VALUE OF CUBAN IMPORTS .AND. 'PERCENTAGE BY SOURCES 
Year.· United States Amerioan Countries United Kingdom 
Value % Value -~.% Value % 
00 84 16,021,000 . 
1943 138;565~000 78 28,007~000 16 4~255,000 2 
1944 168,841,000 81 28,113,000 14 2,518,000 1 
1945 187,963,000 79 32,987 ,ooo 14 .'!~ 2, 778 ,ooo 1 
1946 234,114,000 76 44,479,000 15 ,# 4,272,000 1 
1947 437,448,000 84 37,305,000 7 6,915,000 l 
1948 420,260,000 80 53,174,000 10 8,410,000 1 
1949 375,676,000 83 32,384,000 7 6,484,000 2 
1950 407,120,000 79 44,413,000 9 8,577,000 2 
1951 492,222,000 77 48,305,000 7 19,278,000 3 
Source: Cuba, Economies 1 Financiera, June 1952, p.30. 
. ' 
&'. 
11¥' ..... 
.• 
.. 
. •f! ' 
.-A] 
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Other Countries 
Valu.e 
6,609,000 
9,176,000 
15,208,000 
22,382,000 
39,222,000 
45,612,000 
36,846,00.{) 
54,960,000 
80,410,000 
4 
4 
6 
8 
s 
9 
8 
10 
13 
..... 
\,\) 
0 
\ 
reason f'or this loss wou;td be the severe·shortage of tthard" 
currency in ~ese countries. Through most of' the post-wa~ 
period, Onba's Enropean markets were maintaine~ despite 
. . ' 
the imbalance because the ECA program of the Upited States 
to' 
which provided extra dollars to European nations. Cuban 
export$, ._financed under EOA dollar grants from April 3, 
1948 to November 30, 1950, amounted to $339,178~000 while 
total Cuban exports to Enrope for the period, 1948-1950, 
amounted. to $543,385,137. Now that the stimulus of various 
Unite9. States f'oreign aid programs is gone, Cuban imports 
from Ell.l:"ope will have to. increase. or the markets·for her 
exports will be lost. That inc:reased purchases are being 
, 
made is evidenced by the increased values on the table 
above. Another indication that the imbalance is in the 
process of being corrected is.the signin~ of bi-lateril 
agreements with Great Britain, Germany and Spain in 1951. 
The future of Cuba's foreign trade which is the 
bawis of her economic welfare, lies to a great extent in 
the formulation o:f a wise commercial policy which would 
help place the Cuban economy in a position where it will 
be less effected by external fluctuations. Only with 
internal diversification of.industry and agriculture, and 
international diversification of' her export markets and 
sourees of supply,- a greater de'gree of stability can be 
achieved. 
.. /" . . 
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CHAPTER IV 
MONETARY AND FISO.AL DEVELOPMENTS 1944-1951. 
Introduction: 
During the war and the post-war y~~rs, changes . 
occurred in the moneta'ry af'f'airs Qt' Cuba. From a "have-
not" nation in terms of' international purchasing power, 
Cuba was able to amass large f'oreign eocchange reserves 
due to an enormously active balance for payments. In-
ternally,-~he international reserves expanded the money 
supply, but as a consequence, also created an inf'lation-
ary problem. These ~evelopments and those on the govern-
mental t'iscal level will be dealt with in this chap~er. 
Monetary Developments 
:• 
Money Supply ~ the Bal!6nce .Q.t Pavments: 
Cuba has experienced a great monetary expansion 
during the war and post-war period. From a low of' 154.2 
million pesos in 1939, her money supply was increased to 
a peak of 1300.6 million pesos as of August, 1950. The 
source of this money expansion have been bank credit and 
international transactions. 
From Table 16, below, a rise of' S50% in Cuban money 
supply is apparent f'rom the end of' 1939 to August, 1950. 
Ot' the 1146.4 million pesos increase, 154.3 million pesos 
1940 
1941 
1942 
1943 
1944 
1945 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
n 
ft 
it 
ff 
" tt 
tf 
t1 
\ 
., 
e 
\ 
TAB~ 16 ,. 
.. 
MONEY SUPPLY BY ORIGIN-1939-1950 
2c 
-6.7 43.0 96•5 36.0 • 
53.5 90.9 41.3 4.0 45.6 99.1 36.0 .1\ 
'53.5 107.3 40.7 22.4 44.2 .. 97.7 36.0 .1 
54.0 148.9 83.9 58.9 6.1 60.1 36.0 1 
54.5 219.,5 138.4 30.9 50.2 104.7 36.1 i.1 
56.9 308.9 198.1 67.0 43.8 100.7 36.1 .1 
58.4 359.3 229.5 " 74.8 55l-O 113.4 36.1 .1 
60.2 423.8 225.,2 96.3 '102.3 162.5 36.6 .1 
62.9 490.3 269.4 111.0 109.9 172.8 36 .. 8 .1 
63.8 455.6 218.4 119.9 117.3 181 .. 1 37.3 .1 
'67 .o 451.7 228.7 108.6 114.4 181.4 38.1 .l 
66.8 497.9 232.4 80.7 184.0 250.8 34.4 .1 
easury vredit (seigniorage) and Oredit of Nationai Bank. 
2a - Signt Deposits. 
2b -Banks' .Oash .Reserves. 
2o - Banks~ Net Balances abroad. 
2 --Bank Credit (2a - 2b ~ 2c). 
1.2 
1.2 
26.2 
5!4>2 
151.2 
226.2 
251.2 
3$6.~ 
331.2. 
359.,0 
409.2 
3 --Total Money of Oredit Origin. (1 f 2). 
4 -- Bullion Value of Silver Ooin baoking,Si1ver Serts and Cuban Subsidi 
Coin. 
5- -- Gold Coin in Banks. 
6 -- Gold Bullion and Dollars Backing Siiver Certificates. 
·"-
t-' 
\.:1.) 
\.:1.) 
1940 
1941 
1942 
1943 
1944 
1945 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
---
.2 
6.0 
.• 9 
7.3 
5.6 
14.9 
7.0 
2.7 
1.0 
1.7 
e 
TABLE 16 toontinued) 
. .. 
MONEY SUPPLY BY ORIGIN-1939-lteo 
. (millions.) 
11.3 4.0 52.6 
17.6 22.4 77.5 
42.4 58.9 169.6 
78.1 30.9 197.2 
82.7 67.0 344.4 
95.9 74.8 . 438.7 
101.8 96.3 500.9 
92.1 111.0 603.2' 
86.6 119.9 577.8 
70.3 108.6 577.1 
63.5 80.7 . 589.6 
rs ln Cuban Treasury. 
-• Dollars in B6nks.. · 
9 -- Bankst Net Balances Abroad. 
.2 
19 .• 4 72.0 151.7 171.1 
29.0 106.5 175.2 204.2 
37.7 207.3 229.7 267.4 
79.1 276.3 301.9 381.0 
120.1 464.5 445.1 565.2 
139.6 578.3 552.1 691.7 
146.4 647.3 663.4 809.8 
205•9 808.2 776.0 981.0 
293.6 871.4 758.9 10l52.1 
383•1 960.2 758.; 1141.5 
460<,2 1049.8 840.4 1300.6 
10 ... _ Total .. Money of International O_:rigin Excluding Dollars held by the 
. Publie. (4 1- 5-/- 6 1- 7 /- 8 /-.9.:. 10}. . 
tt 11 -- Dollars Held by the Publia. . 
n 12 -~ Total MOney of International Origin Including Dollars held by the 
"· . Public •. ( 10 /-11 .:. 12). . . . 
tt 13 ...... Total Money Supply Net of' Dollars Held by the Public. ( 3 /- 10 .:. 13). 
1
' 14 -- Total Money Supply Including Dollars Held by the Public. (3 1- 12 =.-14 
" 
Source: Report on Ouba, Table 87, p. 542a. I-' \.;.) 
~ 
1.35 
were accounted for by Treasury and bank credit and 992.1 
million pesos from international origin. The increase in 
money of international origin was brought about by an 
enormously active balance of payments, as indicated in 
Table 17. The relatively small increase in money of 
treasury and bank credit origin was due to the moderate 
deficit financing by the government and to conservative 
.; 
lending p~licies by the banks. 
As has been noted in the previous chapter, the valUE 
of Cuban exports has expanded greatly since 1941, with 
the largest boom occurring in the post-war.period. The 
value of the exports was much greater, especially from 
1943 to 1947., than merchandise imports and resulted in 
large balance· of t:bade surpluses which were more tha-n su:f'-
ficient to cover all other out-payments in current account, 
The result of this was an active balance of payments whiCh 
~ontributed substant:ial:Ly to expand the circulating media. 
As has been noted in the last chapter, the large exports 
of sugar were the l:>asi.c inflllence for the increase in 
total exports. 
From Table 17, we see that the years 1943 to 1947 
ended with larger current account balances than those of 
the latter post-war years. This is explained by the fact 
that during the war years,the availability of imports, 
e 
TABLE 17 
. 
CUBAN BALANCE OFPAYMENTS, 1939-1945 {Current Account in millions) 
Item 
Exports 
Imports 
· Trade Balance 
Foreign Travel 
Transportation and 
Insurance 
Investment Income 
Private Remittances 
0f.fic1a1 Grants 
Miscellaneous 
Total Current Account 
Balance 
1939 
147.7 
~ 
--u:s 
5.0 
- 5.2 
- 19.4 
- 2.8 
---
- 0.2 
19.2 
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 194~ 
127.3 211.5 182.4 350.6 427.l 409.9 
103.9 133.i 146.7 177.4 208.6 2,i.9 
23.4 77. 35.7 173.2 218.5 1 .o 
10.' 11. 3 2. 0 • 6 0. 0 1. 6 
- 5.6 . -10.4 -20.5 -17.0 -31.1 - 33.6 
- 18.0 -29.8 -28.9 -20.8 -26.2 - 19.8 
- 6.4 - 1.8 - 5.5 - 6.0 - 5.3 - 14.0 
~-~ -~- --- --- --- ~-~ 
- 0.7 - 0.3 3.6 - 6.4 ~---13_.4 ___ 14•_2_ 
3.6 46.6 - 13.6 123.6 169 .. 3 120.1 
Source: Henry Wal11ch, Monetary Problems of an Export Economy, pp. 330-33~. 
~ 
'v.l 
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TABLE 17 (cmntinued) 
I 
POST-WAR CUBAN BALANCE OF PAYMENTS-1546-1951 (current account in m~llions 
I 
Item 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 
I 
Exports 534.6 772.7 724.1 593.2 667.4 800.1 ! 
Ilnports 222·8 212·2 -i~l:* - !±21.4 215.1 640.2 Trade Balance 234.8 253.0 141.8 152.3 - 159.9 ~ 
Foreign Travel 
- 18.0 - 31.3 -33.2 - 12.0 - 26.6 - 24.8 
Transportation and 
- 25.6 - 36.9 -46.3 Insurance - 42.2 - 49.3. - - 55.7 
Investment Income 
-
40.3 
- 73.9 -51.5 - 30.4 - )6.0 - 36.8 Official Grants 
-
~.2 - 2·1 --- --- --- ---
Total Current Account 
Balance 142.1 117.5 85.2 77.5 58.2 61.6 
" I 
Source: Balance of ~ay.ments Yearbook, 1948, pp. 132-133. I 
MOody, Governments and Municipalities, 1953, p. 1822. 
I 
1--' 
\I.) 
.....:1 
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which came mainly from the United States, was ever so 
limited and continued so through most of 1946. The large 
favorable balance of 1947 was due to a great increase ~ 
export values, mainly sugar, which was more than sufficien 
to cover the large increase in imports. The narrowing of 
the export surplus of 1948~50, was due to declining prices 
and also lesser quantity of exports, while imports rema~uo~l 
at a relatively high level. In 1951, though, the increase 
in exports was paralleled by an increase in im.pihrts which 
brought equilibrium into the trade balance at approxia.ate 
the 1950 level. 
In the post-war period the size or the over-all 
balance of payments, surpluses has tended to decline not 
only because of smaller m.e~chandise trade balances, but 
also because or a decidedly negative trend in foreign 
travel, transportation and insurance items, and an expan-
sion ~ profits and dividend remittances. 
During the war years the tourist trade in Ouba was 
limited, but travel by Oubans was restricted also. In the 
post-war period though, a negative balance in travel expen-
diture developed because Oubans were traveling more and 
spending more abroad due to the availability of foreign 
exchange. This was not offset by an increase in the number 
of visitors to Ouba. The negative balance in transportat 
and insurance expenditures was due to greater shipping 
1.39 
activity brought about by increasing exports. Since Ouba 
.has only a smal.l merchant marine service, the increasing 
shipping on foreign boats represented an increased outlay. 
In investment income, en item in Cuba's balance ot payments 
·that has consistently been negative due to large foreign 
investments, a more negeti ve trend developed as greater . 
business activity meant more profits remitted abroad and 
the corresponding shrinkage of available international 
reserves. 
The positive balance of payments has caused an ex~ 
pan.sion in the Cuban money supply because under Law 5, of 
~Y 4, 1942, the peso is backed by dollars or gold. Since 
the foreign reserves were almost com.pletely of'' dollar 
origin, the creation of silver certificates based on these 
reserves was possible and al.lowed for the absorbtion of 
the great volume of foreign exchange resources into the· 
money supply.158 The circulation of the dollar alongside 
the peso added to the facility with which the money of 
international origin was absorbed. Only with the creation 
of the National Bank of Cuba was the cireula tion of 
dollars severely limited, but this did not restrict the 
money supply as they were converted into pesos. 
·• 
I 
I 
I 
140 
Bank ~ Credit Policies: 
In the last ten years Oubats banking system has 
been undergoing significant changes. One ot these has 
been the re-appearance of Cuban-owned banks. In 1939, 
Cuban-owned commercial banks held 16.8 per cent of total 
deposits and by August, 1950, this ratio had risen to 
. 159 
45.5 per cent. The important position assumed by Cuba 
owned banks has been possible because of the high economic 
activity requiring more banking facilities and because the 
foreign banks have limited themselves· to certain specific 
types of financing. The foreign banks declining importa..u.•von 
has resulted from a desire to limit risk which was deter-
mined by their experiences of the 1920s and 1930s when 
160 
they sUffered large losses. And foreign banks, in 
general, welcome the return of domestic banks as these 
banks will handle many loans that the foreign banks refuse 
to provide. 
The growth of the Cuban-owned banks can be attribute 
basically to the high liquidity that Cuba experienced as a 
result of the war and post-war booms. Also the shift from 
the dual monetary system to a peso system has restricted 
the expansion of foreign banks. Another important faetor 
has been the creation of the National Bank which has given 
confidence to the Cuban banks as it provides them with a 
lender of last resort in times of banking erises.l61 
141 
In the last ten years the reserv~ position of the 
banks has been greatly strengthened. By law the ratio or 
reserves to deposits should be twenty-five per cent. This 
though, was not so until 1938, and since then the cash-
deposit reserve ratio has been well above the legal mini-
mum. During most or the war years the cash-deposit reSd1v~ 
ratio was maintained at above rirty per cent. The cause 
or the high reserves was the expansion of the money s~ply 
and the return to Cuba of money held abroad by banks and 
insurance companies because a 0.15 per cent monthly tax 
on these balances was established. Without doubt, the 
high reserve policy maintained by the banks was very bene-
ficial to the Cuban economy as bank credit -expansion was 
not superimposed upon the enormous expansion of the money 
supply brought about by very active balances of payments. 1t~ 
From Tables 16 and 18 the slow rate of bank credit 
expansion until 1945 is readily discernible and indicates 
the conservative loan policies that were followed. In the 
post-war years bank loans have increased in keeping with 
the greater economic activity. Although the volume of 
bank loans has followed the money supply and the measures 
of real economic activity down in depression and up in 
the boom, the changes in the volume of bank loans seems to 
have been considerably smaller than thmse of the measures 
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of real activity. 
o:r 
Year 
1942 
1943 
1944 
1945 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
e 
TABLE 18 :·· 
TOT.AL LO.ANS BY CUBAN BANKS AOCORDJNG TO TYPE 
{dollars/pesos} 
Sugar Loans 
29,040,862 
26,015,974 
19,793,711 
26,473;207 
38,895,441. :. 
30,550,837' 
32, 507,436 
32,224,892 
4~,920,000 
N.A. 
-
809,214 
1,210,594 
2,428,607 
2,344,534 
2,120,580 
. 4,584, 783 
2,129,379 
2,371,030 
8,981,000 
N.A. 
• 
10,119,674 
9,443;145 
12,.172. 904 
15,307,735 
16,714,953 
15,820,693 
24,679,610 
21,483,128 
22,020,000 
N. A. 
Total 
28~178,557 VVJ _ 
40~834,087 77,503,8 
53,557,605 87,952, 
66,569,708 110,695, 
104,114,068 161,845, 
123,296,441 174,252,75 
135,889,629 195,206,05 
129,843,194 185,422, 
184,7001000 258,621,0 
N. • 325,127,00 
Source: Eoonomioa y Finanoiera, April, 1947, p. 17; April, 1952, p. 
I-' 
~ 
N 
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The distribution of bank credit as shown in Table 
18~ denotes some of the changes of the lest ten years. 
The basic change has been the relative decline of sugar 
loans as the predominant user of bank credit while loans 
to foster commercial activity have greatly increased. 
This trend became more positive in the post-war period 
when the large volume of imports and exports made credit 
necessary. It should be noted that much of the commercial 
activity revolves on sugar trade which enhances the perspen-
tive of the sugar industry in bank loan activit~." It 
--,_ 
'-, 
should be noted, also, that many of the large sugar mi+ls 
are foreigned-owned and can rely upon credit from their 
home office. 
.... , __ 
Sugar financing during the zafra, or harvest period 
is a vital function of the banks. MOst loans are made 
directly to the sugar mills and the large sugar growners, 
or colonos. The smaller colonos are financed indirectly 
through the sugar·mill that buys their produce. The 
monthly bank loan tables that are available in uouba, 
Economics y Financieran adequately indicate the increase 
in loans from December through May, the time of the Zafra. 
Instead, from May through November a consistent decrease 
in total loans is shown. This tact indicates that the 
sugar loans and commercial loans are short term. 
~ 
•II;. ~. ' 
.... 
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The short term loan is the predo.Jj.inant type of 
Ottban banking. For exam@le, of the loans outstanding at 
the end of 1949, siaty-si:x: per cent were tor. terms of np 
to ninety days.164 This fact· illttstrates the lack ot. ..• 
adequate credit facilities for medium and long term loans, 
- . 
necessary for industrial and agricultural develop.mento 
From Table 18, we see that agricultural activities 
othe~ than sugar have not been given very much credit. 
which has been due to the conservative lending·policies 
of the banks as these agricultural activities do not have 
strong collateral. This group, like the small colones, 
have had their credit supplied indirectly, being at the 
end of the credit chain--commercial loans to wholesaler 
or import-export merchants who provide eredit for the 
retailers who in turn finance th~ small farmer. This 
chain of credit naturally raises the inte~est rates for 
the 'small farmer who can ill afford it. ttThe loan prac-
tices of the present commercial banking system are .sttch 
that· outside the .commercial and sugar sec_tions, the banks 
are either rationing credit very severely, or making no 
. - .· . 165 
bank credit available at all.u 
The rate of interest on bank loans varies according 
to the risk involved. The first-class loans, or those 
se~ured by strong collateral, are available at relatively 
low ra~S'', two to tour per cent, as the competition is 
. 
~~-~- -- -· 
... ;-, 
., 
• 
very keen. These a.re the rates for loans that go to the 
large sugar mills and commer·eial agents. connee:ted with 
the sugar industry. For other types of borrowers, loans 
naturally would be avail.able at higher interest rates de-· 
pending on the risk involved. 
The National Bank of Cuba and ~ Bank of :ABricultural. 
And Industria~edi t: -· 
In accordance with article 280 of the Constitution 
of 1940, a law was passed in 1948 for the creation Qf a 
National Bank of Cuba which began operations in April,l950 
The outstanding features of the bank are the following, 
according to Wal.lich: 
2. 
). 
6. 
control. mf the bank by the government, with 
a minority representation for the private 
banks; · 
prohibition of loans to the public; 
severe limitations of direct loans to_the 
government; 
implicit provisions for the financing of 
temporarily unsalable sugar surpluses through 
nine-month rediscounts; 
provision for the establishment of exchange 
control with the concurrence of the exeeu-
tive power; 
requirement to maintain exchange rate at 
par only with respect to exports and es-
sential imports, thus in effect permitting 
multiple exchange rates.n~o5 
From number two above, we can conclude that the 
National Bank of Cuba is actually a ffbank's bank11 • One 
--
important function of the National Bank will be to act as 
a lender.of last resort to the commercial banks during 
·:··· 
times of crisis. 
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This will be the first time that the 
Cuban banking system will be able to develop a confident 
attitude in the people as to the worthiness of the Cuban-
owned banks. It will also help to place the domestic b 
on a par with the foreign banks who have been able to rely 
upon their home offices in times of crisis. 
Under the provisions of the law. it is hoped that 
the bank will concentrate in its hands foreign exchange 
resources so that stabilizing policies can be followed. 
Te be able to 'implement this, the bank has been given.the 
power to enforce exchange control and other regulatory 
measures, necessary in an economy so dependent upon for-
eign trade. 
One of the basic functions of the bank is to act 
as a strong influence in the regulation of money supply. 
In regard to the banks, the simplest way in which this can 
be done is by requiring high reserve ratios when a contra 
tion of money is necessary and by lowering reserve re• 
quirements when expansion is the goal. 
Another featu+e of the central banking legislation 
is the legal right to establish sp:eeial credit insti tu-
tions, namely, a government agricultural and industrial 
credit bank. Soon after the National Bank began operation 
Congress passed legislation to establish the Bank of Agri-
cultural and Industrial Credit. The influence of the 
14-7 
National Bank is evident from the fact that of the five 
directors of the new credit bank, three are also members 
of the governing staff of the National Bank. 
The initial funds for the credit bank were supplied 
by the government and amounted to twenty-five million peso 
that were raised through the floating of a government 
bond issue. Of the twenty-five million pesos, fifteen 
million were for credit operations and ten million for 
development work. The differentiation between credit and 
development is that the credit loans are made directly to 
the farmer or industry for improvements, or the like, while 
developmental credit is for the establishment of new indus-
try or agriculture and for research. 
The function of the bank is to provide credit 
facilities for small agricultural and industrial activities 
which have been lacking in mrequate credit facilities from 
the commercial banks. Provision is made for the issuance 
of short, medium and long term loans in both the agricul-
tural and industrial divisions o-r the Bank .• 
Thus, in the post-war period the creation of the 
National Bank o-r Cuba and the B~nk of Industrial and Agri-
cUltural Credit has strengthened the island's banking sys- ., 
tem and has attempted to correct the deficient credit 
situation o-r the small producer. It has also through this 
. . 
legislation set up a system whereby monetary policies can be 
·~., .' . 
: fr' 
The Inflationary Problem: 
Ouba during t~e war and post-war period has had an 
inflatiQnary problem. The major cause of inflation can be 
. . ,, 
attributed to the high volume of sugar exports which 
created large active yearly balances of payments which re-
sulted in an expansion of the money supply. As we have 
noted in the discussion of the money supply, @overnment 
deficit financing and over-expansion of bank credit were 
not major factors responsible for money expansion and thus 
cannot be blamed for inflatimnary pressures. 
The scarcity of imports was a factor that aided in 
the development of inflation but in Cuba was not of'ex-
tre.me importance as imports have been steadily 'increasing, 
even through the war period. The price level of: imports 
\' .. 
which can be an important catilie. of inflat.ion, was control-
lable during the war years as a sp.ecial arrangement was 
... ;· 
made with the United States to keep essential foodstUffs 
at fixed prices in return for a stabilization of the price 
of sugar. 
Attempts to control inflation through price contro1s 
were not very effective and m.ay have creat~d~!a negative 
effect by causing a very large and active black market to 
function. 
From. Table 19, below, we see that the inflationary 
trend became .more intense in the post-war period. 
J.49 
TABLE 19 
INFLATIONARY INDEX BASED ON TEE COST OF FOODSTUFFS 
{base year 1937 ~ 100} 
Year Index Year Index· 
1937 100 1947 248e8 
1943 150.9 1948 271.4 
1944 172.0 1949 235 .. 5 
1945 194.4 1950 227.9 
1946 212.9 1951 252.4 
Source: _ Statistical Yearbook, 1951, Table 155, p.421 
Two factors were responsible for the rise in the 
price level during the post-war period~ ( 1) the higher 
cost of imports; and ( 2) the wage increases supported by 
government action. 
By 1946, the rise of import prices became general 
as the inflationary spiral had started in the United Sta_tes 
with the removal of price controls there. Because such a 
large percentage of Cuban imports are of United States 
origin, the price level in Cuba was affected. This factor 
continued to aggravate the inflationary problem as import 
prices rose throughout most of the post-war period .. 
As prices started to climb, labor through its unions 
demanded higher wages which for the post part were not 
granted by management and forced labor to· ask f'or the aid 
of the government in securing their aims. Most of the 
appeals were granted by the government through decrees 
• 
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~h~eh meant_ that ~~~~ge~ent had to comply or face legal 
action. This placed the inflationary spiral in aetion as 
wage rises were followed by price rises which renewed wage 
demands and so on. It should be noted that the favorable 
attitude of the government toward the wage demands of 
labor was a political rather than an economic policy. As 
we have seen in the discussion of Cuban politics {Chapter 
II), the PRB(A), the party in power• relied heavily upon 
the support of labmr. In order to retain this group withi~ 
their camp, the government felt that it waa politically 
necessary to side with labor in wage disputes even though 
it might have been unwise from an economic point of view. 
In 1949 and 1950, there was a decline from the in-, 
flationary peak or 1948 beQ8use a recession in the United 
States lowered prices on goods imported into. Cuba and be--
cause consumer resistance to high prices was increasing. 
By 1949, the s~ply of both domestic and imported goods 
was sufficient to bring into action intense competition 
which tended to low.er prices. Part of the price decline 
can also be attributed to a decrease in the general eco- . 
nomic activity which we have noted previously in the dis-
cussion of industry. 
In 1951, there was a resumption in the upward trend 
of prices due to the, inerea,sing economic activity brought 
about by the Xorean War. The increasing price level in 
151 
in the United States was an important factor once again. 
Internally the renewed demands of labor returned the wage-
price spiral to full force recreating a severe inflationar 
problem .. 
~he solution to the inflationary problem is most 
plex and highly.6ut of the hands of internal control con-
sidering the importance of international factors. 
Government Finances 
The Budget: 
By constitutional provision the Ouban budget is 
divided into two sections, the fixed and the annual budget. 
Within the fixed budget the debt service and the legisla-
tive and judicial-expenditures are covered. The annual 
budget covers all other revenues and expenditures except 
6 those for the development of ~ational wealth, to which 
special funds and taxes are assigned."166 From.the fore-
going statement one can deduce that the constitution pro-
vides for the setting ~ of special funds for specific 
purposes which are outside of the general budget. This 
proviso has been used to a great extent by the government 
to levy new taxes and assigning them to special projects. 
The budget process in Cuba is very similar to that 
of the United States. The preparation of the budget is a . 
responsibility of the executive branch with Congressional 
'.~. 
.~ . 
.. ~ . 
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raising and disbursement of funds. It Congressional ap-
pro.val is not given, the last budget so approved is exten-
ded quarterly until a new budget is put -intb force. From 
• .··' < •• 
1938 to 1949, budget extension was the rule. The budget 
increases registered in this period were constitutional 
under the proviso allowing executive action to raise re-
venue during a war period which had not been officially 
ended in 1951. For the fiscal year 1950-51, the practice 
of extension was resumed with the 1949-50 budget being the 
one extended. 
One development of the war and post-war period was 
the division of the annual budget into an ordinary and an 
extra-ordinary section. This was done to get around two 
eonstitu.tional provisions, articles 52 and 53. Article 52 
specifies that the monthly salaries of primar-y teaehe;rs 
shall equal ~o less than one-millionth of .the total budget 
Article 53 provides for the expending of two and one-quar-
ter per cent of the total b~dget expenditures, minus the 
foreign debt service, on the University of Habana as long 
167 
as the University is not self-supporting. Because of 
the rise in revenues and expenditures, the fulfillment of 
these conditions would have placed exceedingly large sums 
toward salary and unive~~tty expenditures. By dividing 
the budget and assigning the percentag~s to the ordinary 
!L• 
I • 
1-
·~· 
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budget, these two expenditures were kept within approp-
riate limits. 
In December 1950, the constituti~;>P.al provision for 
the enactment of legislation to establis.q., a·~,~ribunal of' 
~ ... 
-II .. ~ 
Accounts became a reality. This body is :··an official gn'IT.,. ... ,... 
ment agency which will s~rve as auditor for the municipal, 
~· provd:ncial and federa+ accQunts. The Tribunal is also an 
investigating agent to. see that funds are administered 
properly and are required by law to turn over to the 
courts all evidence of malfeasance of public funds. The 
Tribunal is also to be sonsulted before the passing of 
the annual buiget. Thus, tor 'the first time in Cuban 
history a-system of _fiscal controls has 'been established. 
. :.~. 
,.. ·~·~! . ~ ... 
Revenues and Expenditures: 
The revenue of the Cuban government has increased 
almost four hundred per cent from 1937 to 19511 as is 
indicated in Table 20. The phe'nome.~al rise has been due 
to ~he general increase in economic activity and to the 
creation of new taxes and increasing older ones. 
With prosperity government revenues·have risen 
because higher levels mf' prices, profits, incomes and im-
ports, which are the tax sources, ~t~eant a greater yield. 
In the post-war years, the sugar boom continued to raise 
revenues above the war levels and since 1946. have 
Year 
1944 
1945 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951· 
• 
e 
TABLE 20 
ANNVAL REVENUES OF CUBA-1937-1951 
'. [inpeaos} 
General Budget . Fund Surcharge get of National Budget of Total 
Defense . National 
n_ ... _,,...,"" 
• 
. 69,615",930. 11,953,970 n.c .• n.c. n.c .• 81,.569 '9 
124,701,255 12,139,101 7,882,027 11,456,394 8,167,630 164,346,407 
139.,115,812 14,356,476 . 8,572,192 9,923,376 6,711,006 178,678,86 
174~541,343 13,521,525 6,365,568 13,824,526 6,819,701 215,072,663 
244,462,017 15,463,291 5,580,275 15,357,361 6,279,989 287,142,988 
216,597,948 18,240,268· 4,398,616 16,179,766 6,506,020 262,.462, 618 
181,889,005 18,386,599 4,666,219 14,279,855 5 ,.963' 525 224,985,176 
239,497 '900 21,801,438 4,668,197 15 J 22'3 '490 5,667,510 286,858,53 
282,360,401 28,844,316 7,823,600 18,477,082 6,241,787 343,747, 
n.c.- no coJ."J.ec:tlon as f 
So'urce: 1937-1945·> Cuba; Economica y Financiers, January 1947, p.; 13. 
1946-19$1, The Yearbook of the West Indies, 1952, p. 333. 
"' 
'!;: .... 
1-1' 
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remained above 200 million pesos annually. From Table 2Cl, 
~e notice a decline in revenue for 1948 and 1949. This 
was due in part to lower prices which have bended to con-
tract receipts from custom duties, profit, income and 
other taxes. The increases registered in 1950 and 1951 
were due to a resumption of a higher price level and to 
improving collection methods. 
'l'he taxes which provide the government with revenue 
are of the following types: direct taxes on profits and 
declared oap~tal, on interest and dividends and on income; 
I 
property taxes on real estate sales and income; consump-
tion taxes on tobacco, liquor, salt and other products, 
and on sales and gross receipts; import taxes such as 
custom duties and charges, consular fees and port improve-
ment charges; sugar tax, various levies for specific pur-
poses placed on each bag of sugar produced; and other 
taxes. 
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The greater part of government revenues is derived 
from consumption and import taxes which in 1949-50 ac-
counted for 57.1 per cent of tax receipts while direct 
taxes amounted to 21.5 per cent of tax receipts with the 
other 21.4 per cent consisting of taxes on sugar, property 
and other things.169 
The importance of the indirect taxes, those of 
consumption and import, indicates the need of reform in 
156 
Cubats tax system for all direct taxes are passed on to the 
consumer in the form of higher prices. Also, this is one 
of the major causes of the great fluctuations of revenue 
collections which go up and down with prosperity and 
recession. By making direct taxes the greater part of 
total revenues, the fluctuations can beless intense and 
will allow for long range budget planning. One reason for 
the lesser importance of direct taxes in Cuba is that t 
is a great deal of tax evasion, especially of income taxes. 
This is attested by the fact that 80,000 people file pro-
fits tax returns while only 20,000 people pay income tax 
directly. The form of income tax collection most widely 
used in Cuba is withholding by ~ployer agents. In this 
. . 
way taxes are collected from 110,000 individuals.17° The 
problem of evasion intensifies the need for reform of the 
tax administration. 
The expenditure pattern of the Cuban government has 
been to spend all the available funds during each fiscal 
year. From Table 21, below, we notice that surpluses exis 
ted from 1942 to 1947. But ttthe surpluses shown do not 
represent existing cash balances at the end of the year. 
They merely indicate surpluses of revenue over budgeted 
expenditures.nl7l These surpluses were liquidated by 
extra-ordinary appropriations, mainly to the Ministry of 
Public Works. 
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TAB:!;..E: 121 
.. 
BUDGET REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES..:t942-1951 
. (in thousands or pesos) 
Year 
1942 
19·43 
1944 
194.5 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949-50 
19.50-.51 
Revenue 
199,918 
128,;6; 
162,623 
1.58,018 
201,06.5 
277,248 
241,862 
233,213 
242,974 
.. 
· Expendi ttire 
. . 
. ' . 
104j896 
120,269 
1.50,793 
14.5,146 
174,014 
199,386 
288,794 
227,436 
24~,637 
S~plus ibr 
Deficit 
.. 
~ 4,922 8,296 ~ 11,830 12,872 ~ 27,0.51 77,862 
-
46,932 
~ .5,777 377 
"··· 
Source: John Moody, Governments and.llunioipalities, 1952, 
p. 1822. 
Because or the complex organization thebudget, with 
its ordinary and extra-ordinary ·divisions and special fund 
service, it is difficult to arrive at the true ~evel or 
expenditure. In Table 22, the expenditures for the fiscal 
year 19.50-51 are .listed as an example or the departmental 
division or the budgeted ex~enditures. 
We can see that a large percentage of the expendi-
tUres were service expenditures. Approximately rorty per 
cent or the 1950-51 budget was expended on public works, 
education and public health. But it. seems that byfar too 
great a percentage or the budget was expended on just 
government administrative costs. The only ra'ctor that 
J41~==~================h'======================~~ .. ==~l 
. . ·~. -- ·~ 
' 
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justiries this to any extent is the fact that the govern~ 
ment does account for the employment of many people in a 
country with an unemployment crisis. 
TABLE 22 
DEPART:MENT.AL EXPENDITURES OF THE 1950-.51 BUDGET 
_ {in thousands of pesos) . 
Department .Amount 
Public Debt Service • • • • • • • • 6,702 
Legislature • • • .. • • • • • • • • 8,214_ 
Judiciary • • • • • • • • .. • • • • 8,432 
Presidency • • • • • • • • • • • • • 643 -
Prime Minister • • • • • • • • . • • 673 
Ministry of State • • • • • .• • • • 2,446 
Ministry of Justice • • .. • • • • • 793-
Ministry of ·Government • • • • • • 14,395 
Ministry of the Treasurer • • • • • 16,401 
Ministry of Public Works· • • • • • 23,345 
Ministry of Agriculture • • • • • • · 5,908 
Ministry of Commerce • • • • • • • 2,130 
Ministry: of Labor ~ • • • • • • • • 2,068 
Ministry of Education • • • • • • • 52,994 
Ministry of Public Health • • • • • 21,180 
Ministry of Communications • • • • 10,678 
Ministry of National Defense. • • • 39,176 
Other Expenditures • • • • • • • • 23,291 
Rabana University • • . • • • • • • • _ __...·2..L,_l_6 .. 7 ,.._ .... 
Total 242,63't--~ 
The National Debt: 
.. 
The national debt of Cuba has gone through two 
basic changes from 1944 to 1951. First and for~most, its 
external debt consistently declined; second, the internal 
.. ~\ 
j .. 
.· 
',1..'' 
'I,,· 
. ~ 
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or domestically-held debt. increased in substantial prmporQ 
tion as an important domestic money-market developed. 
Table 23 below, illustrates these two basic changes. 
ear 
45.~ 
31/46. -·~~;' 
/30/47"~ ., . 
7/30/48 ... 
7~31~49 7 31 50 
7/31/51 
3/1/52 . 
TABLE 23 
TOTAL PUBLIC DEBT OF OUBA-1944-1951 
·· · (in thousands ot pesos} 
ernal 
. .-~. Public 
95;,.)47 . 7,167 102,714 
89-j987 7,117 97,104 
86,532 7,117. 93,649 
90,523 7,067 97,600 
75,288 7,017 82,305 
72,488 6,967 79,855 
69,613 101,252 170,865 
68,163 149,497 217,660 
c 
including 
Floating 
bt 
172,714 
167,104 I 
174,518 2 
167,590 'l 
163' 202 .I 
184,360 
265,865 
287,660 
as ot 12/31/47; . s of 8/31/48; . as of 12/31/49. 
Source: MOody, Governments and Municipalities, 1953, p. 18 
From Table 23, we notice that the consolidated publi 
de8t had been decreasing gradu:ally through July 31, 1950, 
as payments were being made on both the external and inter~ 
nal debt. The increase in the internal debt in 1951 and 
early 1952 was due to new bond issues, one in 1949 for 
twenty-five million pesos and one in 1950 tor 120,000,000 
.... ;:r;:. 
pesos. Tlii· 19;49 issue ·was tqr the payment of Veterans 
. ,· .Ji;· 
- ,.p •. 
Pensions and the 19 50 issue was a pnblic works loan of 
ive million esos went to the National Development 
.. · 
/ 
.. 
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Commission and twenty-five million to the Bank of Agricul-
tural and Industrial Credit. It should be noted that the 
ability to place these bond issues internally was due to 
the high level of prosperity which made investment money 
available. 
One important conclusion that can be drawn from the 
fact that these bond issues were sold internally_is a grow~ 
ing confidence in the government by Cuban-owned commercial 
banks which handled the 1949 issue. The 1950 issue was )>' 
handled thrbugh the Bational Bank with some of the commer-
cial banks acting as underwriters. It should be noted ·that ··,. 
a relatively large percentage of both issues,were placed 
I . 
with various pension and retirement ~unds •. ;..; 
The disposal·. of the. bond issues· internally is a .. 
favorable development as it does not put any pressuse o~ 
the ~uture foreign exchange reserves. I:r the bonds had 
been disposed o:f externally, they would have had to be paid 
in :foreign monies, most likely dollars. Since the bonds 
were sold domestically, the question of the :future of ~or­
eign reserves and o'f the position of the peso to the dollar 
will not have to be dealt with whe~ the government amortiza~ 
tion of the bonds begins. With internally-held bonds, de-
preciating currency beGomes an asset when it would hav.e 
been a severe liabi&~ty with externally-held bonds. 
The ~unded debt o~ Cuba as o~ February 29, 1953, 
was comprised o:f the :following issues: 
TABLE 24 
ISSUES COMPRISING CUBAtS FUNDED DEBT ON FEBRUARY 29, 1952 
Issue 
.External 
1937· ·77 Public Works 
1941-55 Public Works 
Internal 
1906 Internal 
1949-60 Veterans 
1950-80 Public Works 
Coupon 
Rate 
Amount o:f 
Issue 
8;,ooo,ooo 
8,664,000 
Total External. 
Outstanding on 
February 29, " 2 
11,174,200 6,867,300 
25,000,000 25,000,000 
120,000 000 1:17,630,000 
Total internal 149,497,300 
Total Funded Debt 217,660,000 
From Table 24, it can be concluded that the greate_st 
part o:f Cuba's national debt is due to the recent bond is-
sues and that her funded debt does not seem. to be out o:f 
proportion to current revenue standards. But the funded 
debt is not the only debt of the Cuban government. 
In Table 23 ~- we notice that the consolidated, or 
funded, debt of Cuba is only a sub-total as the total na-
tional debt includes the «floating" debt or open debt. The 
:floating debt consists of liabilities mf the government 
which are not bonded and are not included in the budget :for 
payment. The floating debt has arisen from budget deficits 
..._ 
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use of special funds outside the budget, judgments in 
tribunals and courts and other unpaid obligational The 
exact total of the floating debt is not known, but is usual:w 
estimated at 7o.ooo,ooo pesos in attempting to arrive at 
Gubats total national debt. But, according to a Price. 
Waterhouse tenative estimate in 1950, the floating debt a-
mounted to 180,000,000 pesos. It should be one of the 
duties of the Tribunal of Accounts to determine the legal 
amount of the floating debt so'that provision for payment 
can be made .. 
or the total ·national debt' including both funded 
and floating debts, by far the greatest problem is the 
floating debt, as no provision tor payment has been made. 
The obligations of the funded debt are covered by the bud-
get. How the floating 4ebt will be paid is purely a matter 
for speculation. It is indeed unfortunate that some of 
these obligations were not paid with the budget surpluses 
of the boom era. Pehhaps with a continuation of surplus 
budget collections, the government will apply some of it 
to redemption of the floating debt in the future. 
CH.APTER V 
LABOR AND EDUCATION--1944-1951 
In trod uct ion: 
Because of their obvious importance, the topics of 
labor and education will comprise the basis for the dis-
cussion of social developments in Cube during the war and 
post-war periods. Chengew have occurred in labor-manage-
ment-governmental ~elations, the effects of which have 
generally been detrimental to economic development. In the 
discussion of education, we shall attempt to determine 
whether or not the present system provides the necessary 
educational training so vital in promoting social, politics 
and economic progress. 
Labor 
Labor-~nagement-Governmental Re~ations: 
The effective organization of labor into unions is 
a relatively new development in Cube as it is only within 
the lest twenty to twenty-five years that unions have been 
recognized as the represents tive of the working man. Withi ~ 
this period, however, vest steps have been taken to put 
labor in a position where it is strong enou~~ to bargain 
efficaciously with management.. With the ,~trengthening of 
,. 
labor, much discussion has developed a,s to whether or not 
. ·' .. _, .;· 
labor is taking unfair advantage of the employer groups. 
The pattern of union organization in Cuba is one 
of local unions which cover each enterprise or lindustry. 
A11 the local unions of the same or similar activity have 
joined together to form a fed'eration such as the Sugar 
:·· 
Workers Federation and the Tobacco· Workers Federation. The 
next level of organization is the linking together of most 
of the federations into the Confederacion de Trabajadores 
Cubands, the CTO. 
Unionization has taken place in all sector_s of pro-
duction including agriculture, industry, transportation, 
communication, eledtric power, hotel and restaurant opera-
tions, banking and even some of the larger retail outletsl 
To some it may appear rather odd that agricultural workers 
have been o~ganized, but in Cuba the formation o~ unions 
on the agricultural level has been due to the fact that 
:.'f 
. . ~ ' 
large numbers of workers are employed in the agricultural 
. . .,~2 
section of Cuba's two main industries -- sugar and tobacco.~ 
· One weakness of the organizational system of Cuban 
un.ions is the gap that exists between the rank and file 
membership and the leadership of the federations and the 
CTO. One cause for this is the generally passive attitude 
of the members which has allowed various groups or persons 
to use the union system for their personal aims. Besides 
:1· .. 
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the ~oliticians, the grou~ that has made wide use of this 
ga~ is the Communists. 
From 1933 to 1947, the Communists worked diligently 
to attem~t to eGntrol the CTC and were almost at their goal 
. ,;. . . 173 
when in 1947 the government interceded. The government 
intervention develo~ed from a claims by the Autentico dele• 
., 
gates to the Fifth Congress of the CTC, tha~,.i ~82 Communist 
delegates were falsely certified. When this claim was made 
the Ministry of Labor interposed and disbanded the Congress. 
· 1S4 
.so that credentials could be checked. The final result 
was that the Autentico delegates were given a majority of 
the certified delegates &nd were thus able to wrest the 
To 0 . 175 I control of the C from the ommun~sts. t should be 
noted that this was the beginning of an intense campaign 
against the Communists and seems to parallel the start of 
:::: .. ;'.~· . 
the 'ct>ld war between the::United States and. the Soviet bloc. 
The ~rimary field of action of labibr unions from · ~ 
. . 
1944 to 1951, was to secure wage raises and maintain them. 
During thts period labor relied heavily upon governmental 
decree action rather than genuine co~lective bargaining be-
tween labor and management. Decree No. 2631 serves as an 
excellent example as to the manner in which the. government 
catered to the wage desires of labor. This Decree of 
August 19, 1944, granted the foJ.;I,owing: 
'f 
-',. 
'-
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1
'Every person engaged in comm.ereial, industrial~ 
agricultural, or other activities who tasks are · 
regulated by the labor legislation then in ~oree 
was ordered to increase the renumeration o~ his 
personnel • • • (Groups exempted were the sugar ~ 
industry and newspaper enterprises which were 
regulated by special legislation.} Wage earners 
receiving up to 3.00 pesos per day were to be 
granted an increase o~ 20%; those receiving more 
than 3.00 pesos and up to 4.00 pesos an increase 
o~ 15%; and those receiving more than 4.00 pesos 
and up to 6.67 pesos an increase or 10%. Employers 
were considered to have complied with the new 
decree i~ on tranuary 1, 1944, or, t~erea~ter they 
had given increased equal to the above, and ·i~ 
greater increases !1oe given, they. are required 
to maintain them.tt 
In 1945, by Supreme Court action this deeree was 
dedlared unconstitutional, but its er~ects were maintained 
by an exeeutive decree which froze the wage floor at the 
level established under Decree No. 2631.· The government's 
action was entirely constitutional as it is allowed to es-
tablish minimum wages. 
After the 1944 decree was declared unconstitutional, 
the government did not issue-general wage increases but 
.. 
resorted to issuing special decrees ~or each industrial or 
agricultural working group whenever it was necessary. 
Thus even though blanket wage raises were not permissible• 
the same result was achieved by the promulgation of special 
wage decrees under the guise o~ establishing new minimum 
wage levels. 
While the gover~nt's action was satis~ying the de-
mands or labor, it was creating high production costs ~or 
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management. In the discussion of the inflationary problem 
in the previous chapter, we noted that most of these wage 
increases were simply passed on to the consumer in the 
form of higher prices. We have also noted previously that 
the level of economic activity was limited in Cuba, es-
pecially in 1948 and 1949, partially by conswmer resistance 
to high prices. 
Considering these facts, we can conclude that labor 
has been working against its aims of more e~loyment as 
their wag~ raises did effect a decrease in the level of 
activity and productivity. It seems logical that a level 
of agreement, satisfactory to both parties could have been 
reached if labor was made to understand, through genuine 
collective bargaining with management, that their consisten 
wage demands and governmental granting of them, were in 
I 
reality creating more unemployment. 
Because of the general une~loyment problem and the 
seasonal fluctuat~ons, labor has resorted to various de-
vices to maintain employment. MOst of these have ha~ open 
government support which has also had a negative effect 
upon labor-management relations. 
Considered by management as one of the major problellll 
is the relatively few grounds on which the discharge of an 
unsatisfactory employee is permissible. This has not been 
due to limitation by law, but rather to interpretation of 
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o~ the law by the labor courts. Decree No. 798 o~ April 
13, 1938 "clearly defines ~ourt.een permissible causes for 
the discharge o~ workers ••• including such things as ~­
justi~ied absence ~rom work, ~raud or abuse o~ con~idence, 
ineptitude, negligence, habitual drunkenness, insubordina-
tion, continued voluntary slowdown, crimes against the 
. "177 I enterpr~se, etc.· t seelD.S that the law does provide 
a reasonable and ~le list for discharge. As a means of 
protection against unjusti~ied dismissal, appeals can be 
made to the labor courts where the burden of pro.,f rests 
with the employer~ · Since 1944, in many cases that appear 
justified, the court has ruled against management and ~oreec 
the re-hire of the worker. The ef~ea:t of this upon eoonomi 
development is to hamper the success~ul operation of any 
enterprise. In cases where reduced operations ·are necessar~ , 
the government· has granted the right o~ dismissal rather 
than see the total ruination o~ the industry due to high 
overhead. 
Other deviees used have b.Ben the ttmake work1' measure: 
o~ the government sueh as the decree of 1946 which required 
eighty per eent of all export sugar to be stored in ware-
houses prior to shipment. This act naturally meant the 
hiring of more employees. The dearee further provided that 
when it was not expedient to store the sugar that compen-
... 
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sation still must be paid. 
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The rear of mechanization causing a displacement 
or employees has resulted in labor holding to an anti-
mechanization policy. As has been stated previously, if 
many of Cuba's industries are to continue operating on a 
competitive level with producers in other nations, they 
will have to institute efficient production methods. The 
long-term effect of 1a bor' a policy could mean lowered pro-
ductivity and thus more unemployment. When machinery has 
-. 
been allowed nit is generally under the stipulation that 
the same number of workers be employed as were used under 
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the older· aild inefficient methods. n This policy, t c;>o,~ 
has caused production coats to remain high and has been- -
an important factor in spreading unemployment. This. was 
referred to in the discussion of the tobacco industry 
where labor's resistance to mechanization caused s.ev~re 
-~ -! 
decreases in tobacco exports due to high prices and fur~ 
ther caused unemployment. 
The government-supported labor policies have been 
able to exist in the post-war period because business has 
been able to prosper despite the hinderances• Because 
--
the psychological orientation of labor in regard to jobs 
is one of insecurity, they have taken advantage of the 
prosperity of 1944 to 195l to press their demands. The 
attitude of the government was to meet their demands 
~71 
mainly because labor as a group was desperately necessary 
to remain in power. The result or this, on the other hand, 
has been a derinite aversion to invest in constructive new 
ventures which would increase and diversiry production and 
employment. 
Thus, it can be concluded that labor's desire to 
increase employment opportunities has been rrustrated partl: 
by their own workings. Like inrlation this has started a 
vicious circle--because or the unemployment problem mabor 
has made many unjustirfed conditions which deter new in-
vestments and higher productivity which are the only way 
job opportunities will increase. Only by real attempts to 
settle their differences by collective bargaining can the 
problem be solved. Ir it should be necessary ror the 
government to intervene, it should act from a point or view 
or the economic welfare &r all eoncetned rather than short-
sighted political advantages. 
Some hope can be held ror the ruture as to the 
government's realizing the need for a more equitable policy 
For in September, 1951, when criticism by businessmen, 
newspapers and the public, or the government '_s appeasement 
or labihr reached a peak, the President announced a "new 
policy or firmness in handling labor's excesses.« He said, 
'"that for the most of Cuba r s workers ways and means or 
providing more jobs were relatively more important than 
2 
than was the need ~or higher wages.nlSo 
Social Security Legislation ~ Workers Covered: 
' . 
Throughout the world organized labor has strived ~or 
adequate social insurance programs. In Cuba great strides 
have been made toward providing adequate coverage. The 
bulk o~ Cuba's social legislation besides that dealing with 
the regulation o~ hours, wages, child labor and other 
things, has revolved around the establishing o~ insurance 
programs covering the ~ollowing: old-age, invalidity, 
survivors, maternity and workments compensation. 
Cuban social legislation, in regard to hours, en-
~orces the eight-hour day and a ~orty-~our-hour work week 
with double time ~or each hour over ~orty. Wages are regu-
lated by a minimum wage law which, as we have noted above, 
has been strictly en~oraed and consistently raised through-
out the post-war period. Workers are also guaranteed one 
monthts paid vacation annually. Any child labor laws 
establish the minimum working age at 14.
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While these regulations apply to all workers, the 
social insurance programs vary according to the group 
covered. This unequality between various groups is one 
o~ the main weaknesses o~ the social security system in 
Ouba. 
The largest group to be covered by social legislati 
is the s workers includ loyed in sugar 
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cultivation, processing, transportation, manufacture and 
trade, to the ex·clusion of officials, directors, and ad-
182 
ministrators who are owners or stookholders.n By the 
legislation of 1941 and 1948, the workers in the sugar 
industry are covered for old age, or retirement, invalidism 
and survivors insurance. 
The source of the funds for these insurances are 
per cent of employees earnings. three per cent of all wages 
and salaries paid by the employer and agricultural employer 
pay an additional four centavos per 2.500 pounds of ground 
sugar produced; and the government contributes the proceeds 
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of specified taxes. From this are paid old age pensions 
at fifty-five, after thirty years of contributing, or at 
sixty, after fifteen years of contributing,with the length 
of service computed from January 1928. Pensions are based 
on wages and are payable at the end of fifteen years servi 
in the following .manner: 
Olass I when basic salary is not more than 500 
pesos annually, the pension is thirty 
per cent of wages earned. 
Olass II covers the wage group earning 501 to 
1,000 pesos annually, and the pension 
is twenty-five per cent. 
Class III is 1,001 to 2,000 pesos annually, with 
a twenty per cent pension. 
Olass IV is 2,001 to 6,000 pesos annually and 
allows a fifteen per cent pension. 
To each group is added 1.5% of the basic wage for each yea 
174 
of service over fifteen and the total pension can not .veed 
47.5% of the basic wage. Invalid insurance is paid on the 
• 
same basis as old age, but is payable after three years of 
service. Survivors insurance is equal to 80 per cent of 
the pension paid or payable to the insured. Widows and 
children under twenty-one are entitled to the survivors in-
surance or it can go to parents, brothers and sisters if 
the insured was single.184 Benefits very similar to these 
were extended by Congress to workers in the fiber, textile 
and garment industries in 1945.185 
The administration of the Sugar Workerst Retirement 
.. ' 
Fund is by a Board of Directors on which· are six represen-
tatives of employees, six of employers and two government 
186 
appointees, the Chairman and the Treasurer. 
By legislat,ion in 1946, retirement, invalidity and 
survivors insurance was extended to workers in the cultiva-
tion, processing, transportation, manufacture and trade of 
tobacco. This law also excluded proprietors, directors and 
some managers. The source of the funds is a four per cent 
deducation from employees earnings, plus the sum equal to 
the first monthts wage increase and swm of the first 
monthly salary in the tobacco industry; four per cent of 
all wages and salaries paid by the employer; and a 600,000 
peso-grant annually by the government.l87 
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Old age pensions are paid a~&er ten years o~ con-
tribution and are based on a wage class as in the sugar 
industry. 
Class 
Class 
I those earning up to 500 pesos annually 
receive a ~i~ty per cent pension with 
additional payments ~or eve+Y year over 
ten to a maximum o~ seventy per cent. 
II {501 to 1,000 pesos annually) a twenty-
~ive per cent pension is paid with ad-
ditional payment ~or every year a~ter 
ten to a maximum o~ sixty-~ive per cent. 
Class III (1,001 to 2,000 pesos annually) a ~ifteen 
per cent pension is paid with additional 
payments ~or every year over ten to a 
maximum of sixty per cent. 
Class IV those earning over 2,000 pesos annually, 
the pension is ~i~teen per cent with 
additional benefits for each additional 
year u.p to fifty per cent. 
Invalidity is payable on the same basis as old age with 
a prerequisite of ten years service. Survivorts insurance 
is fifty per gent o~ the pension paid or· payable to the 
insured and is alloted to the widow and children to a 
. 
maximum of seventy per cent in the case o~ four or mare 
188 
children. 
These two groups illustrate some o~ the differentia-
tions that exist in the social security plans ~or various 
groups. Retirement plans including invalidity and survivor~ 
insurance have been put into effect in Cuba for almost all 
employees, including the governmental workers. 
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One o~ the oldest insurance programs in Ouba is the 
maternity insurance system which was established in 1934 
~or all employed persons with the exclusion o~ agricultural 
workers. In ;June 1951, this insurance was extended to thAm 
This program pays ~or the wages lost ~or twelve weeks (six 
be~ore and six a~ter birth} and varies ~rom 1.25 to ~our 
pesos daily, according to earnings. It also provides ~or 
medical, obstetrical and surgical care and hospitalization 
in maternity homes operated by the Board or by the Ministry 
or Health. The operating ~unds ~or this insurance are 
contributed at the rate o~ 0.25% of employees earnings, 
0.50% of the employerts payroll and proceeds of speoi~ied 
government levies.l89 
The other insurance program available to all Cuban 
workers except domestic servants and sel~-employed, is 
workments compensation. This is supported exclusively by 
the employer through a private insurance company or by 
assumption o~ the risk. This program is under the general 
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supervision o~ the Ministry of Labor. 
For temporary disability caused at the place o~ 
employment, payments are at the rate o~ fi:Cty per cent o~ 
wages lost ~or a maximum period of one year. I~ the dis-
ability is total and permanent, the pension equals two-
thirds of the wage and is increased to the total wage if 
a constant attendant is necessary. With partial disabilit~ 
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the pension is equal to fifty per~ent while in the case of 
death, the survivors are able to receive up to seventy per 
cent of earnings in the case of four or 3ore childrene 
Nedioal care, hospitalization, medicine and retraining are 
191 
provided for with complete payment of all costs. 
From this summary of Cuba's social legislation, we 
can conclude that labor has succeeded in obtaining in Cuba 
many social benefits that relieve some of the pressures 
on the worker brought about by old age, disability, mater-
nity and employment-caused illness. One major area that 
is not covered by insurance is unemployment which is un-
derstandable in view of the large unemployment caused by 
seasonal fluctuations and the lack of job opportunities. 
If sufficient funds were to be raised to establish unem-
ployment in Cuba, it is possible that the cost to the 
worker, employer and the government would doom it to fa 
from its start. 
Education 
The Centralized System: · 
The organization of Cubats public educational syst 
is highly centralized as all the public schools are operat 
by the Ministry of Education except for the six 
schools which are under the supervision of the Ministry of 
Agrieulture. The.hierarohy of supervision isJafter the 
17S 
Minister of Education, on the provincial level, with each 
province having one superintendent. The next division is 
the 126 municipios or counties each of which is a school 
district under the supervision of a school board consisting 
of three members selected by the provincial superintendent 
and appointed by the Ministry of Education.192 
The levels of schools operated by the government 
are the primary schools for Grades one to six, the ~dvanced 
primary schools for grades seven and eight or rural student , 
pre-vocational and agricUltural schools which are through 
nine. The next level of education is the institutes of 
secondary education which provices a five-year study course 
with the last one being devoted to specialization in either 
arts or sciences. For vocational training, normal schools, 
commercial schools, home economic schools and trade schools 
are available. The next highest level is the University 
of Eab.ana which is the only place in Cuba where a college 
degree can be earned.l93 
School Attendance ~ Educational Qgportunities: 
By law, school attendance is mandatory from age 
six to fourteen; but from Table 25, below, it is readily 
discernible that the percentage of children in school is 
really not in keeping with las as consistent decline in 
enrollment take place in primary schools as the gra~e 
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TABLE 25 
NUMBER OF PRIMARY SCHOOLS, CLASSROOMS AND PUPILS ENROLLED 
·IN :EACH GRADE FOR THE, SCHOOL YEAR 1949-50 
Item Urban Rural Total 
Classrooms 1 
Pupils Enitolled 
total for all 
Grades 394,619 172,460 567,079 
Kindergarten and 
pre-primary 50,011 580 59' 591 
Grade 1 102,563 77,807 180,370 
Grade 2 69,610 42,680 112,990 
Grade 3 54,897 25,735 80,632 
Grade 4 42,751 15,863 58,614 
Grade 5 30,850 7,148 37,998 
Grade 6 20,335 2,647 22,982 
Grade 7 9,750 9,750 
Grade 8 4,850 4,852 
• 
Of an estimated 1,118,184, primary school age childr 
only 567,079 are enrolled in schools or 50.7 per cent of 
which two-thirds is accounted for in the urban area.l94 
When this is compared with a sixty-three per cent enrollmen 
in 1925-26195 it can be concluded that as concerns primary 
schools, retrogression has occurred. Part of this decrease 
has been balanced by a large increase in the enrollment in 
privale schools where from 29,000 in 1925-26, to 90,000 in 
196 
1949-50. 
One reason for the growth of the private schools has 
' . 
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been the development of a general laek of oonfidence in 
public schools. The installation of the half-day session 
in the m930s due to inadequate facilities has been one ot 
the basic cuases for this lack of confidence. Besides the 
lack of space, the lack of adequately trained personnel, 
texts and other necessary articles are major reasons. A 
shortage of funds has been partly responsible, but poor 
administration of available resources is apparent when one 
takes into consideration the fact that expenditures have 
increased consistently in the post-war period and condit 
have not improved. 
In a 1950 report, Dr. Oiro Espinosa estimated the 
total enrollment in the.advanced primary schools and the 
secondary schools, including all vocational schools, at 
514~18pupmls. He also estimated the age group 13 to 18 
{the age group that would be enrolled in this level of edu-
cation) to be 615,000 which means that less than one in ten 
have the opportunity for seaondary education.197 it should 
be pointed out that a~ost no secondary educational op-
portunities exist ·in the rural area as the secondary schoo 
are mostly in towns and travel-to them is very difficult. 
Agrieultur.al Traihing Facilities and Rural Education: 
Education in the rural areas is one of the biggest 
problems facing Cuba today. We have noted above that of 
the total 
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accounted for in rural areas. Much of this in turn is ac-
counted for by lack of school buildings and personnel. 
Many rural areas have no schools and in 1948 when 628 schoo ~s 
were built in the rural sections, very few of them were 
placed in the appropriate locations which is another ex-
ample of poor administration. The lack of roads also pre-
vents many children from attending school, if one is avail-
able, as the means of arriving there are very laborious 
and time-consuming. 
Ob:baining teachers for the rural schools has been 
an important problem. Many of the teachers available in 
Cuba have refused to go into the rural areas because of 
the isolation. ~ny times, on the other hand, teachers 
that are appointed never report for duty but do continue 
to receive their salaries, since all teachers are appoin-
ted by the government for life and are entitled to ·their 
salaries whether actively engaged in teaching or not.198 
This factor places an inherent weakness in the school sys~ 
tem as too often teachers are appointed as political pat-
ronage. 
For those rural children fbitunate enough to obtain 
' 
a primary education, advanced primary schools are avail-
able, but, as pointed out above, only in tbe towns. And 
since transportation is not available at public expense, 
the opportunities are severly limited. Available, also 
.. 
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are the rural ch~ldren•s homes which are advanced primary 
schools. Throughout Cuba there. are thirty-nine of these 
schools with an average enrollment or thirtY., where at 
government expense, tuition, housing, food and clothing 
-
are provided. The cirricuium includes agricultural train-
... ·, 199 
ing as well as academic sUbJects. 
Also available, to those who oomplete five y~ars 
of primary education are the provincial agricultural 
schools, with one in each province. Here practical and · 
~~-
theoretical training in agriculture is given for three 
years at government expense for tuition, board, room and 
clothing. Admission is by competitive-examination and 
is restricted to farmerst sons only. 200 
The University of Habana provides for the college 
level of studies of agriculture through their School of 
Agronomic Engineering And Sugar. Here departments have 
been established in agriculture, chemistry, economics, 
engineering, ind·ustry· and sugar and. food processing. 201 
In all divisions, however, the emphasi~. :is placed on sugar 
which greatly limits the number of trained specialists 
that are available to contribute toward agricultural diver-
sification. 
. /· 
•' 
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Educational Opportunities Other Than Agricultural: 
For those persons able to get through the advanced 
primary schools, the opportunity to obtain vocational 
training is severely limited especially for those wanting 
to develop trades and mechanical abilities. In all of 
Cuba there are only four good polytechnic schools, or 
trade schools where training in mechanics, woodworking, 
printing, electrical trades, carpentry, construction and 
the like is available. Or these four schools, two were 
opened in 1945. These schools are government supported 
and pay tuition, room, board and clothing for the student. 
Admission is by competitive examination and the course is 
of three years duration. 202 
Other training schools for teaching, nursing, home 
economics, commercial business, and the arts are available 
in Cuba. Also, there are seven other trade schools where 
mechanical skills are taught but the great lack or ade-
quate equipment, tools, and teachers greatly limits their 
utility in training ~oung people. University level edu-
cation is available only at the University or Habana which 
as we have noticed in the previous chapter, is government-
supported. This University devotes most or its teaching 
to liberal arts, medicine, law and archicecture. A de-
rinite lack of scientific training that will provide chemis s, 
engineers and the like, only enlarges the total dericiency 
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of' the Cuban educational system to provide the necessary 
training to prepare the populace to be gainfully employed 
in a modern and complex society. 
If Ouba is to have economic development on a modern 
level, the educational system and opportunities throughout 
the island must be improved. Educational opportunities 
must be broadened if the populace is to cope with the in-
creasing complexities of modern production processes. In 
each advanced level of education, mare emphasis could be 
placed on technical training of' technicians, managers and 
other supervisory employees. ~st of the needed reform 
will have to come from governmental circles because of the 
centralization of the educational system. 
CONCLUSION 
Beyond the factual developments in Cuba during 
1944-1951, which have been presented in the body of this 
thesis, it is the underlying political, economic and social 
interrelationship. The question to be answered now is 
whether any changes in any one or any combination of these 
factors have improved the Cuban political, economic or 
social situation and institutions or make Cuba less vul-
nerable to the instabilities that have existed in each one 
of these areas separately, and as a whole, since Cuba be-
came an.independent Republic. 
The historical-political scene in Cuba has been one 
of turmoil. Throughout the colonial eaa, the desire for 
independence perpetrated political instability w1 th the 
frequent revolutionary attempts finally succeeding in 1898 
with the help of the United States. But the establishment 
of the Republic did not decrease the political m~tability 
as is evidenced by the interventions of the United States 
under the Platt Amendement, and the frequent fraudui.ent 
elections, dictatorships and revolutions later on. The 
political inconsistencies of the first twenty-five years 
of the Republic culminated with the brutal dictatorship 
of Machado who in turn was ousted by mass uprising which 
ultimately led to the establishment of a psuedo-democratic, 
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army-supported dictatorship under Batista. In 1944, a 
r.ree election brought democratic instituitions into the 
political scene. From this development came the appear-
ance of political stability which was disrupted by a 
coup d'etat in March 1952, led by Batista and supported by 
the army. 
But the political stability was in reality only a 
facade as is attested to by the fact that many times dur-
ing this period, realignment of political parties occurred. 
When the formation of new coalitions, which are for poli-
tical expediency and personal gain, is necessary to remain 
in power, it shows an inherent weakness in the political 
institutions of the country. ~t is important to consider 
the fact that the coalitions formed by both the government 
and the opposition, contained parties professing complete 
divergent principles. This is indeed a sign of political 
immaturity. And so, in appraising the political events of 
the past eight years, we see very little change from the 
historical pattern that brought about dictatorship and 
revolution. The cycle today is at the dictatorial level 
and what the next change in form will be is pure specula-
tion, but partially dependent upon the economic and social 
developments as well as the political. 
Historically, Cuba's productive energies had been 
devoted to producing goods Which were complementary to 
1$7 
was the producing o~ agricultural commodities, mainly su~a~ 
-
and tobacco, in exchange ~or the manu~actured goods o~ 
Spain; and domestic manufacturing was limited to those good~ 
not available from Spain. Basically, this pattern has 
continued up to the present time with Spain being replaced 
by the United States. 
Throughout the Twentiety Century Cuba has been sub-
ject to periods of prosperity ~ollowed by recession and/or 
depression. This has been caused by the growing importance 
of sugar in her internal and international economic posi• 
tion. Since the economy has been geared to the export o~ 
sugar, any ~luetuation in the world market has immediately 
shown itw e~rects on the leyel of domestic eeonomio activit • 
The typical vulnerability o~ the Cuban economy has there-
~ore persisted and to some extent beeome aggravated • 
.Uuring the war and the post-war years the sugar in ... 
dustry~s importance has been increasing despite concerted 
efforts to diversify production. That is, all attempts 
toward diversification, and thus greater stability have 
been overshadowed by the larger rate of growth of sugar 
production relative to all other commodities. Considering 
~he ~act that ninety-five per cent or sugar output is for 
export and that export is subject to the availability o~ 
external markets, liable to fluctuate, we can conclude that 
the economic instability of Cuba has beoome more intense. 
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Thus, although the sugar industry did bring prosp 
ity in recent years, the economic welfare of Cuba 
mains as vulnerable, if not more so, as it has in 
And it would appear that ,a major task of overhauling the 
whole economic set up would be necessary to provide Guba 
with more stable conditions. 
Political and economic instability have had a direct 
affect upon social developments in Ouba. The people have 
:suffered many hardships under dictatorship and revolution!t, 
and the standard of living has been dependent upon fluc-
tuations, referEed to above. with the ensuing great de-
privations. Logically, in times of recession the worker 
has been one of the first to suffer as decreased exports 
l~wer the level of economic activity which results in dec-
lining prociuc.tion and unemployment. This explains why the 
psychology of the V«:lrker in recent years has been to strive 
for all types of benefits and aevices to maintain their 
jobs when the economy is in decline. 
Under the prosperous era of the 1940s Cuban labor 
s pressed tor, and received through government assistance 
considerable benefits. But it shihuld be pointed out, 
ce again, that because of political instability successi 
overnments have tended to grant laborts demands, despite 
he fact that many of them were economically unfeasible. 
other words, labor's political backing to remain in 
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power has been a more important determinant than any other 
social or economic consideration. 
The political, economic and social weaknesses have 
a definite interrelationship. The rapid changes in govern-
ment have not allowed for the formulation and enforcement 
of the constructive policies to deal effectively with the 
economic problems. On the other hand, the political and 
social instabilities have been partially caused by the 
frequent economic fluctuations. It appears that reform 
of the economic system would be most efficacious in 
creating greater stability as it would develop increased 
security among the people which in turn would probably 
enforce the functioning of democratic institutions. 
... 
APPENDIX 
THE RETURN OF BATISTA 
The democratic prosess in Cuba came to an abrupt 
end on March 10, 1952, when ex~resident and Army General 
Fulgencio Batista, the political boss rrom 1933 to 1944, 
ousted President Pr{o Socarrls rrom otrice by an army-
< 
supported coup d'etat which was executed with extreme pre-
cision and a min~ of bloodshed. 
The overthrow occurred less than three months berore 
the scheduled June 1st, elections in which Batista was a 
candidate. From all indications at the time or the revolt, 
the government-supported candidate, Carlos Hevia, would 
win the election as the political alignment brought togethex 
all of Cuba •s parties but two, the Cuban Peoples Party 
which supported Roberto Agramonte and the United Action 
Party whose candidate was Batista. 
But despite this trend, in his radio broadcast on 
March 10, 1952, rrom Camp Colombia, Cuba's army headquarters 
''General Batista accused President Pr{o Socarrt(s or planning 
to create chaos by 'gang~ter•action in order to suspend 
the Presidential elections ••• and to establish a dictator-
ship on April 15. 11203 He said, "that he had been roreed 
to carry out the coup because of his 'love or the people 
and to reestablish public order' • • .'No one can accuse me 
• 
.-
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of a desire for revolution or ambition for power.' tr204 
... 
Without doubt Batista capitalized "on the growing criticism 
and resentment against the Px[o go~ernment for maladminisw 
tration, alleged misapp~opriation of funds, corruption, 
and a wave of political assasinations. • .tt205 
At the time of this writing, April, 1953, Batista 
remains in power even though at the time of the coup he 
uassured the people that the tnew government will be in 
power only the time required and then we shall have elec-
tions without pistoleros (gunmen} sowing terror in the 
Republic. ttt206 But the elections have not been held as 
yet, and in the past year, they have been postponed many 
t~s. They are now scheduled for June, 1954. 
It one were to judge the election postponment on 
the basis of Batistats own statement, above, one would 
think that nordettt has not yet returned to Cuba. But this 
is not the case. Thus, it appears that Batista's plan at 
the time of the revolt was to perpetuate himself or his 
henchmen in power for as long as possible • 
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ABSTRACT 
Following tour hundred years of Spanish rule, the 
political scene for the first twenty-five years of the 
Republic saw the Liberal and Conservative Parties battle 
for political pwwer. But no matter which party was in 
power, the corruption and graft remained. Within these 
years, Cuba also witnessed her largest economic boom fol-
lowed by her severest depression from which she did not 
recover until the 1940s. 
In 1925 with the election of Machado came a most 
brutal dictatorship which lasted until 1933, when popular 
uprisings and unofficial intervention by the United States 
forced him to resign. This was followed by a number of 
provisional governments, the last of which was overthrown 
by a military coup dt~tat let by Fulgencio Batista. 
Batista, with the backing of the army, controlled the po-
litical developments for eleven years with Batista, him-
self, occupying the Presidency from 1940 to 1944. ThroughM 
out this period Cuba was a psuedo-democratic country as 
elections were not free. 
In 1944, however, a free election was held. The 
organization of the two coalitions for this election was 
. ~ . 
for political expediency only as the Coalicion Socialista 
Demoeratica, the CSD, consisted of two -rightist parties, 
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the Liberal and Democratic Parties, and the two leftist 
parties, the ABC and the Popular Socialists {Communists). 
The other coalition under the leadership of Ram6n Srau 
/ 
San Martin also consisted o~ rightest and leftist parties, 
the Republican Party and the Autentic Cuban Revolutionary 
Party, PRC(A), respectively. This alliance which campaignE[ 
on the issues of graft and corr~tion under Batista and 
the need for political, economic and social reforms, won 
the Presidential election. But a government majority in 
Congress was not had until 1946, when the ABC and the 
Communists became part of the government coalition. 
In 1948, the Republican-Autentic Alliance candidate, 
Carlos Prio Socarras, was elected to the Presidency mainly 
because the opposition was unable to unite to form an ef-
fective coalition. However, in this election the Cuban 
Peoples Party formed i~ 1947, by a dissident PRO(A) group 
/ -
led by Euardo Chibas, actively challenged the "revmlu-
tionary" and reform position of the PRC{A), claiming that 
under Grau San Mart{n no constructive progress was made. 
A further schism developed in the PRO(A) in 1949, 
~ 
when Grau left the Party because Prio had allowed the 
courts to indict him for malfeasance of public funds. The 
government was further weakened when a large segment of the 
»epublican Party deserted to form the National Cuban Party. 
This Party, the Grau dissidents and the United Action Party 
--1 
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led by Batista, effectively united in 1950 to win the 
~yoralty mf Habana, the second highest political position 
By the end of 1951, however, all the parties e~e~pt the 
United Action Party and the Cuban Peoples Party rejoined 
the government bloc which seemed to assure victory for 
them in the 1952 elections. But in March, 1952, an army-
/ 
supported coup d•etat led by Batista ousted Prio and the 
coalition. 
Since 1900, the backbone of the economy has been 
the production and export of sugar which has made Cuba 
subject to the fluctuations of world trade. During years 
of World War IIt under stimulation of the wartime require-
ments of the United States, the sugar industry expanded. 
After the war this growth continued despite the develop- . 
ment of marketing problems from 1948 on. But above-quota 
purchases by the United States and increased sales to 
Europe each year bailed out the industry and thus the 
economy as the level of industrial and commercial activity 
is regulated by the prosperity of the sugar industry. 
Because of this growth of the sugar industry and increased 
reliance upon world markets, the economy has become more 
unstable. 
The other export-oriented activities in Cuba, the 
tobacco, mining and fruit and vegetable industries, also 
expanded during the war years. But this was followed by 
2~0 
immediate contraction when the war demand ceased and thus 
made sugar a more important factor in Oubats foreign trade 
and economy. 
The manufacturing industries remained on a relati 
high level of activity from 1944-~95~, because 
purchasing power of most Cubans. But the high production 
cost industries which have not been able to compete effec-
tively with producers in other nations have had to be sub-
sidized and given strong tariff protection. In 1945, a 
concerted effort by the government to enhance industrial 
development and thus create greater economic stability, 
to the issuance of various decrees which granted libera~ 
tariff and tax concessions to new industries. By 1951, 
fifty new industries were operating under these benefits, 
but their rate of growth was overshad6wed by a larger 
in the sugar industry, making their importance as a diver-
sifying factor less important. 
In Cubats foreign trade, sugar exports have grown 
and accounted for ninety per cent of total export value. 
In imports, the importance of foodstuffs has been 
decreased as the proportion of total import value account 
for by raw materials and machinery increased. The United 
States importance as a customer has declined with Europe's 
importance increasing. But the sources of Cuban imports 
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has not paralleled this change and may mean the loss of the 
European market due to hard currency shortages there. 
through wise commercial policies can this imbalance be 
corrected. 
Mainly as result of vast sugar exports, large bal s 
of payments surpluses developed w~ich were the major cause 
for an e50% expansion in the money supply from 1939 tq 
1950. Because of conservative bank loan policies and no 
' deficit financing by the government, credit played a minor 
role in money expansion. The expansion of the circulating 
media was the factor responsible for the creation of an 
inflationary problem which was aggravated by the wage-price 
spiral. 
In the field of banking, credit during the war years 
was highly restricted. A limited expansion occurred in 
the post-war period to meet greater credit needs of the 
commercial and sugar activities. Because credit faeilities 
were not available to the small farmer or industry, the 
government in 1950j established the Bank of Agricultural 
and Industrial Credit. 
Because of the unwillingness of the foreign banks 
to handle the increased banking needs, the Cuban-owned 
banks have expanded. The establishment of the National 
Bank of Cuba in 1950 has made the expansion of the Cuban-
owned banks more secure as it provides them with a lender 
. . 
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With greater economic activity the government re-
venues have increased as the yield rrom ~port, sales, 
profit and other taxes has increased. Since 1946, total 
re:tenue has exceeded 200 million pesos annually but the 
rising expenditures left no surpluses. 
The Cuban national debt has become mainly internal 
as two bond issues rloated in 1949 and 1950 were disposed 
of within the country. This is a most ravorable develop-
ment as no pressure is placed on future foreign reserves. 
But a problem does exist with a 70,000,000 peso rloating 
debt or unpaid government obligations which are not bonded 
or covered by budget allowance. 
The major social developments have been the granting 
of laborts wage and job security demands by the gover~ent 
to maintab their political support at the expense of 
higher production costs. Educationally, the country has 
retrogressed as evidenced by decreasing enrollments and 
lack of educational opportunities, especially in the rural 
areas and on the higher levels of education. It Cuba is 
to have a dynamic society, capable of meeting the complexi-
ties of economic development, her educational system and 
opportunities will have to be improved. 
- - ' 
In general, the instabilities t;h~t existed in Cuba 
before World War II have not been decreased by the prosper 
but in some ways have become 
welfare of the island. 
